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This book provides a complete overview of political parties in
France. The social and ideological profiles of all the major parties
are analysed chapter by chapter, highlighting their principal
functions and dynamics within the system. This examination is
complemented by analyses of bloc and system features, including
the pluralist left, Europe, and the ideological space in which the
parties operate. In particular, the book addresses the impressive
capacity of French parties and their leaders to adapt themselves to
the changing concerns of their electorates and to a shifting
institutional context. Contrary to the apparently fragmentary
system and increasingly hostile clashes between political
personalities, the continuities in the French political system seem
destined to persist.
Drawing on the expertise of its French and British contributors, The
French party system forms a benchmark study of the state of party
politics in France. It will be an essential text for all students of
French politics and parties, and of interest to students of European
politics more generally.
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Introduction
Jocelyn A. J. Evans
The French party system Introduction
In the more recent literature on European party systems, emphasis has
been placed squarely upon the notion that the overall cross-national
trend is one of convergence and, by extension, stabilisation. Where new
parties have appeared, they tend to have been absorbed into existing
structures and very few have actually superseded older parties. Increas-
ingly, European systems which had stretched from the two-party system
of Britain to the polarised pluralism of Italy are coming to resemble
each other. Whether or not the premises for such a hypothesis are
accurate, the French case at first glance shows few signs of conforming
to such a model. In 2002, the French party system seems to be demon-
strating a fluidity, if not outright instability, equal to any period in the
Fifth Republic’s history. The question this book aims to answer is: to
what extent does this represent outright change and to what extent shifts
within a stable structure?
Looking at the supposed format of the system before the presidential
elections of this year, the key elements were a plural but essentially
cohesive governing left, and a hopelessly divided right. By the end of
the presidential elections, commentators were speaking of a hopelessly
divided left and a newly cohesive right, a state of affairs confirmed and
reinforced by the legislative election outcome in June. Granted, the
cohesion of the left had always been suspect – largely the outcome of
elite compromise and in particular the leadership of its Prime Minister,
Lionel Jospin. Similarly, the right’s fragmentation, although conforming
to certain ideological differences, was always due more to personality
clashes within and between parties than to any gulf of doctrinal incom-
patibility. However, the interaction between certain conjunctural events
in the pre-electoral period and key institutional changes also pre-dating
the elections combined to rebalance the party system in terms of its
components if not in terms of its overall structure.
Moving from left to right, a previously governing Communist Party
which had seemingly survived the post-1990 collapse of many of its sister
parties clung on with 4.8 per cent of the first-round vote and 21 deputies
1
to form its own parliamentary group with little to spare. The previously
governing Socialist Party saw its vote drop only by a relatively small
margin, but the two-ballot system and relative absence of three-way
run-offs – the famous triangulaires of 1997 – returned a paltry number
of seats as a result. The Green Party remained on the fringes of the
mainstream and of electoral success, unable to provide a credible alter-
native on its own, but hampered by its travelling on the Socialists’
coat-tails. The Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), once the
presidential federation, had now been relegated to 5 per cent of the vote
and only just able to secure enough deputies for its own parliamentary
group.1 The Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) and Démocratie
Libérale (DL) (plus two-thirds of the UDF), brought together under the
banner of the Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle (UMP), formed the
first right-wing party in France able to unite the right in a manner similar
to its Gaullist predecessors of forty years earlier. Finally, the extreme
right still loitered menacingly on the margins of the right with one in
ten votes, but was incapable of winning a single parliamentary seat, even
with the apparently immense political capital of its candidate having
reached the second round of the presidential elections.2
The presidential element had a larger effect than normal on the
legislative elections both for timetabling and constitutional reasons. Per-
haps most importantly, the inversion of the electoral calendar to put the
presidential elections first meant that no party wanting to run an effective
electoral campaign could avoid fielding a presidential candidate. Quite
simply, because of the presidential priority and its outcome, there was
no legislative campaign to speak of. Sixteen candidates in the presidential
first round indicated that few parties were ignorant of this logic, but in
the process so fragmented the vote that, at least for the left, the starting
line-up proved catastrophic.3 Second, the recent reduction of the presiden-
tial term from seven years to five, partly as an obstacle to another period
of cohabitation deadlock and partly as a rationalisation of an excessively
long executive incumbency, has pulled the presidential candidates and
their respective parties closer together. The effect of the five-year simul-
taneous mandates in terms of power distribution between president and
governing parties is as yet unclear – what is clear, however, is that the
tightening of the two executive branches helped to ensure the moderate
right’s effective unity and consequently its clear margin of victory.
However, despite the importance of these elections – indeed, all
elections – in providing a benchmark for assessing the systemic array,
the election results per se should not be looked at in isolation. Such
changes are to be regarded as at least partly the result of shifts which
have occurred in the French party system over recent years, and not
simply the outcome of a combination of conjunctural effects and math-
ematical quirks. To address these, this book assesses the context to the
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current situation and the extent to which the array we find today is in
keeping with the changes in the system and the players within it in recent
years. The contributors concentrate principally on the period subsequent
to the quadrille bipolaire – the four-party, two-bloc array vaunted as the
French ideal type in the semi-presidential two-ballot majoritarian system
– which is largely held to have ‘peaked’ in 1978, and begun its ‘descent’
very soon afterwards.
The changes since 1978 have been principally conjunctural rather than
structural. The main feature at legislative elections since the final follow-on
victory of the right in that year has been alternation. Held up as a dynamic
to which to aspire by proponents of an Anglo-Saxon remodelling of the
system, this has been taken to extremes which had probably not been
envisaged. Simply, neither bloc has been able to retain incumbency since
that date – six changes of governing bloc in six elections over a little
under one-quarter of a century. At the mass level, this hyper-alternance 4
has had the greatest systemic effect, giving voters little to decide upon
when making their electoral choice. For many voters, each side having
had three periods in government and none having been seen as particu-
larly successful, all mainstream parties look as bad as each other. When
adding to this the periods of cohabitation where one has often been hard
pressed to tell the two sides apart, Le Pen’s parody of the left and right
as blanc bonnet, bonnet blanc seemingly has some foundation. However,
even a rapid succession of swings of the electoral pendulum does not
equate to party system change per se: re-equilibration has largely occurred
between two stable blocs, one each side of the centre. The unoccupied
centre and the floating voters of a Downsian logic have consequently
remained deciding elements to elections since 1978, conditioned by the
level of turnout and fragmentation within electoral blocs.
Newer smaller parties, who conversely do represent potential structural
change if relevant within the system, have also been affected by this logic.
The Greens could only hope to win a small proportion of the electorate,
namely the committed environmentalist voters, if they attempted to
remain faithful to their ‘neither left nor right’ stance of the 1980s.
Similarly, Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s attempt to play a similar ‘off the
spectrum’ republican card in the 2002 presidential elections led to
disastrous results in both the presidential and legislative elections. In the
former case, however, the decision to implant themselves firmly on the
left reaped electoral rewards and a position in government. The other
major player to reject the two-bloc labels was the Front National (FN).
In terms of votes, this party was much more successful, winning 15 per
cent at its legislative peak in 1997. Similarly, its pouvoir de nuisance allowed
it to cause the moderate right severe problems in constituencies where
it managed to advance to the second round together with the anticipated
left and moderate-right run-off candidates. However, in representative
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and governing terms, again the two-bloc system prevented it from ever
winning more than a single deputy at any one time.5
Lastly, the ‘empty centre’ of the two-bloc system rejected any attempt
to fill it with a cross-bloc alliance – for instance, the failed attempt of
Michel Rocard to include the Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (CDS)
segment of the UDF in the minority Socialist government between 1988
and 1993. The left–right logic remained and remains inexorable, at least
at the national level and in the mainstream. At the sub-national level,
in the second-order European elections, and as Alistair Cole notes in the
opening chapter of this volume, ‘on the margins’ – the extremes and,
at the mass level, among the disenfranchised, disenchanted pool of voters
who are casting protest votes or abstaining in apparently ever-greater
quantities – a different set of circumstances pertain, given the differing
electoral systems and a separate set of stakes. There, the moderate right
has not been entirely cut off from the extreme right, illustrated in
particular by the ill-fated compromise by four UDF regional presidents
to rely upon FN support in their councils in order to ensure incumbency.
Moreover, there is greater scope for compromise within the mainstream
in local councils than at the national level. As Jean-Luc Parodi has termed
it, this ‘electoral accordion’, whereby the party systems at the different
electoral levels expand and contract according to the rules of the game
and the political context more generally, should have some knock-on
effect at the national level – when the accordion opens, it does not close
again in exactly the same fashion (Parodi, 1997).
The voters choosing the extremist candidates or not voting at all
compound these distorting effects by effectively rejecting the rules of the
game. Survey after survey reveal numerous voters decrying left and right
as anachronistic and the parties which place themselves in these terms
as atrophied. A large proportion of the electorate in the presidential
election demonstrated their disenchantment by voting for electorally
hopeless candidates – le vote inutile. Useless, that is, except in terms of
demonstrating to the mainstream that they could not necessarily rely on
their vote and that, as a result, some of them might not reach the second
round. Yet, this dynamic did not reproduce itself at the legislative
elections, at least not in terms of those who voted (abstention set a new
record). Despite an unprecedented 8,444 candidates in the first round,
the actual changes in vote were relatively sober. Small parties failed, the
mainstream hegemons remained or were resurrected, and le vote utile
resurfaced. The latent extremist pool remains, however, as a potent
source of future change.
The threat of change being replaced by politics as normal has not
been restricted to the margins, however. For instance, the area upon
which perhaps clear ideological differences have been most apparent –
Europe – between the members of the moderate right led to the UDF
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and RPR–DL presenting separate lists at the 1999 European elections.
Invoking the electoral accordion once more, one might expect this schism
to have some effect on coalition-building at the national level in 2002.
And in fact, if we look at the first-round legislative ballots, the UDF
precisely would not present single candidates with the RPR. However,
this dynamic of rupture was confounded by the formation of the UMP
in the aftermath of the presidential first round. Thus, the fragmentation
of the moderate right alluded to at the beginning of this chapter has at
a stroke been almost eliminated. A split right no longer matters because
the redistribution of votes between the two sections is sufficiently skewed
to make one almost irrelevant. The major forces for change are thus
less a mutation of the structural pattern to the system and more the
shifts of power within essentially stable structures.6
The above elements are a synthesis of the principal areas covered by
the authors in the chapters which follow. Perhaps the most important
element discussed is that of the cyclical shift in the balance of power
towards the left and then back to the right between the mid-1990s and
today. In this respect, David Bell’s chapter on the Parti Communiste
Français (PCF) and Bruno Villalba and Sylvie Vieillard-Coffre’s chapter
on the Greens present the combination of strategic incentive and ideo-
logical disincentive that these parties have encountered in their role as
props for the Socialist Party’s government. The 1997 victory relied upon
the Parti Socialiste (PS) presenting itself as a less arrogant party than it
had been in the 1980s, and for this reason as well as for reasons of
legislative necessity, it opened up to its ‘extreme’ and ‘new’ left flanks.
The flanks have suffered as a result, partly due to their partners, partly
due to their own failings. However, as Ben Clift notes, the success of
Jospin in winning control of the PS in the mid-1990s despite competing
factions within the party was not matched by an ability to ensure that
similar cohesion extended in the long term to these two partners. The
mutual intra-coalition sniping, the inability of the PCF to maintain an
independent electoral following concomitant with a position of relevance
and the Greens’ almost pathological desire to assert autonomy from the
Socialists have all contributed to the electoral defeat of 2002.
David Hanley’s assessment of the years preceding this show the pre-
cariousness of the plural left entering the electoral campaign period,
even when faced with the fragmented right and an apparently discredited
president. Elite compromise may hold a governing coalition together,
but at election time such coalitions demand more than just a consensus
– which the gauche plurielle failed singularly to present anyway – among
leaders. When such consensus is often absent on constitutional matters
such as Corsica and on key aspects of economic and social policy, even
the relative merits of the gauche plurielle’s incumbency can soon be
overshadowed by negative elements. The PS’s approach may have been
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both strategic and worthy in equal measures, but the remaining contra-
dictions cost the left dear, providing division at the presidentials and no
subsequent basis for cohesion at the legislatives.
Moreover, such a lack of cohesion is not restricted to the elite level
on the left. One of the two key questions asked in the chapter by Robert
Andersen and Jocelyn Evans is: to what extent is there evidence of greater
mass ideological cohesion on the left in 1997 than previously? The answer
is ‘none’. Granted, the gauche plurielle was at the beginning rather than
the end of its relatively short life in 1997, but the ability of the parties
to compete and to form a government might suggest some antecedent
convergence. Until similar data become available for 2002, we can only
speculate as to the extent to which convergence during the gauche plurielle’s
reign occurred – but the speculation is still ‘not at all’. In terms of
competitive space, there have simply been too many voices on the left.
Now many of them have been marginalised, but this does not solve the
mainstream left’s problems – now who can the Socialists reasonably ally
themselves with to oppose the newly unified right? The success of
returning to the same PCF–Parti Radical de Gauche (PRG)–Green trio
– Chevènement’s Pôle Républicain (PRep) being a terminally chastened
force – is not assured of success, despite perhaps being inevitable.
Nevertheless, as is often the case in democratic competition, one side
only does well because the other side is doing badly. Success is relative
although in electoral terms the outcome is absolute. In the French case,
the right seems to be victorious and cohesive only now that the left is
in disarray, and thus we should perhaps not be too certain that the
right’s troubles are a thing of the past. The front républicain to oppose
Le Pen’s second-round candidature and Jacques Chirac’s subsequent call
for a presidential majority party all build upon the conjunctural elements
which we have already highlighted, but they are in no way based upon
any amicable resolution of personality clashes within the right. Nor have
the parties suddenly resolved policy differences – these remain in some
areas, and in others have been resolved gradually over many years. Chirac
has simply found a context allowing him to assert almost total dominance
over the moderate right, at least in the short term.7
As Andrew Knapp’s chapter on the RPR and its presidential successor
shows, the interference of the president in his own party has been a
common and not altogether welcome aspect of his first incumbency. The
clashes in particular with Philippe Séguin, former General Secretary of
the RPR, led to perceptions of considerable party disunity during the late
1990s. The latter’s departure in 1999 may have led to greater Chiraquian
unity within the party, but it did nothing to alleviate tensions with the
UDF. Nicolas Sauger’s chapter illustrates the way in which the departure
of DL in May of the previous year deprived the UDF of one of its more
proximate elements to the RPR. Consequently, DL’s acceptance of the
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UMP has left the UDF isolated between the unified moderate right and
the chasm of the centre. Its future appears unsure, to say the least.
As we have noted, the shifts in the system have not been exclusively
focused upon the shift in the balance of power between left and right
governing blocs. One of the specificities of the recent period in French
party development has been the rise of the extremes, most notably the
extreme right but also the continued presence of the extreme left. Both
have proved more successful at presidential elections, suggesting that
personality may play a substantial independent role in vote preference
at this election. Whatever the reasons, however, the success of the extreme
left has been a perhaps surprising corollary to the decline of the moderate
left. Jim Wolfreys emphasises, however, that the success of the extreme
left has been as much through alternative action – the social movements
and protest which reappeared in the mid-1990s – as through the ballot
box. Arlette Laguiller and Olivier Besancenot can thus mobilise support
in the single national constituency in a way that their parties, groupuscular
in their constituency support, cannot.
Conversely, the right extremists’ support has implanted itself precisely
at the regional level and consequently built up to a national level allowing
over 10 per cent of the vote consistently since the mid-1980s. The success
in the 2002 presidential elections was based upon the core support that
the party has relied upon from its earliest days – older voters in the
Midi and Eastern regions, supplemented by the industrial areas of the
North and Parisian belt. The party which subsequent to Bruno Mégret’s
departure to form the Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) in 1999
had been declared dead still finds a stable electoral pool upon which to
draw. Gilles Ivaldi’s contribution implies that the relative failure of the
party at the second round of the presidentials and at the legislative
elections after its leader’s success in the presidential first round may
mark a zenith in its success. However, there is still undoubtedly a large
pool of voters who are positioned in such a way in French political space
as to be receptive to this party’s political supply.
The status of this pool is somewhat unclear – certain authors have
granted it ‘separate status’ as a new bloc within the French system; others
prefer to see it as an extreme flank, but still part of the right. Andersen
and Evans favour the latter interpretation, arguing that the extreme right
does represent the radical side of the right bloc in ideological terms,
and has done since the 1980s. In some ways, the social composition
may be different to that of the moderate-right bloc, but the definition
of voting blocs by social composition alone seems somewhat circular
as an argument – and in ideological terms, there is no evidence that
the moderate and extreme-right bloc do not share similar ideological
positions, differing only in intensity.
Though perhaps unwelcome to the moderate right, this emphasises
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that the differences between them and the extreme right are no more
exacerbated in many ways than the differences between the moderate left
and the extreme left (if socially less acceptable for many). In overall
systemic terms, then, there appears to be remarkable stability in the bloc
balance between left and right and between the elections of 1997 and
2002. Electoral flows are apparent in 2002, but these have principally
occurred between the presidential and legislative ballots – from extreme
left to moderate left; and from extreme right to moderate right. Given
the landslide victory of the moderate right, some shifts from moderate
left to moderate right are also likely. In many ways, this seems to
correspond quite closely to the expected cyclical changes one finds in
stable party systems – intra-bloc shifts and competition for the centre
‘floating’ voter. But one should not ignore that the extremes remain
strong on the right, and have shown evidence of a pool of potential
support on the left, even if this has so far been restricted to the presidential
ballot.
A very similar conclusion is reached by Alistair Cole, who chooses to
give the system the status of ‘artificial bipolar multipartism’. In other
words, the stresses between the parties and their leaders pull towards
increased fragmentation within the system, but the institutional framework
continues to force this into the two-bloc logic. Given consistently rising
levels of abstention among voters turned off by the choice ‘imposed’ by
the current institutional framework, revisions to this framework are likely
to go beyond the changes in presidential incumbency to date. Commen-
tators continue to talk of the formulation of a Sixth Republic, although
whether this indicates full regime change or simply a substantial amend-
ment of the Fifth Republic is unclear. Furthermore, the ardour of
incumbents to change a system which has brought them to power is
always dampened by incumbency itself. The extent of institutional and
constitutional change remains to be seen.
However, the form that such changes take are crucial to the future
dynamics of the system. Calls for the introduction of proportionality to
the legislative elections would favour smaller parties and increased frag-
mentation of the system. This may mean that the party tensions finally
produce significant structural change once released from their current
institutional constraints. Concomitantly, the European ‘issue’ dealt with
by Jocelyn Evans also suffers from institutional binding and may turn
out to be a future element to party system restructuring, as well as
representing a separate arena with which the domestic party system has
little interlinkage. To reiterate, however: the shifts which have occurred
since the quadrille bipolaire seem to have taken place within largely stable
structures.
We will return to shifts across time in the system in the conclusion,
contenting ourselves for now with a couple of elementary observations
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with which to introduce the authors’ contributions. First, the hybrid status
of the system – bipolar logic plus a certain level of latent polarisation –
satisfies the Downsian model of an unoccupied centre and floating voters
deciding the outcome to a certain extent; but the polarisation implies
that fewer voters are to be found in the centre, many moving to more
extremist candidates when the context is favourable. In this light, many
of the chapters emphasise that while the parties themselves may lack the
ideological keenness that we are told once characterised political parties,
the electorate still wants to see such definition. While there may be the
contented voter in the middle ground looking to sustain the status quo,
this type is less prevalent than in other European systems. Parties can
mobilise their electorates if they are able to take a clear stance on issues,
and credibly so.
Second, and linked to this, the chapters on the mainstream parties all
allude to the machinations that elites go through not only in their
jockeying for individual influence within a party or a coalition, but also
to be in a position to mobilise the electorates. Yet time and again, the
elite manoeuvring hinders this aim, either because the electorate perceives
this as elites putting their own careers before their representative function,
and hence the electorate is turned away; or simply because the machi-
nations fail, either due to internal intransigence or external pressures,
and hence the electorate remains unmobilised. Two examples of this are
well placed to conclude this introduction. First, the Socialists and the
gauche plurielle – an electoral alliance designed from the vantage of
opposition to encompass the various strands on the left and provide an
electoral majority succeeded; but the same alliance in government sin-
gularly failed to back the supposed presidential candidate of the left or
to secure its own return to power because elite manoeuvring could not
disguise ideological dissent, and indeed often pandered to it. Second,
the newly cohesive right and the UMP – parties seemingly destined to
remain fragmented despite the best intentions of some elites – suddenly
found themselves drawn inexorably together by the presidential frame-
work and the need for cohesion in the face of an extremist threat, and
consequently for many voters came to represent a credible governing
alternative characterised by unity and effectiveness.
It is precisely such interactions between parties, electorates and the
institutional framework – the supply and demand in the electoral market
– that produce the outcomes which mould the party system. The chapters
which follow will look at these three elements and their effects on each
other in order to better understand the state that the French system
finds itself in at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
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Notes
1 With 22 seats won at the second round of the legislative elections, François
Bayrou the UDF leader was confident that a number of former UDF deputies
who had decamped to the UMP would return to the UDF parliamentary
group. At the time of writing (summer 2002) the parliamentary group only
numbered 29.
2 His stock was reduced somewhat by his crushing defeat in the second round
of election, however.
3 The only main parties not to field their own presidential candidates were
the MPF and the RPF – Philippe de Villiers was absent from the beginning,
and Charles Pasqua withdrew his candidacy shortly after the beginning of
the campaign.
4 A term coined in Evans and Ivaldi (2002).
5 Except for the 1986–88 period when the party won 35 deputies due to the
proportional representation electoral system preceding this legislative term.
6 Remaining with the European theme, the transfer of power away from the
domestic system is surely also a potentially influential restructuring factor.
The effects on the domestic party system, as Chapter 10 shows, have to date
been minimal, however; effects on policy-making, particularly in the economic
sphere, have been much greater, but are evidently outside the remit of this
book.
7 All 2002 post-election conferences have debated whether Chirac’s destruction
of his competitors on the right parallels a silent assassin or an accomplished
demolition derby driver. No firm conclusion has yet been reached.
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Stress, strain and stability in the
French party system
Alistair Cole
The French party system Stress and stability
Introduction
Political parties do not find a natural breeding ground in France.
Portrayals of French political culture point to incivisme, individualism and
a distrust of organisations (Crozier, 1970, Pitts, 1981, Gaffney and
Kolinsky, 1991). Though these representations are overly impressionistic,
a powerful strand of French republicanism has denigrated political parties
as divisive, fractious organisations. This is best exemplified by the Gaullist
tradition, within which the political movement facilitates a direct rela-
tionship between the providential leader and the nation, but does not
presume to intervene in this privileged relationship. The distrust of
parties is deeply embedded in the ideology of the republican state itself,
where the state represents the general will, superior to the particularistic
interests represented by parties, groups and regions. There is no natural
sympathy for doctrines such as pluralism which emphasise the importance
of the corps intermédiaires between the citizen and the state.
At the same time, French political parties perform such essential
functions as political mobilisation, the aggregation of interests, organising
political competition, feedback, public management and political recruit-
ment. Our aim in this chapter is to give an overview of the evolution of
the French party system in the first forty-five years of the Fifth Republic,
to examine the principal changes since the 1980s and to identify the
underlying continuities in the party system.
The structure and evolution of the French party system
The history of French parties prior to 1940 was one of fragmentation
and regional specialisation. A complex mosaic of political factions existed
during the Third Republic. On the centre and right of the political
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spectrum, party labels either did not exist, or signified distinct political
realities in different parts of the country. More centralised, coherent and
disciplined parties gradually began to emerge after 1945 – in the form
of the Christian democratic Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP)
and de Gaulle’s ephemeral Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF) –
but such parties were undermined by their internal divisions and by the
corrosive effects of the Fourth Republican political environment. The
situation was clearer on the left: since the Tours split in 1920, there had
existed two well-organised rival parties, the Section Française de l’Inter-
nationale Ouvrière (SFIO) (PS from 1969) and the PCF. Historically
speaking, these fraternal enemies of the left have experienced a relation-
ship based on mutual distrust: long periods of internecine conflict and
rivalry have been punctuated by much shorter episodes of left unity (the
tripartite government of 1944–47, the ‘Union of the Left’ of 1972–77,
the Mauroy government from 1981 to 1984 and the plural-left government
from 1997 to 2002).
During the Third and Fourth Republics, the fragmented structure of
the party system, along with the parliamentary basis of political power,
had a direct and divisive impact upon governmental stability: no single
party or coalition of parties could normally gather a lasting majority of
support either within the country, or within Parliament to sustain ma-
joritarian governments. Cabinets lasted an average of twelve months in
the Third Republic, and seven months in the Fourth (Williams, 1964).
This pattern changed abruptly with the creation of the Fifth Republic.
After an initial period of confusion from 1958 to 1962 linked to the
consolidation of de Gaulle’s leadership, the party system became simpli-
fied between the 1960s and early 1980s on account of the bipolarisation
process, streamlining parties into two rival coalitions of the left and the
right. Beginning in earnest in 1962, the height of bipolarisation occurred
in the 1978 parliamentary election. The structure of the party system in
1978 was that of a bipolar quadrille. Four parties of roughly equal political
strength together obtained over 90 per cent of the vote and divided
voter preferences evenly between the PCF and the PS in the left coalition,
and the neo-Gaullist RPR and the liberal conservative UDF on the right.
There are several explanations for this process of rationalisation. The
first relates to the institutional rules of the game. From this perspective,
the enhanced prestige of the presidency as modelled by de Gaulle between
1958 and 1969, the bipolarising pressures of the direct election of the
president after 1962 – only two candidates go through to the decisive
second ballot – and the strengthening of executive government in the
constitution of the Fifth Republic all operated in favour of a rationalised
party system. The institutional argument emphasises the emergence of
the presidency as the linchpin of the political system from 1958 to 1986
(Wright, 1989). Consequently, the key contenders for office gradually
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refocused their attentions upon the presidential election: to exercise
influence, parties had to form part of rival presidential coalitions. The
existence of disciplined, pro-presidential coalitions controlling the Na-
tional Assembly for most of the period since 1958 was in stark contrast
to the Fourth Republic, where governments were short-lived and multi-
farious, usually based on unstable coalitions and shifting party alliances.
Until 1986, parliamentary majorities were elected to support the Presi-
dent. At the time of writing in the summer of 2002, the argument remains
pertinent that the institutional architecture of the Fifth Republic and
rules of the game favour a bipolarised party system, as we shall see later
on when we briefly consider the 2002 elections. In historical terms, these
institutional factors were even more important. With the emergence of
strong, stable governments encouraged by the 1958 constitution, parties
were deprived of their former capacity for Byzantine political manoeuvre
in an Assembly-dominated regime.
A separate but related institutional argument highlights the role of
the two-ballot electoral system in parliamentary elections (Bartolini, 1984).
By its discriminatory effects against smaller parties, the two-ballot system
forced the centre parties to choose between the Gaullist-led majority and
the left in order to survive. The two-ballot system also provided powerful
incentives for ideologically neighbouring parties, such as the PCF and
PS, to form alliances, and it stalled minor parties, such as the Greens
or the FN, at important stages of their development. While the discrimi-
nating effects of the majoritarian system are obvious, the electoral system
has not in itself prevented the emergence of new parties. Electoral systems
can operate in variable manners according to underlying political cir-
cumstances. While the two-ballot system has penalised centre parties for
most of the Fifth Republic, it strengthened centre parties in the Third
Republic (Goldey, in Bogdanor and Butler, 1982). One must also therefore
bear in mind specifically political factors, most notably: the political
leadership of de Gaulle; the historic impact of Gaullism and its role as
a federating force of the centre and right; the survival instinct of the
left-wing parties; the rejuvenation of the French PS and the rebalancing
of the French left in the 1970s; the talented mobilisation of prejudice
by Jean-Marie Le Pen during the 1980s and 1990s.
Finally, analysis of party system evolution must also incorporate a third
series of explanations based on social change: these vary from neo-Marxist
arguments relating to the emergence of the social class as the salient
electoral cleavage, giving a sociological underpinning to left–right bipo-
larisation, to sociological analysis pinpointing the emergence of the ‘new
middle classes’ as the central groups in post-war French society, favouring
the emergence of broad-based parties such as the PS (Bacot, 1976,
Mendras, 1989).
Since the mid-1980s, however, the structure of the French party system
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has become far less neatly balanced, giving way to a more complex
pattern of uncertain and changing contours. There has been an increase
in the number and a change in the nature of parties and the issues
processed through the political system. The bipolar contours of the
French party system have been challenged by the emergence of new
political issues, such as immigration, security and the environment, and
the difficulties experienced by the mainstream parties in articulating
these new political demands. When observing the French party system
in 2002, one is struck by the increasingly manifest opposition between
a formal, bipolar and structured party system as represented in national
political institutions (especially the National Assembly and municipal
government) and an underlying multipolar, fragmented and contestataire
pattern of party support.
The three main developments in the past two decades have been: the
emergence of a series of minor but significant parties, and in particular
the breakthrough, persistence and subsequent division of the FN; the
changing dynamics of factional and coalition politics, perhaps most clearly
demonstrated in the decline of the PCF and the emergence of the PS
as the dominant party of the left; and patterns of growing electoral
instability, namely increased electoral volatility (each election since 1978
going against the incumbent government) and a certain disaffection
towards traditional politics, as demonstrated in higher abstention rates
and the weakening of the parties of the 1978 bipolar quadrille. Overall,
while the PCF, PS, UDF and RPR obtained over 90 per cent of the vote
in 1978, in 1997 and 2002 these parties obtained around 67 per cent.
While there are many enduring features of party system stability,
which we will explore in the final section, we are primarily concerned
in the subsequent section to identify stresses and strains and to map out
the important changes that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.
Stresses and strains in the French party system
The challenge of new parties
The emergence of new parties (or the breakthrough of previously mar-
ginal parties) and the reaction of pre-existing players to these party
newcomers is the most obvious development. The most significant of these
parties are the Greens and Lutte Ouvrière (LO) on the left, and the FN
on the right (Cole, 1998). There has been a plethora of more temporary
and marginal forces that have had a lesser, but real, impact upon specific
elections, or across particular issues. Such ephemeral or marginal forces
as La Droite of Charles Millon, the RPF of Charles Pasqua and Philippe
de Villiers, the Mouvement Ecologiste Indépendant (MEI) of Antoine
Waechter, and Saint-Josse’s Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions (CPNT) fit
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this category. These movements testify to the importance of ‘flexible
specialisation’ (Kitschelt, 1997) as issue-specific parties rise and fall to
exploit the contradictions of broader-based structures. These marginal
parties invariably define themselves as being against the parties of the
political establishment and perform better in ‘second-order’ elections
fought under proportional representation (regional elections, European
elections) than in the decisive parliamentary or presidential elections. In
the 2002 National Assembly election, a total of 8,455 candidates presented
themselves in 577 constituencies, an average of 14.65 per seat, the highest
ever.1
By far the most significant of these parties is the FN. With around 15
per cent in the 1995 presidential, 1997 parliamentary and 1998 regional
elections, the FN could already claim to be the second formation of the
French right. In the first round of the 2002 presidential election, Le Pen
and Mégret, the two candidates of the far right, polled almost 20 per
cent between them (16.86 per cent for Le Pen, 2.34 per cent for Mégret)
outpolling the combined Socialist–Communist total in mainland France.
In party system terms, the success of the FN above all harmed the
mainstream right, or, at least, it did until 2002. For almost two decades,
the FN damaged the cohesion of the parties of the right by posing highly
divisive dilemmas of alliance strategy, organisational discipline, political
philosophy and policy adaptation. The tripartite structure of the French
right (RPR–UDF–FN) has been its undoing ever since the breakthrough
of the FN in 1982–83. We can illustrate the corrosive effects of the far
right by comparing the 1997 and the 2002 National Assembly elections.
In 1997, consistent with Le Pen’s desire to defeat the Juppé government
by fair means or foul, the FN maintained its candidates wherever it could
on the second ballot. There were 76 left–right–FN triangular contests;
the left won 47, the right 29. Given the closeness of the result, the FN’s
tactics undoubtedly facilitated the arrival in power of the Jospin govern-
ment. In the changed political circumstances of the 2002 National
Assembly elections, the far-right parties were less able to influence the
outcome of the mainly bipolar left–right second-round contests (Cole,
2002). With a reduced first-ballot score in 2002 (11.33 per cent for the FN,
1.10 per cent for the MNR), the FN was less able to provoke the three-way
contests that had been particularly damaging for the parties of the
mainstream right in 1997. In 2002 there were only 9 three-way fights,
down from 76 in 1997. There were 28 duels between the FN and UMP
(from 56 in 1997) and only 8 duels between the left and the FN (from
25 in 1997). The right won back 43 of the seats it had lost as a result
of three-way contests in 1997 ( Jaffré, 2002). The main difference between
the two elections related to the level of FN support, as well as the degree
of unity of the mainstream right parties (low in 1997, high in 2002), a
theme to which we shall return.
Stress and stability  15
The real impact of the FN lay in its agenda-setting role. At its height,
the FN forced issues such as immigration and security onto the political
agenda and ensured that they remained there. If primarily detrimental
to the mainstream right in party system terms, the FN had a corrosive
impact on all existing parties, especially insofar as it skilfully exploited
the theme of the political corruption of the pro-system parties, the RPR,
UDF and PS.
From faction to party
One of the most striking developments of the 1980s and 1990s was the
rise of internal factionalism in almost all major political formations. There
is nothing new about party factionalism. Divisions within parties were
inherent in the parliamentary organisation of the Third and Fourth
Republics. In the Fifth Republic, the modern PS was reconstructed after
1971 as an explicitly factional party, with the right to free expression of
factions (courants) guaranteed within the party’s constitution. Initially the
preserve of the PS, in the 1990s party factionalism became as characteristic
of the RPR and UDF, not to say the PCF and FN.
The most intractable factional conflicts arise in relation to personal
rivalries, political strategy and policy differences. Personal rivalries testify
in part to the normal contradictions of human agency. They also respond
to precise institutional incentives in the Fifth Republic, to the pivotal
role of the presidential election and, recently, to the organisational
incentives for ambitious politicians to stand as a candidate for the
presidency.2 Even more than personal rivalries, however, during the
1990s the main parties, and especially the RPR and UDF, were divided
on the question of alliance strategy and in relation to specific policy
issues such as Europe and immigration. Though there has been a
narrowing of distinctive economic policy positions between the main
parties, issues such as European integration and immigration have
divided existing parties and cut across traditional lines of political
cleavage. The neo-Gaullist RPR was divided over European integration;
the UDF was split wide open by the question of immigration and alliances
with the FN.
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between personal rivalries,
questions of political strategy and policy differences. During the late
1990s and into the new century, the existence of a myriad of structures
fronted by innumerable second-rank party leaders – Madelin’s DL, Bay-
rou’s UDF, Pasqua’s RPF, de Villiers’ MPF, Chevènement’s Mouvement
des Citoyens (MdC), Baylet’s PRG and so on – increased the impression
of permanent, personality-based competition, even though each political
formation occupied a distinctive position along the political spectrum
and was engaged in a relationship with one or more of the main political
families.
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If the first twenty years of the Fifth Republic were characterised by a
tendency for the emergence of broad-based coalitions, the last decade
of the twentieth century sorely tested the capacity for rassemblement of
the main political formations. Each of the main party families experienced
a schism within its midst, as there was a general move from faction to
party. This move occurred within the PS (the creation by Jean-Pierre
Chevènement of the MdC), the RPR (the creation of the RPF by Pasqua)
the UDF (the breakaway of Alain Madelin and DL) and even the FN
(the split of December 1998 and the creation of Mégret’s MNR). Para-
doxically, the pitiful performance of all of these factions-cum-parties has
reinforced the centrality of party and of the main political families. While
factions can often exercise influence within a party, once outside of
the party fold their influence is either negative and short-lived (as in the
case of Chevènement in the 2002 presidential election) or non-existent.
As the case of DL and Madelin’s deal with the UMP demonstrates,
ambitious politicians need to operate within one of the main party
organisations.
The diminishing legitimacy of party politics?
Various converging forces allow us to pose the diminishing legitimacy of
party politics as a central research question. However we interpret the
success of the FN – as a modern variant of Fascism or as something else
– the persistence at a high level of support for two decades of a populist
far-right party reveals an ambivalent attitude towards existing political
supply, and indirectly towards liberal democracy, among a significant
minority of voters. The inadequacy of political supply can be measured
in other ways, most notably by the diminishing support for representatives
of the two main political families, PS and RPR, and by growing rates of
abstention. In the 1994 European election, the two leading lists were
reduced to a combined total of 40 per cent; in 1999, this figure was
even lower. On the first round of the 1995 presidential election, the two
leading candidates ( Jospin and Chirac) polled just over 40 per cent of
the vote, a far weaker proportion than in any other presidential election
(Cole, 1995). In 2002, the two leading candidates (Chirac and Le Pen)
did even worse: with 36.74 per cent of voters and barely over a quarter
of those registered to vote (Cole, 2002)
France’s historic political families were each challenged on the first
round of the 2002 presidential election, at which Jean-Marie Le Pen won
through to the second-ballot run-off against Jacques Chirac. Communists,
Socialists, Gaullists, Liberals, Christian Democrats, even Greens per-
formed under par. None of these candidates did as well as they might
have expected and many voters were dissatisfied with all of them. The
strong performance of the far-left and far-right candidates, the high
abstention rate (at 28.30 per cent, a record in any presidential election)
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and the general dispersion of votes to candidates not generally considered
to be genuine presidential contenders such as St Josse, Chevènement
and others were all part of this trend. Chirac and Jospin, the prematurely
‘preordained’ second-round contenders, obtained only just over one-third
of votes and one-quarter of registered voters between them.
The corollary of this is the development of parties and movements
which have defined themselves against the existing political elites, such
as the FN, but also LO and the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire
(LCR). While these forces are marginal in the bipolar party system, they
demonstrate the survival of a tradition of radical politics on the far left
and extreme right, potently recalled on the first-round of the 2002
presidential election when the far left (10.44 per cent) and extreme right
(19.20 per cent) captured almost one-third of votes between them. The
persistence and strengthening of the parties of the far left and especially
of the extreme right articulates a profound disillusion towards the ‘parties
of government’ of all complexions on behalf of the popular (working-
and lower-middle-class) electorate. More than ever, the Le Pen electorate
in 2002 was over representative of those suffering from the most acute
sentiments of economic and physical insecurity. Le Pen was the favoured
choice of the lower-middle classes (31.9 per cent) and of workers (26.1
per cent), far outdistancing both the Socialist Jospin and the Communist
Hue in working-class support.3 The French electorate’s vote on 21 April
2002 suggested an unresolved tension between French identity, the
implicit promises of French citizenship (including the economic promises)
and the uncertainty provoked by Europeanisation, globalisation and an
unpredictable future.
A more general cause of fragility lies in the pessimism of public opinion,
which has lacked faith in political parties, broadly defined, to resolve
intractable policy problems. This has tormented each government since
1981. After the economic miracle of les trente glorieuses (1945–74), political
parties in government have proved incapable of dealing with the per-
ception of prolonged economic crisis. In comparative European
perspective, the reality of the French crisis is debatable, but the perception
of economic malaise has had a destabilising effect on all incumbent
governments since 1974. The real yardstick against which governments
have been measured – unemployment – has proved to be particularly
intractable. Since 1981, every single decisive election (presidential or
parliamentary) has gone against the incumbent government, in a manner
that suggests the electorate’s dissatisfaction with the performance of
successive governments.
This lesson was repeated in 2002, when the Prime Minister of the
outgoing plural-left government failed even to reach the second round
of the presidential election. In a very real sense, the 2002 campaign
was fought as a single-issue campaign, but this time over the issue of
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insecurity rather than unemployment. Events and campaign strategies
converged to define the agenda. A concatenation of events – the Middle-
East crisis, the aftermath of 11 September, and above all a set of
particularly shocking murders and violent disorders in France itself –
set the agenda for the two months of the 2002 campaign proper. In all
other recent election campaigns, the theme of unemployment has
emerged as the principal preoccupation of voters. Not so in 2002 –
SOFRES polls demonstrated that from January 2000 insecurity had
replaced unemployment as the principal subject of concern of French
voters (Gerstlé, 2002). To some extent, Jospin was a victim of his own
success in bringing down unemployment rates. The unemployment prob-
lem was perceived as less acute than in the past, surpassed in importance
by the ubiquitous theme of insecurity, much less favourable political
terrain for a centre-left candidate.
Political variables are equally pertinent in explaining dissatisfaction
with existing political supply. For over two decades, the problem of
corruption has been at the top of the political agenda (Mény, 1992).
There is some evidence of endemic political corruption, and much media
speculation around the subject. Political corruption has centred on the
operation of local and regional government, the imperatives of party
finance and organisation, the attribution of public markets and personal
enrichment. In the classic schema, political parties have received occult
commissions for attributing public markets; any firm must factor the
party commission into its bid. Cases of personal enrichment are rarer,
but there are several celebrated examples to demonstrate the enduring
appeal of avarice (Evans, 2002). The problem of corruption is a complex
one. Most corruption cases have involved raising finance to fight pro-
hibitively expensive election campaigns. While corruption has probably
always existed, new incentives have been provided by the decentralisation
laws, which leave important powers of planning and the attribution of
public markets in the hands of mayors and their adjoints. More cases of
corruption have been uncovered as a result of the increased activism of
the juges d’instruction (investigating magistrates). The negative political
fallout of any hint of corruption is such that incumbent ministers, such
as Strauss-Kahn in November 1999, invariably resign if they are inves-
tigated by the juge d’instruction, even before any formal allegations have
been made.
The French party system was shaken to its core by problems of political,
institutional and ideological coherence throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Party fragility was real, but there were also countervailing forces in play.
In the ensuing section, we identify three underlying causes of party
continuity: institutional incentives, flexible and adaptable party organi-
sations, and the absorptive capacity of the main French political
traditions.
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Underlying continuities in the French party system
The prestige of the presidency, and the majoritarian effects of the
two-ballot electoral system are potent institutional variables. In a formal
sense, at least, the bipolar party system remains a structural variant of
the rules of political competition in the Fifth Republic, though we observe
an ever-increasing gap between formal bipolarity, on the one hand, and
the underlying fragmentation of electoral choice on the other.
The electoral series of 2002 defied many basic bipolar rules of the
Fifth Republic. The first round of the presidential election did not
produce a run-off between left and right. The second round was a
quasi-referendum for democracy that produced the largest victory for
any candidate in any free election in recent memory. The changing role
of the presidential election points to the danger of attributing eternal
features to the operation of particular political institutions. Rather than
supporting from the first round the candidate they ideally want to see
elected president (as in the traditional slogan, ‘Choose on the first round,
eliminate on the second’), voters have begun treating the first round of
the presidential election as a ‘second-order’ election, expressing a pref-
erence in the same way they would in a regional or European election.
That the 2002 campaign was closed rather than open encouraged such
a fragmentation of support. The belief that the first round did not count
encouraged voters to support minor or extreme candidates, either
through obstinacy or as a way of influencing the agenda of the candidate
eventually elected President. There was certainly a lot of choice. With
sixteen candidates in competition in 2002, the first round played the
role of a non-decisive proportional election, with the bulk of voters firmly
believing in a Chirac–Jospin run-off. That this outcome did not materialise
deprived the second round of its usual left–right configuration.
On 9 and 16 June 2002, the French party system returned to something
resembling its normal bipolar state. Two parties – the UMP on the right
and the PS on the left – occupied almost 90 per cent of parliamentary
seats, a far greater measure of bipartisanship than in recent elections.
The hegemony of the UMP on the right was matched by a domination
of the Socialists on the left, in votes as well as in seats. The far-left parties
(2.83 per cent) were squeezed by the movement to use usefully for the
Socialists, as was the PRep,4 with just over 1 per cent, and, to a lesser
extent, the Greens (4.5 per cent) and the Communists (4.8 per cent).
The far right lost one-third of its electorate by comparison to 21 April
(11.33 per cent for the FN, 1.10 per cent for the MNR) and was unable
to repeat its spoiling tactics of 1997, when it had helped the left win the
election. In elections fought under the single-member constituency two-
ballot system, the four parties of the 1978 bipolar quadrille (PCF, PS,
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RPR and UDF) have continued to dominate parliamentary representation.
Only one deputy (out of 577) was elected in 1997 from outside the rival
electoral coalitions and none in 2002. Because the vast bulk of parliamen-
tary seats are confined to members of the left or right electoral coalitions,
the ability to form alliances is crucial. Its isolation has deprived the FN
of major national parliamentary representation except in the 1986–88
legislature.
In addition to the institutional underpinnings of the Fifth Republic,
the cohesion of the French party system also rests upon the bedrock of
municipal office (as witnessed by the longevity of the generation of mayors
first elected in 1977) which has itself been transformed into an arena of
(mainly) bipolar political competition. The bipolar basis of political
competition in the Fifth Republic has spilled over into local municipal
and cantonal elections fought under the two-ballot system; since 1977,
municipal elections in the large cities have by and large been contested
by rival left and right lists, a pattern confirmed in 2001.
Structural explanations, then, are important in identifying how the
institutional rules of the game have shaped important aspects of party
competition in the Fifth Republic. But they do not tell the whole story.
They have difficulty in distinguishing between different types of party
supply and they underplay the dynamic and unpredictable qualities of
the party system, as demonstrated by the breakthrough of new parties
and the adaptation of older ones.
The underlying stability of the French party system also rests upon
flexible and adaptable party organisations. This is a double-edged sword.
On the one hand, French citizens appear more reluctant to join party
organisations than their northern European counterparts. Mass mem-
bership parties of the German or Scandinavian variety are rare; only the
Gaullists and Communists have presented examples of mass parties and
both are a shadow of their former selves. But this relative weakness of
party organisation stricto sensu has certain advantages. The weakness
of organic links with the trade unions or business, for example, has
allowed French parties to reposition themselves more convincingly than
their counterparts in certain other European countries. More generally,
flexible organisational forms are well adapted to the particular structure
of incentives in the French polity, focused on the exercise of power
in municipal government as well as on the conquest of decisive (presiden-
tial and parliamentary) elections. Here we would again emphasise the
importance of municipal government. For certain parties (PS, UDF),
municipal government has served as a long-term substitute for a powerful
party organisation; for others (PCF, RPR), municipal government has
underpinned the illusion of a genuine party organisation. Once the
municipal support is removed, the organisational chimera is laid bare.
Even ‘strong’ parties, such as the PCF and RPR, rely more on the logistical
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infrastructure provided by municipal government than on their formal
party organisations. This is demonstrated in numerous former Communist
municipalities such as Le Havre where the PCF organisation has been
severely damaged following the loss of the municipal council.
The weakness of party organisation is not necessarily synonymous with
a lack of organisational efficiency. The renewal of the French Socialist
Party in the 1970s was predicated upon an open dialogue with voluntary
associations much more than upon a revival in party membership. Their
cross-cutting membership served the interests both of the party and
supportive voluntary associations, facilitating the exchange of policy ideas
and personnel. In their own very different ways, the Greens and the FN
learned a similar lesson in the 1990s. The organisational capacity of the
French Greens has been strengthened by the strong links maintained
with voluntary associations (not just environmental groups). In the case
of the FN in Orange and Toulon, the far-right municipalities created a
network of parallel associations under the tutelage of the town hall
(McAna, 2001), somewhat along the lines of traditional Communist-run
municipalities. These practices have positive and negative characteristics.
They can be interpreted as embodying new forms of political participation.
They can also contribute to a lack of transparent governance – municipally
financed associations are sometimes little more than vehicles for the
exercise of informal partisan influence.
Lastly, the robust character of the main political traditions principally
underpins the stability of the French party system: French-style com-
munism, socialism, liberal conservatism, Gaullism, Christian democracy
and national populism. They can each trace their lineage back to the
Second World War or much earlier, and have each demonstrated the
capacity to reinvent themselves to cope with changing circumstances and
political incentives. Even when threatened by the rise of new parties and
by the manifestations of disaffection with existing political supply, over
time the French party system has proved its absorptive capacity. The
‘absorptive capacity’ (Hanley, 1999a) of the French party system is
particularly marked on the left. This is demonstrated by the ability of
the PS to transcend internal divisions and changing ideological fashions,
and retain its dominant position on the left. The emergence of the
Greens as a post-materialist, new-politics party forces us to modify this
appreciation, but only partially: the three Green deputies are entirely
dependent on alliances with the PS.
It is rather more difficult to apply the thesis of the absorptive capacity
of the party system to the French right. This has been hampered by its
divisions ever since the decline of historic Gaullism and the creation of
the RPR and UDF in the 1970s. In addition, the rise of the FN from
1983 onwards has posed acute dilemmas of alliance strategy and political
positioning for the parties of the mainstream right. The FN was a problem
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because the right was divided, hence too weak to ignore the far-right
movement. The failure of the RPR to stamp its authority on the French
right during the 1990s was all the more damaging in that a Gaullist
President occupied the Elysée palace from 1995 onwards.
In one important respect, the 2002 electoral series represents a return
to the sources of the Fifth Republic. Once re-elected President, Chirac
imposed the creation of the UMP as a presidential platform to which
all existing right-wing parties would have to subscribe. UMP candidates
had to accept to sit in the same parliamentary group in the National
Assembly, to support the President and to participate in the creation of
a vast new party of the French right in autumn 2002. A committee
containing representatives of the three main pro-Chirac parties (RPR,
DL, part of the UDF) but heavily weighted in favour of the RPR distributed
UMP candidacies in the parliamentary contest. François Bayrou led the
resistance of a centrist rump, retaining the title UDF and pledging critical
support for Jacques Chirac. The presidential party strategy worked exactly
to plan. This strategy involved not just providing a majority for the
President, but also engineering a realignment within the right in favour
of the RPR, to sweeten the pill of the dissolution of the Gaullist movement
into a much broader conservative party.
The 2002 elections represented the first time since 1973 that there
had not been at least two major parties on the French right. Right-wing
unity paid off handsomely. The UMP won an overall majority (399 seats
out of 577), only the third time in the history of the Fifth Republic that
a single political formation has held an overall majority.5 In 2002, the
UMP formula masked a new domination of the RPR. With the election
of an overall majority for a single formation of the mainstream right,
the French party system again resembles in part that of the 1960s,
whereby a dominant presidential rally is flanked by a small centre party,
a ‘reservist’ force of the right whose existence is barely tolerated.
However, the capacity for absorption is limited to the formal party
system, as measured in decisive elections fought under the second-ballot
system. It can account neither for fragmentation of party support in
second-order elections, or for the evidence of dissatisfaction with political
supply and demand that we uncovered in the previous section. One
explanation of party persistence might be that parties gives expression
to deeply embedded cleavages. Joachim Schild (2000) summarises the
principal cleavages in French politics as being positional (left versus
right), existential (religious versus lay), ideological (cultural liberalism
versus authoritarianism), socio-economic (class conflict) and issue-based.
We have argued elsewhere that these variables lourdes have lessened in
significance since the early 1980s (Cole, 1998). The left/right cleavage
remains pertinent in certain respects, but its mobilising force has been
diminished as a result of the Mitterrand presidency and the decline of
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the PCF. The religious-lay cleavage retains the capacity to mobilise
opinion on specific issues such as the defence of, or opposition to écoles
libres, but the relation of cause and effect is uncertain. We demonstrated
above that ideological cleavages can cut across party lines, as can those
based on issues. Voting patterns corresponded far less neatly to social
class identities in 2002 than they did in 1978 (Cole, 2002, Capdevielle
et al., 1981, Perrineau and Ysmal, 1998) . The electoral volatility of the
new middle classes and the strengthening of the FN among the working-
and lower-middle-class electorate explain these cross-cutting pressures.
Moreover, as the issue of European integration demonstrates, party
structures do not always correspond neatly to divisions over issues or
ideologies. Traditional cleavages have clearly lessened in importance, as
France has undergone multiple internal and external changes, but they
remain as cognitive maps within the collective memory. While there is
no easy relationship between political attitudes and behaviour, partisan
lenses can provide one way of comprehending and reinterpreting a
changing environment.
Conclusion
The decline of parties is not terminal; it is contingent on underlying
political and economic circumstances. We can draw three main conclusions
from the partially contradictory evidence presented in this chapter. Party
system change is the first one. That the French party system has under-
gone strains and stresses is obvious. The challenge of new parties, the
decline of certain older parties (notably the PCF) and the limited capacity
of existing parties to articulate new political issues have had an impact
on the number and the nature of parties. The issues processed by the
party system reflect a changing policy agenda. On the one hand, new
political issues such as the environment and immigration have forced
their way onto the agenda. On the other, governmental realism and the
end of ‘lyrical illusions’ associated with the abandoning of a certain type
of left project under Mitterrand have refocused elite attention on public
policies, rather than competing visions of society. Partisan discourses
have not proceeded apace. The resulting distance between political
discourse and policy achievement has created disillusion and demobili-
sation among many French voters.
This is one of the most convincing explanations of the public disaffection
with political parties during the 1980s and 1990s. This aspect of the crisis
of party politics is more apparent in France than in comparable countries.
Because partisan discourses are deeply embedded in French republican
political culture, public expectations have been higher and the electoral
retribution for failure has been harsher. This is the specifically French
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dimension of a broader pan-European phenomenon, whereby established
party families have had to adapt to a series of internal and external shocks
over the past two decades, cognisance of which has preconditioned their
ability to survive and prosper.
Indeed, this absorptive capacity of the main political families modifies
the first conclusion. While the traditional parties were at times unnerved
by the new-issue politics, the resulting new parties such as the Greens
and the FN failed to replace the existing players. The Greens owe their
political survival to the PS. Over a long period, the FN has articulated
a powerful strand within French public opinion and indirectly influenced
the political agenda. Without allies, however, it has failed to translate its
electoral potential into full political capital and has lacked second-round
credibility, both in the 2002 presidential contest (where Le Pen polled
17.85 per cent against 82.15 per cent for Chirac) and in parliamentary
elections, where the FN usually fails to hold on to its first-round vote in
those rare constituencies where it can fight the second.
The existing parties absorbed the fluid centre of gravity of French
politics. They occupied a strategically and organisationally privileged
position to adapt to and interpret a changing internal and external
political agenda. The same process transformed the leading parties, and
especially the PS and RPR, in important respects both by the exercise
of domestic power and by the changing European and international
policy agenda.
We conclude thereby in the persistence of a rather artificial bipolar
multipartism, the left and right coalitions functioning most effectively
when one party assumes a dominant role – the Gaullists from 1962 to
1974, and the PS from 1981 onwards. This leads naturally to our third
and final conclusion. To the extent that two blocs provide the mainstay
of political competition across most European countries, French party
competition has moved closer to the mainstream European model. As
in most West European democracies, the mainstay of political competition
is between left of centre and right of centre parties and their respective
political allies. The pattern of party fragility in the 1980s and 1990s was
not specific to France but in many respects formed part of a pan-European
adjustment to the end of post-war prosperity. The form that such fragility
took in France – the rise of the extreme right, increased abstention, a
weakening of party identity – was nationally specific, but similar phe-
nomena could be observed in comparable countries such as Italy (where
the entire post-war party system collapsed under the weight of political
corruption), Germany (where the ‘new politics’ prospered on the failure
of traditional social democracy) and Britain (where the electoral swing
of 1997 broke all post-war records).
To achieve a just measure of the balance between party stress and
party stability, we can learn from longitudinal historical and cross-national
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comparison. Longitudinal comparison suggests that there is no real
equivalent to the party system stress of the Fourth Republic in the late
1940s, when the PCF and RPF – forces openly antagonistic to the regime
– obtained the support of half of the voters. We must not lose a sense
of perspective. From a cross-national perspective, while allowing for
nationally tinted referential frames and for the discursive traditions of
the main political traditions, we observe that the pressures on the French
party system are broadly consistent with those observed elsewhere.
Notes
1 The inflated number of candidates in 2002 was mainly attributable to the
rules on campaign finance, which allow parties to obtain state funding on
the condition that they field candidates in at least 50 constituencies.
2 Candidates obtaining the signatures of at least 500 elected officials (mainly
rural mayors) are eligible to stand for the presidency and participate in the
official campaign, which gives them free media coverage. Candidates with
over 5 per cent of valid votes get their campaign expenses reimbursed, up
to a limit of 7,460,000 euros.
3 Figures from the Louis Harris–Libération–AOL post-election poll published
in Libération, 23 April 2002.
4 This was the name given to Chevènement’s presidential rally. Pro-Chevène-
ment candidates stood in over 400 constituencies in the parliamentary
election, but fared poorly.
5 The Gaullists from 1968 to 1973 and the Socialists from 1981 to 1986 are
the other examples.
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Introduction
Under the Fourth and Fifth Republics the Parti Communiste Français
(PCF) was one of the most important forces in the shaping of the party
system. This status only began to diminish in the 1980s with the victory
of François Mitterrand in the presidential and legislative elections of
1981. Although the Communist Party is a shadow of its former self, the
shape of the party system and its behaviour over the post-war period is
explicable only in terms of the PCF’s historical comportment. No dis-
cussion of the French party system is possible without taking into account
the size and nature of what was, for most of the cold war, the biggest
Communist Party in the western world.
French Communism has had both negative and positive effects on the
party system. It was, on the one hand, the great party of the left
dominating the parts of society which in other western countries were
social democratic. It was tightly organised and ran unions, societies and
associations which it used for its own purposes and it had a press and
publishing empire of some size. It is not surprising that this power in the
service of a revolutionary cause provoked hostility and even fear in both
its allies and opponents. In the Fourth Republic, this negative influence
kept the centre parties together, in the Fifth Republic, it helped to
consolidate the conservative right into alliance. It was very difficult
to ignore the Communist presence in most social areas until the Party’s
influence began to decline in the 1980s. By the same token the waning
of the Communist Party’s influence in the 1980s had ramifications across
the party system, reducing confrontation, enabling realignments but also
abandoning part of the extreme-left spectrum. At the same time, there
were social changes which undermined the sense of the working class
on which the Party depended. This was the start of the transition from
a society of 40 per cent ‘workers’ in 1950 (broadly defined) to one of
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27 per cent ‘workers’ in 2001 1 and in addition to a working class which
was fragmented, better educated and part of which took on middle-class
aspirations. The Party did not comprehend these changes, and for a
long time acted as if they had not happened.
The PCF continued its ‘saw tooth’ decline throughout the 1980s and
1990s. In the presidential elections of 1995 the Party’s leader Robert Hue
polled only 8.7 per cent to the Socialist candidate’s 23.2 per cent. After
the 1995 elections, a coalition of the left, led by the Socialists, was put
together and the Communists participated along with the ecologists, the
MdC, the left Radicals and some independents. In the 1997 snap general
elections, the Communist Party’s candidates polled just fewer than 10 per
cent and won 34 seats, dwarfed by the Socialists’ 242. In purely electoral
terms, the Party’s decline continued over the Parliament and by 2002 it
was slipping into irrelevance. Its candidate Robert Hue polled a marginal
3.37 per cent in the presidential elections (its worst ever) not qualifying
for reimbursement of his expenses and coming below two of the three
Trotskyite candidates, Arlette Laguiller and Olivier Besancenot. French
Communism only kept an edge through its force in local government
although that had been further weakened the previous year. This local
implantation explains its slight revival to 4.7 per cent of the vote in the
ensuing general elections in June. However, it lost seats (including that
of its president Robert Hue) and with 21 deputies crossed the threshold
enabling it to form a parliamentary group by only one seat.
The three aspects of Communism
There are three aspects of the Party relevant to what it currently is in
the French party system and from which it has to break free. First, the
PCF was devoted to the Soviet Union where the ‘Revolution’ had taken
place and to the USSR which was building Socialism. Even if ‘mistakes’
had been made on the way, the belief was that the elimination of private
property and the central planning of the economy was the route to
Socialism (‘Just because there were spots on the sun, it did not mean
there was no sun’). Hence, in France, Communism was seen as the parti
de l’étranger and as promoting Socialist society with its queues for essentials,
Gulag and nomenklatura (Duhamel and Jaffré, 1997).
Second, the Party was a ‘party of a different sort’. It was the framework
for the new society and the advance guard of the Revolution. Unity was
at a premium enforced through ‘democratic centralism’, which can be
summed up as obedience in the ranks and militaristic top-down com-
mand. The structure of the Party, divided into cells at the base and
supervised by superior organs, facilitated discipline. But the main force
in the Party was Lenin’s ‘professional revolutionaries’, the employees of
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the Party dedicated full-time to its organisation. It was the ‘bolshevik’
core of the Party that enabled the Communists to magnify their influence
in unions or in institutions which had been infiltrated.
But Communist Party voluntary activists and fronts, organised profes-
sionally, disciplined and spread throughout ‘capitalist society’, have also
been one of the Party’s resources. It claimed to have 275,000 members
at its 29th Congress though the number could be as low as 100,000.2
Yet the proportion of members under 30 has also fallen from 25 per
cent in 1978 to 10 per cent in 2001 and the percentage of workers
dropped from 47 per cent to 31 per cent over the same time. The Party
newspaper L’Humanité, once part of a large publishing group and essential
to activists, has had to seek private capital to keep going.3 Of the other
satellite front organisations very little remains. Only the Confédération
Générale des Travailleurs (CGT) is a force to be reckoned with but that
trade union is also in a tense relationship with the Party hierarchy: if
the CGT is to revive, it needs to free itself from the Party but the Party
needs the CGT to prop up its own flagging influence.
Third, the Communist Party had commandeered the cultural high
ground of revolutionary Marxism and had imposed its own brand,
Marxism-Leninism, as the orthodox version. By the 1990s, Marxism itself
had become a negative factor in the Party’s repertoire and, of course,
linked with the ‘Stalinism’ of its recent past, something which, in its
constant use of ‘Communist’, it continues to remind people of (Duhamel
and Jaffré, 1997). Robert Hue’s (1995) exercise in homiletic excess,
Communisme, La Mutation, does not distinguish the new Party from the old
one in a convincing way. In his opening to the 29th Party congress in 1996,
Hue asserted that the roots of the Party are in the French Revolution of 1789
and that the PCF represents a long and continuous French tradition dating
back to that time. But, of course, the Party has in its ranks people who
remain devoted to the ‘Communist idea’ and they would be demoralised
by any change of name.4 Hence, to some extent the Party has returned to
the young Marx to open up themes of justice and rights and of the once
rejected ‘humanism’. But the Communist Party remains a critic of ‘capi-
talism’ (though now referred to as ‘market totalitarianism’ or some similar
term) and the ills of society are attributed to rampant ‘neo-liberalism’.
Un passé qui ne passe pas
In Western Europe, the principal line of cleavage has been between left
and right in the post-war period (Gallagher et al., 2001: 95). Coalitions of
parties have lined up facing each other across this divide. The norm has
been a bipolar system with the main struggle for the centre ground – the
middle or ‘floating voter’ – and a centripetal dynamic has been evident
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over the long term. It was the intrusion of the big Communist Party into
the French Party system that frustrated any such bipolar development in
the Fourth Republic (though not to the same extent as in Italy).
The Communist Party emerged from the war benefiting from the
legitimacy of its part in the Resistance. At the Liberation, the French
Communist Party was one of the big three political parties along with
the Christian democratic MRP and the Socialist SFIO. It came to be seen
as a national party: as patriotic, reformist and ‘modern’ while its rivals
– notably the Socialists – were afflicted with a ‘cultural cringe’ when faced
by the PCF’s penetration of working-class milieux. By the October 1946
general elections, the PCF was the biggest party in the system polling
26.2 per cent to the Christian democratic MRP’s 25.9 per cent and the
SFIO’s 21.1 per cent. It had participated in governments under de Gaulle
and its leader, Maurice Thorez, made a serious bid to become Premier,
falling short by only 51 votes. But the onset of the cold war meant that
by 1947 the principal cleavage in the party system divided the Communists
from the Socialists. It pushed the Socialists into alignment with the MRP
and with other moderate and centrist groups willing to participate in a
centrist programme and the Communist Party’s self-imposed isolation
became a ghetto from which it could not escape.
This ‘polarised pluralist’ format came into being and prevailed through
the Fourth Republic until 1958 (Sartori, 1976). Parties which supported
the Fourth Republic in the centre were attacked by anti-system parties
from the two sides of the ideological continuum but the anti-system
parties were kept out of power and had no incentive to moderate their
attacks or to accommodate the political mainstream. Parties in the
centre found it increasingly difficult to provide solutions to contemporary
problems and the régime fell when faced by the Algerian crisis of 1958.
Alliance politics
For the French Communists, the main change in strategy was in 1956
with Khrushchev’s ‘parliamentary road to Socialism’ in Western Europe:
western parties were to use elections to gain power in the European
situation that was then unpropitious for revolution. However, there was a
tension at the heart of the strategy that the PCF never overcame. It was
necessary to downplay the ‘Revolutionary’ aspirations (which were the Party’s
raison d’être) in order to find allies and get elected as part of a coalition.
However, communist parties sought allies and for the PCF this meant
the SFIO had to be wooed. French Communists, still the principal party
in France, and attracting one voter in four after the 1956 general
elections, made overtures to the Socialists (Rioux, 1987: 260). However,
the Communists remained excluded from the majority and their position
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in the ghetto was confirmed after the Soviet repression of the Hungarian
uprising in November 1956. Communists persisted in seeking an alliance
with the Socialists, but their reintegration into the party system was
postponed (Schlesinger and Schlesinger, 2000: 136–7).
It was the return of de Gaulle to power in 1958 that transformed the
party system. De Gaulle’s politics also gave the Communist Party the real
opportunity to promote the coalition of the left it had demanded after
1956. What the Communists wanted was an alliance of the left, of the
Communists, Socialists and Radicals along with whatever other small
parties could be persuaded to join. Communist leaders no doubt assumed
that they would dominate it. This domination might not be obvious, and
non-communist politicians would be the facade, but the Party’s size in
vote and membership, its resources and its command of the unions and
its political resources would guarantee its authority over the left.
Potential allies feared the same thing and there began a long ‘hesitation
waltz’ as non-communist parties sought a way of managing the PCF
within an alliance. Matters were, however, hastened by de Gaulle’s creation
of a modern conservative party federating the parties on the right and
forcing the small centre parties to chose between the right and the left.
De Gaulle’s politics started to move the party system to a bipolar one
of confrontation between government and opposition with the centre
divided between them. By the end of the 1960s the centre was already
part of one or other of the coalitions.
As the 1960s and 1970s progressed, the choice between de Gaulle’s
conservative coalition and the left along with the Communists became
sharper and was seen by many as one of choice of society and régime. But
a new factor in allocating dominance on the left came from outside the
Communist Party (and the Socialist Party) and that was presidential
politics. In the competition for the presidency, the Communist Party could
not hope to win although a candidate from the left might win with their
support. Party leaders decided to avert a humiliation at the polls by not
putting up their own candidate and chose instead to participate in (and
legitimise) the presidency by supporting the independent Mitterrand. As
the big organised party of the left it experienced an influx of members
from the 1965 presidentials and it had taken an important step towards
its objective of creating a coalition of the left. Under the leadership of
Thorez, then Waldeck Rochet and then Marchais, the PCF’s revolutionary
ardour was muted and they bargained with the main representative of
the non-communist left whom they helped to build up as a viable
interlocutor.
However, despite the onset of bipolarisation between 1965 and 1973,
there was the possibility that it could be rejected by the left and the
centre as much as by the conservatives. On the Communist side, the
changes made little difference and the search for an alliance around a
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joint platform continued. For the Communist Party, the apotheosis of
the ‘Union of the Left’ around a ‘Common Programme’ came in June
1972. This platform was extensive and unique in French party politics,
which was more used to coalition bargaining between leaders in the
National Assembly than to manifesto politics. French politics polarised,
and the fight, or so it seemed, for the future of the Republic became
more divisive and also more mobilising.
What happened after 1972 and the conclusion of the ‘Common Pro-
gramme’ was unanticipated: it was the Socialist Party which became the
beneficiary of the coalition’s advances. Within the left, the Communist
Party lost its preponderance as the Socialists gained members and voters.
The presidential elections of 1974 after President Pompidou’s death were
revelatory. In these, the Communist Party played an exemplary role
supporting the Socialist candidate Mitterrand but making few demands.
After that election, almost all the benefits went to the Socialist Party
which began its rise in the polls and Socialists took the major winnings
of the left at by-elections. This was a situation to which the Communist
Party did not find a response. It started an open quarrel with the Socialists,
which ended only in 1994 with a new leader.
The year 1977, it transpired, was a crucial year for the development
of the party system and the Communist Party’s place in it. Local elections
held in March that year saw a further bipolarisation of the party system
into left and right coalitions. Old ‘Third Force’ alliances that had
subsisted between Socialists and centrists (against both the Gaullists
and Communists) were finally ended and replaced in most cases by
Communist/Socialist/Radical ‘Union of the Left’ alliances. There were
204 of these ‘Union of the Left’ lists in the 221 large cities and they
won 156 of these contests. In the big cities (over 30,000) the Communists
gained 22 and held in total 72 to the Socialists’ 81. From the Communist
perspective, the local elections provided tangible gains for the first time
in the alliance and the number of Communist councillors in large cities
almost doubled from 1,560 to 2,306.
But the worm had entered the bud. Communists were forced to share
power even in their strongholds and the local victories pushed power
down from the central Party apparatus to mayors. At its origins, Com-
munist politics had gone counter to the trend of localised politics typical
of France and instituted a central control of party politics. In 1988, panic
measures taken in response to the collapse of its vote in the presidentials
promoted local figures but made it more vulnerable to dissidents. In
addition, its need to keep local power in order to survive as a national
party bound them securely to the Socialist Party. These factors were to
become crucial in the comportment of the PCF in the 1990s as the
demands of the alliance pulled it in one (governmental) direction away
from its revolutionary roots and militant supporters.
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Anti-system to system politics
In September 1977 the negotiations to update the ‘Common Programme’
failed and the alliance was formally ended. As in the past, the PCF
coupled a domestic hard-line with international solidarity with the USSR.
In the development of the party system, 1978 was the year in which the
role of dominant party on the left passed from the Communist Party to
the Socialist Party. Thus in 1968 the Gaullist Party had been the dominant
party in the system and had outdistanced the Communists by 46 per
cent to the PCF’s 20 per cent. In 1978, during the bipolar quadrille
party system, there was a left–right division with each camp split in half.
In the 1981 election, the Socialists polled 37.8 per cent, the neo-Gaullists
20.9 per cent and the Communists took 16 per cent. A Socialist and Left
Radical total of 285 seats gave them an absolute majority, but the PCF’s
44 seats did not give it leverage. Whether 1978 was the start of the
decline or not, the process of sliding to the margins was inherent in
the party strategy of 1978.
Over the rest of the 1980s and until the collapse of the USSR the
Party’s position steadily worsened. When Mitterrand won the presidency,
the Party acceded to the demand to support the Socialist Party and,
constrained by its own supporters, it took the four minor ministerial
posts offered. However, it determined to make use of its position in
government to associate itself with successes and criticise failures. This
ambiguous tactic proved no more attractive than outright criticism and
its slide continued. In 1983–84 it was even rivalled as a protest party by
the FN. By 1984, the Party had decided that criticism of the Socialists
from outside the coalition was the best strategy and it left government.
Communist hostility to the Socialists was unremitting from then until
1994. However, in terms of relevance, the PCF was close to slipping out
of the party system (Sartori, 1976: 122–3). Yet, because the Party was
hostile to the ‘reformist’ Socialist Party, and clung to the old certainties
of state socialism, it was unable to capitalise on a probably unrepeatable
opportunity. In 1993 the French Socialist Party collapsed. There were
indications that the former Socialist space was open to conquest. One of
these was the rise of the ecologists who were credited with 20 per cent
in the opinion polls at one point (though their disorganisation prevented
them from capitalising on this) and Le Pen also picked up left-wing
support (Perrineau, 1997). A ‘Downsian’ reaction by the Party moving
to the centre would, at this point, have led to a change in ideology to
compete for the available votes.
As it was the PCF decided to stand pat. All the same between 1992
and 1994 the Communist Party survived. It reoriented its message using
the Maastricht referendum of 1992 to a nationalist and patriotic one
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defending the working people of France from the perceived European
threat. Communism in France had always emphasised its patriotism,
affiliating itself with the national spirit and with the nation (Lavabre,
1994). In the past the Communist Party actively worked to bring together
a mixture of working-class, peasant and intellectual communities to give
them a common identity. What this means is that the PCF has taken up
the defence of social and welfare rights against the inroads of an ‘ag-
gressive neo-liberalism’. This is the point at which Communist
Euroscepticism comes to the fore and joins the Party’s long-standing
anti-capitalism. Europe is, in this view, the vehicle for a market-oriented
liberalisation of France and for the dismantling of the welfare state. Yet
they are limited by the alliance with the Socialist Party and by competition
from the extreme left (and from the FN) for its voters.
In January 1994 at the Party’s 28th Congress, Georges Marchais, who
had effectively led since 1969, gave way to the unknown apparatchik
Robert Hue. Hue changed the terminology of the Party, notably renaming
the Central Committee the ‘National Committee’ and the General Sec-
retary the ‘National Secretary’ but also replacing the old Marxist
vocabulary and distancing the PCF’s discourse bit by bit from the old-
fashioned ‘bolshevism’ that was its heritage.5 Robert Hue decided to
promote a friendly rather than combative image and by 1995 the leader
was held in record-high regard (35 per cent good opinions) and Hue
raised the Party up with him. After the presidential election campaign
the Party had ratings of 32 per cent good opinion (54 per cent bad)
although the opinion polls did not translate directly into real votes
(Duhamel and Jaffré, 1997). Hue ended up with 8.7 per cent of the vote
and took only 1.7 per cent more than Lajoinie in 1988. Hue’s vote was
concentrated in 28 departments – in the Paris region, the north-west,
the centre and the Mediterranean littoral. Even so, Le Pen outpolled
him in some places. Local elections followed and proved worse for the
Party, which lost its last big town (Le Havre), and seven towns of over
30,000. Robert Hue’s strategy was to seek alliance with the Socialists
while renewing the Party’s doctrine as much as possible (given the old
guard’s reluctance to move). This was welcome to a Socialist Party which,
under Lionel Jospin, had revived and sought allies on the left and the
reward later was to be ministerial posts.
Party system possibilities
French Communists have rejected any amalgamation with the Socialist
Party to join what was split in 1920. But, given that the Party had
neglected the opportunity to transform itself in the early 1990s, its main
problem has been to remain as an active participant in the French party
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system. Its strategic dilemmas turned on this problem of exerting some
power in the constellation of small parties around the PS and it is one
of influence. In other words, the Communist Party has lost its place in
the Soviet empire and it has not found a replacement strategy. With the
arrival of Robert Hue at the head of the Party, questions about what the
Party’s role might be and whether the Party is in any position to play it
have become insistent. However, finding a new role for a party, which
has historically had the strongest sense of direction of all parties, has
run up against its own nature and that of the Party’s partners.
There are broadly three views about what the Party’s strategy within
the party system should be and these all have ardent supporters. Com-
munism in France has called on a sufficiently wide range of strands in
the past for each position to claim some legitimacy and to be able to
portray itself as the authentic continuation of French Communism. In
itself this public quarrel about the Party’s role is a novelty and one which
the old generation of Communists are not used to. The leadership’s idea
prevails, but because of the tripartite division in the Party’s hierarchy.
These three strategies are: (1) the so-called ‘alternative’ strategy; (2) the
‘hard-line’; and (3) the leadership’s middle way as developed by Hue
and supported by the National Secretary Marie-George Buffet.
The ‘alternative’ strategy
Inside the Party the biggest minority is probably the ‘alternative’ strategy
promoted by, among others, the late Marseilles deputy Guy Hermier,
Party ideologue Lucien Sève, the historian Roger Martelli and the journal
Futurs. They want to see the Party developed as the conscience of the
left taking up the rights of minorities, extending the welfare state and
leading the attack on the Front National. A ‘radical pole’, it is argued,
could be developed by bringing together the small groups of the extreme
left along with ecologists and that would regenerate the Party. A revival
would enable the Party to deal with the Socialists as an equal but the
strategy is not, in the short term, friendly to the PS. This route seemed
to be opened by the strikes of December 1995 that paralysed the country
for some days and in appearance mimicked the old ‘militant working
class’. Much was made of the Gardanne by-election of October 1996 at
which a Communist supported by a ‘rainbow coalition’ was elected against
a strong challenge from the FN. There is intellectual support for an
‘alternative left’ and the opposition to the all-pervasive free market
liberalism is popular at the grass roots.
This strategy runs up against several problems. The small parties of
the left and the gauche plurielle are not harmonious and are competing
– as the European campaign and the 1998 regional elections showed.6
The Communists and the Trotskyite parties are competitors and the
extreme left has historically made its way in opposition to the PCF. There
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were a few Communist/Trotskyist lists in the local elections of 2001 (one
in Bègles against ecologist leader and 2002 presidential candidate Noël
Mamère) in towns where local disputes led to defensive alliances but
there were many more confrontations. On the ecologist side, the com-
patibility with the Communist Party is by no means evident and they
have their own agenda some of which (opposition to nuclear power, for
instance) is antipathetic to the PCF. On the post-Communist issues, like
the promotion of women, the Pacte Civil de Solidarité (PACS) and soft
drugs the party has not led the way and the other parties are more
liberal. There is the additional risk that the radicalisation of the left will
alienate it from the Socialists and that would pose problems for the
continuance of the Party at local level.
The hard-line strategy
Some of the ideas of the strategists of an ‘alternative’ are echoed by the
hard-liners unreconciled to the evolution of the Party away from its
long-held positions. They are the Leninists who believe in the anti-capi-
talist, anti-imperialist, anti-American ‘party of the working class’ hostile
to ‘bourgeois’ institutions, including the PS. A number of Georges Mar-
chais’ former associates, like Maxime Gremetz and the doyen of the
Assembly elected in 2002, Georges Hage, are resistant to the ‘social
democratisation’ as they see it of the PCF and there are others nostalgic
(like Jacques Karman) for the days of the USSR. Most of the hard-liners
can be found in the Honecker Committees and around the journal
Co-ordination Communiste. These people adopt a hostile stance to the
coalition of the left and the deal with the PS, which they see as a repeat
of the mistake made in the 1960s. This is not a small group and it is
important in federations like the Pas-de-Calais. As far as can be discovered,
it has support in the apparatus of the Party although that remains loyal
to the leadership and it also has its divisions (Duhamel and Jaffré, 1997).
It is, however, looking backwards and not to a strategy for the future.
The leadership’s middle way
More important is Robert Hue’s ‘middle way’ between the two competing
groups avoiding a schism but rejecting both a new ‘Common Programme’
and a competitive radicalism on the left and looking for allies to bring
the Party into the mainstream.7 These allies for practical purposes are
the PS. Under Hue, the Party has tried to set itself up as the left of the
Socialist–Communist alliance: in government but at the same time a
popular tribune. Without being as aggressive as in previous years, this
continues the ‘Ministry of the Masses’ to harass the government but
combines it with governmental prestige and keeps close to the PS. Hue’s
balance is possible as long as it does not make moves that endanger the
special relationship with the Socialists, but that means that the Party has
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limited freedom. When the Party was active in demonstrations for full
employment (with the extreme left in October 1999) or when the Asso-
ciation pour l’Emploi dans l’Industrie et le Commerce (ASSEDIC) was
occupied in December 1997, its position in government is liable to be
questioned.
There are many drawbacks to Hue’s strategy. It is difficult to avoid
either toppling into opposition on the one hand or mutely following the
PS on the other. It has to maintain its distinctiveness but at the same
time deploy its resources in support of the government of which it is
part. Participation in government requires a degree of solidarity and
prevents it, for example, from using anti-Europeanism to rally its sup-
porters, officials and activists. Thus, opposition to the Maastricht Treaty
used as a campaign theme before the 1997 elections was dropped in
the interests of electioneering with the Socialists. By the same token, the
criticism of privatisation which surfaced in L’Humanité was also muted
and the swallowing of some hard choices – like the privatisation of Air
France – has had no pay-off in votes
Even where the Party makes a distinctive radical mark it is always
liable to be outbid by the extreme left or even the ecologists. There is
a space open to exploitation on the protest left as the Trotskyist LO has
demonstrated by polling 5.3 per cent in the 1995 presidential elections
and the 10 per cent taken by the three Trotskyists in 2002. In 2001 the
Trotskyist parties have made advances in local elections (where they are
usually weak) and there were some serious challenges to the Party’s
hegemony in its strongholds. With competition on the extreme left it is
more difficult than it was in the 1980s for the Party to retain a position
in government and keep its radical electorate. Its compromises in govern-
ment (despite the occasional concession made by the Socialists) made it
difficult for the PCF to claim to speak on behalf of the working class or
the disadvantaged.
However, the payout from following the line Hue has chosen was clear.
Most important is the continuation of local government strongholds and
these include (even after March 2001) an important network. It still holds
90 town halls in towns over 9,000, it took 11.2 per cent of the vote in
the cantonal elections in the 1,639 cantons where it was well represented
and has 131 councillors. This is a network of some substance and it will
be years before it is entirely lost. By the same token, it will be many
years before the Greens (or the Trotskyists) can rival it. It also keeps the
Party in the mainstream, at the centre of affairs and involved in bar-
gaining. It can negotiate concessions in government and in committee
and its supporters in the unions and state industries can be helped. Short
of accepting a position on the outside looking in on the left and perhaps
losing its role in the party system altogether, it has to stay in alliance.
What is lacking in Hue’s line is a view of where the Party is going and
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how it differs from its partners. This proved fatal to Hue’s campaign in
the 2002 presidential elections. Hue was unable to give a convincing
account of in what way the PCF had changed or even inflected the course
of the Socialist government of 1995–2002. Hue’s stance as the ‘left of
the left’ did not look credible and it was tested by more extreme and
outspoken candidates during the campaign with the result that the Party
looked opportunist and jaded. Although the humiliation of Robert Hue
in the presidential election caused a leadership crisis there was still no
response to the key question of what new line the Party should take and
its dilemma of how a ‘revolutionary’ party should behave was unresolved.
Conclusion
Little attention has been devoted to the resilience of the French party
system and the way that it could accommodate a radically anti-system
party which did not accept the rules of the game and wanted to change
the nature of society. By incorporating the PCF into the party system,
the mainstream left marginalised it and reduced its potential for desta-
bilisation. However, its predominance on the left enabled other parties
to play on fears of ‘Reds’ and its role helped an extreme right-wing
opposition to emerge.
Despite the absence of an international Communist threat, it is not
clear that this Communist effect, which promotes centrifugal competition,
is played out. With the end of the cold war, however, the Communist–
democratic cleavage became less salient and it became possible for other
parties to define alternative lines of political division. In addition, Com-
munist penetration of society has diminished on a number of dimensions.
Party identification has dropped in France (as elsewhere in Western
Europe) and the PCF has been dependent on this sense of party as no
other. It could also be noted that class voting has also declined (although
in France it has always been below the mean) to the lowest in Europe
(Gallagher et al., 2001: 250–61). This, for what was the self-defined
‘workers’ party’, is a factor in its diminishing cohesiveness. New parties,
or previously marginal ones, have entered the arena and rival the
Communist Party for its own traditional electorate.
For the Communist Party, which knew where it stood and which had
a vicarious participation in a greater project, adaptation to the new
circumstances has proved unusually difficult. Yet French Communism,
having been the dominant force on the left for the formative years of
the Fifth Republic, remains a distinctive force on the left. It is rooted in
French life and in its political culture, it is still highly structured and an
effective organisation at local level as well as a potential government
partner. But the Communist presence does not drive the party system
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and its position in the ‘plural left’ is more like that of a small ‘hinge’
party than an anti-system force. It has also proved unable to keep the
extreme-left supporters inside the coalition of the left and its hegemony
over the forces to the left of the Socialist Party was negligible in 2002.
On this last point, the weakness of the Socialist Party means that, as
things stand, Socialist leaders will have to rely on Communist support
to compose governing coalitions. Thus the PS also has an interest in the
continuing existence of the PCF, even in a weakened condition, but only
as one of the components of the ‘plural left’ and as one of a number of
partners. For the Communist Party it means living with the tension
between participation in government or in alliance with the PS (with the
solidarity that implies) and retreating to the margins as a critical protest
party (invoking the anti-system politics at which it is an adept). Both
these positions have their partisans in the Party (and both positions have
their dangers) but the leadership has so far opted for an alliance or
government role. With the continuing vertiginous decline of the Party,
the temptation to outbid the extreme left (perhaps using the CGT) and
regain its radical electorate must be strong. However, the Party is too
weak to be other than a minor part of any new coalition of the left led
by the PS.
Notes
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2 Le Figaro, 15 April 1997.
3 L’Humanité, 22 May 2001.
4 L’Humanité, 28 January 1997.
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The PCF: from revolution to reform  41
3
PS intra-party politics and
party system change
Ben Clift
The left PS intra-party politics and party system change
Introduction
Approaches to the study of party system change tend to emphasise, on
the one hand, broad electoral trends, such as disaffection with ‘govern-
mental’ political parties, or increasing electoral volatility and, on the
other, institutional developments, such as changes to voting systems. Such
‘macro’-level analysis can at times treat parties as unitary actors, possessed
of one ‘response’ to their changing environment, an approach which
underplays analysis of the party itself. This chapter offers a two-tier
analysis of the interaction between developments within the party system
as a whole, and the internal politics of the French PS.
At both levels, an appreciation of both structure and agency is vital
to understanding how both the PS and the party system have recently
evolved. The first section illustrates the institutional constraints of the
French party system, and how its competitive demands helped to
structure the internal organisation of the PS. Subsequent sections show
how, in turn, the PS has shaped the development of the French party
system. The French party system is not a particularly rigid structure,
destabilised by numerous changes to the electoral ‘rules of the game’,
changing patterns of voting behaviour, and changing constituent par-
ties over the last twenty years. As for agency, the set of actors
shaping electoral strategy within a party can change rapidly. Further-
more, the internal organisational rules governing internal power
relationships are themselves prone to evolve, affecting to what extent
one particular strategic vision can achieve ascendancy within the party,
and beyond it.
Disaggregating beyond the level of the party, and the party’s response
to a changing environment involves two dimensions. First, party disag-
gregation involves analysing different strategies from different factional
groupings within the party. This leads in turn to considering a set of
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intra-party structure and agency relationships in order to understand
how factional interaction is mediated by the internal organisation of the
party. Understanding these relationships is important, since which set
of perceptions are in the ascendant within a party crucially affects the
interaction with the party system and relations between competitor
parties. The role of internal developments, as either a barrier or a
precondition to the emergence of a more coherent electoral strategy in
the late 1990s, is illustrated below.
Second, parties must be treated as independent variables, which actively
interact with and constitute the party system. This is because political
strategy involves both which competitor formations should the PS seek
to ally with (and what should be the nature of those allegiance arrange-
ments) and how the PS should seek to restructure the electoral system,
thus reshaping the balance of forces within the French party system.
This chapter considers how PS factionalism and organisational changes
structure the internal debate, and shape the PS approach to the two
dimensions of political strategy. The final section examines a series of
significant episodes in the PS’s development in the 1990s and explores
the processes of interaction between intra-party politics and opportunities
for party system change.
The French party system, the logic of rassemblement, and the union
de gauche
The advent of the Fifth Republic brought with it a new electoral system
for presidential and legislative elections, specifically designed to preclude
the perceived systemic weaknesses of the Fourth Republic. The two-ballot
majoritarian system contained institutional constraints requiring parties
to reach a 12.5 per cent 1 threshold in the first ballot of parliamentary
elections, and the rule that only two candidates progress to the second
ballot of presidential elections. These presented a hurdle to smaller
parties, and unleashed systemic incentives for larger parties, in the second
ballot, to gain votes transferred from those eliminated after the first.
The majoritarian two-ballot system thus favours both alliance candidates
from the first ballot, and agreements of the weaker candidate to stand
down between the two ballots.
At the same time, the extraordinary ‘catch-all’ success of the Gaullist
Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR) (Kirchheimer 1990: 54–5)
encompassed most of the right, but extended into the centre and even
to elements of the working-class left electorate. This is a case of Kirch-
heimer’s catch-all thesis skewed by de Gaulle’s success within a bi-polar
presidentialised party system. Mitterrand appreciated the need to exploit
the possibilities of discipline républicaine – or the need for a transfer of
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votes from other left groupings to the most likely winner between the
two rounds. To this end, ideological distance from the PCF had to be
reduced in a party system bipolarised by Gaullism. There was thus none
of Kirchheimer’s ‘de-ideologization’ and no ‘drastic reduction in the
party’s ideological baggage’ (1990: 58). On the contrary, there was a
reaffirmed turn to the left.
Appreciation of these systemic factors lay at the heart of Mitterrand’s
strategic vision. Arguably, the reconfiguration of the left culminating at
Epinay in 1971 was designed almost purely to exploit electoral oppor-
tunities of the Fifth Republic. As Hanley notes, ‘the whole enterprise of
creating the successful post-1972 PS stemmed from realising what the
new electoral system involved . . . a new-look Socialist party had to be
put together out of the SFIO and the oddments of the “non-communist
Left” ’ (1999a: 61). Bergounioux and Grunberg note that the PS is ‘more
a juxtaposition of courants, traditions, and personalities than a genuinely
unified party’ (1992: 293). This federating process, however imperfect,
was a necessary precondition of the union de gauche – the marriage of
convenience which formed the linchpin of Mitterrand’s strategy. The
centrifugal tendencies of the French left endured (Bartolini, 1984, Bell,
Chapter 2 of this volume), but such countervailing institutional constraints
often overwhelmed such tendencies.
Thus the make-up of the PS bore the imprint of the functional
requirements of the Party system. Internal proportional representation
and the factionalism it institutionalised was also functional to the process
of rassemblement required by the electoral system, enabling the PS to
broaden its catchment area and bring together a more diverse electorate
at the second ballot than would be possible, for example, with the
monotheism of the PCF. Indeed, Sferza and Lewis (1987) argue that PS
factionalism in large part explains the advances made in the 1970s.
Schlesinger and Schlesinger’s recent study attests to the effectiveness of
the aspect of the PS as an electoral machine (2000: 142, table).
The competing institutional and electoral logics of the French
party system
French political life involves many different electoral systems, electing
the numerous representative bodies within the French polity. Elections,
according to Machin, ‘are too numerous and frequent, different electoral
systems encourage different and sometimes conflicting competitive
strategies and electoral systems are often changed’ (1989: 76). Different
electoral rules in effect demand conflicting electoral strategies. In order
to assess whether a party designed to operate under the second-ballot
rassemblement logic of the 1970s successfully adapted to the competing
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proportional and majoritarian logics at various levels, we should first
briefly outline the significant changes.
‘Decisive’ presidential and parliamentary elections remain majoritarian
penalising small parties, and encouraging the formation of coalitions.
‘Intermediary’ elections, however, have become increasingly proportional,
encouraging parties to stand up and be counted. First, proportional
European elections were instituted in 1979, with a 5 per cent threshold,
and the country treated as one constituency. Second, in 1982, municipal
elections became semi-proportional with 50 per cent of the seats awarded
to the majority (or plurality) in the second ballot, but with the other 50
per cent of seats shared in proportion to votes cast. Third, at the time
of the one-off proportional parliamentary elections in 1986, the first
elections of the regional councils took place, 96 departments became
multi-member constituencies, with a 5 per cent threshold, and seats
distributed on the ‘highest average principle’ (Machin, 1989: 75).
This external turbulence of changing rules of the game in the party
system coincided with a (slightly) calmer internal atmosphere within the PS
as a result of Mitterrand’s unchallenged supremacy until 1988. This en-
sured that his strategic vision prevailed. Although genetically programmed
to operate under a majoritarian system inducing rassemblement in the
second ballot, the PS proved adept at pursuing other strategies for different
kinds of elections. This was facilitated by the party’s flexibility, a by-product
of its ‘weakness’ – the party has comparatively low membership, a small
bureaucratised national office, and a tradition of local autonomy. For
example, differential candidate selection procedures within the PS afford
different degrees of influence to the national and local organisations.2
Part-cause and part-effect of the flexibility and ‘weakness’ of the PS is
the hold that local notables – what Mény calls the ‘Republican aristocracy’
(1995) – have over the national party organisation. This tradition of local
autonomy is highly significant in terms of electoral alliances, given the
differential local performance of some of the PS’s allies. An established
notable, taking account of the relative strength of potential electoral allies
in his or her locality, will decide the appropriate strategy accordingly,
with scant regard for national strategic directives to the contrary.
Such localised strategic variation means that few generalisations can
be made about national electoral strategy, since it varies in accordance
with local electoral realities. Here again, the importance of developments
within PS factionalism are significant. At the height of the factional
skirmishing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, coordination was difficult
to achieve. This was because of geographical variations in the strength
of support for a particular faction. Certain federations operate as power
bases for particular factions, and thus in an area where one faction
predominates, it was difficult to impose a strategy too closely associated
with a factional rival.
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As the strategic context of PS electoral strategy became more complex,
with the range of and variation in strategic options increasing, such
organisational malleability enabled the PS to reconcile divergent positions.
These are variations which the national organisation has neither the
ability, nor perhaps the inclination, to counter. This organisational flex-
ibility was thus a pressure valve releasing some of the tensions caused
by the competing logics of the various electoral systems.
Lastly, in the last twenty years, the public opinion climate in France
has been characterised by a crisis of representation for governmental
parties, evidenced by electoral trends towards ‘protest’ voting, absten-
tion and increased volatility (Boy and Mayer, 1997). The coincidence
of disaffection with the political system, and the governmental parties
within it, and with the electoral system changes outlined above is
significant. None of the larger parties (PS, RPR or UDF) has sustained
claims to ‘catch-all’ party status (Kirchheimer, 1990), in part because
smaller parties benefited from protest voting. Proportional representation
greatly increased the effectiveness of such expressions of disaffection.
Furthermore, even in majoritarian elections, the impact of volatility has
been significant, with no incumbent government having won a legislative
election since 1978 – the so-called hyper-alternance (Evans and Ivaldi,
2002).
That said, we have not seen the triumph of smaller parties over
governmental parties. The PS, even in its darkest electoral hour, still
received more support than any other left political grouping. While the
hegemony of the governmental parties has receded in the face of in-
creasing volatility and abstention, the smaller parties have no more than
dented large party support, unable to make the advances that some
analysts predicted for them. In this situation, the PS cannot succeed
alone, but remains the most important single left grouping. The need
for electoral allies is clear. As Charlot puts it, ‘this combining of forces
between forces necessarily close at the level of ideas and political inter-
ests . . . finds its cement in the institutional constraints which make
the abandonment of union politically costly’ (1992: 23). Thus for all the
evolutions, continuity in decisive elections means a familiar logic continues
to structure the party system.
PS factionalism – structuring the debate over political strategy
Parties are not unitary actors. They should be treated more as arenas,
incorporating competing groups of actors, and a number of competing
strategies in the face of a given structural context, as well as different
suggestions for reform to that context. Intra-party differences over how
to play the hand dealt by the strategic context of the French party system,
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and what structural changes to the system would further the party’s ends,
must be taken into account. This necessitates unearthing the intra-party
political mechanisms, particularly pressing in the study of the PS where
internal proportionality institutionalising ‘presidentialised factionalism’
has structured the party’s development since its foundation at Epinay
(Bell and Criddle, 1988, 1994, Cole, 1989).
Hine’s framework for the analysis of party factionalism identifies struc-
tural incentives to factionalism. Following Sartori (1976: 94–104), Hine
places considerable emphasis on the role of internal PR, arguing that,
‘the use of proportionalism can have an important impact on the nature
of intra-party conflict and, when introduced, can make actions more rigid
and draw more individuals into their ambit’ (1982: 45). It has been
argued elsewhere that the importance of these structural incentives to
factionalism has been overstated (Cole, 1986, 1989, Clift, 2000). This
point is best illustrated by charting the fluctuating levels and intensity
of factionalism within the PS since 1971. There were periods of very
intense factional infighting, notably 1978–80 (Cole, 1989) and 1988–1992
(Dupin, 1991, Clift, 2000) which were interspersed with relatively calmer
periods. Such fluctuation leads us to search for other factors influencing
factionalism, since the system of PR, in operation throughout, cannot
explain the variation.
Focusing almost exclusively on internal proportional representation
tends to crowd out analysis of conjunctural incentives to factionalism,
linked to different strategies pursued by factions depending on the
political context. This political context is affected by such variables as
the proximity of elections, and whether the leader has achieved internal
hegemony within the party. Equally, it will be affected by changes in
relations with competitor parties, and perceived opportunities for changes
in electoral strategy. The set of non-structural incentives to PS factionalism
considered here are the differences between factional camps of strategy
and tactics both over what changes to the institutional parameters of
party system should be advocated, and how to play the hand dealt the
PS by the French party system and electoral context.
Electoral strategy is a key battleground of factional struggle. For
example, one reading of the ‘two cultures’ thesis sees the fundamental
schism within French Socialism as not a philosophical battle pitting
Bernstein against Kautsky, but a purely strategic divergence over whether
or not the PCF constitute appropriate electoral allies. The broad outlines
of the two dominant strategic choices have remained constant, that is
either ouverture towards the centre, or Union towards the left, and
including the Communists. In 1985, the split between Rocard and Mit-
terrand centred on PR, with Rocard resigning in objection to Mitterrand’s
relatively (but not entirely) successful electoral manipulation of the 1986
elections. Criticism and counter-criticism of these competing strategies,
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and such electoral engineering, continued to dominate discussion of
electoral strategy in the post-Mitterrand era.
Internal disagreement passed through the channels of the courants,
which shaped the debate and limited the range of options. As we saw,
the party’s structure facilitated the uniting of the diverse groups behind
the left’s présidentiable. At the same time, however, each of the factions
was afforded the luxury of their own présidentiable who could fight his or
her faction’s doctrinal corner, play a prominent role in internal party
life, and in the longer term could groom themselves and position
themselves as Mitterrand’s heir apparent. Each courant leader – or
‘elephant’ as they are not-so-affectionately called in the party – must be
the first signatory to their courant’s motion or general political statement
(containing clues as to their electoral strategy position) which is presented
at a conference.3
Courants, the received wisdom goes, are a positive and enlivening
element of internal debate when they bring forth new ideas and engage
in debates. However, those tasks, which were performed admirably in
the 1970s have been superseded. In the mid to late 1980s, courants –
with their own finances, offices, and newspapers, behaved increasingly
like parties within a party. The title ‘courant de pensée’ became decreasingly
appropriate as the doctrinal role diminished, leaving only the organisa-
tional, power-brokering role. Rennes, the apogee of the courant system
as a gladitorial power struggle, made this drift all the more apparent.
There ensued, in the years after the Rennes Congress, a sea change in
the approach to internal pluralism, with a shift away from formal or-
ganisation along the ‘parties within parties’ lines, and towards Rose’s
‘stable sets of attitudes’ model (1964). This has been accompanied by
institutional changes, reducing the reliance on internal proportionality,
and a revived convention of synthesising the major positions before
congress, with all the major groupings effectively forming one courant
(Clift, 2000). These internal changes, which ultimately underpinned
Jospin’s internal hegemony (see below), were accompanied by changes
in the PS’s electoral context, presenting some novel strategic challenges.
Episode 1: ‘New politics’, new cleavage formation?
In the later 1980s and early 1990s, support for political ecologism in
France (the principal formations being Génération Ecologie (GE) and
les Verts – the Greens) increased dramatically. After a 10 per cent showing
in the 1989 European elections, the Greens polled 15 per cent of votes
cast in the regional elections of 1992. The fact that one polling institution
put ecologist support at 19 per cent in January 1993 did little to dampen
ecologist hopes (Boy, 1993:161). In the context of the declining electoral
fortunes of the PS and adverse public opinion, a factional debate between
Mauroy (First Secretary from 1988 to 1992) and Fabius (First Secretary
48  The left
after Mauroy’s resignation in 1992) centred on how to approach this
new political formation.
The debate had two dimensions. On the one hand, it concerned
contingent relations between the two parties, involving traditional debates
about whether to sign non-aggression pacts, to agree not to stand in
certain seats, or désistement between ballots in favour of the best-placed
first-round candidate. On the other hand, there were debates about what
structural changes to the French party system the PS might advocate
either as carrots to encourage the ecologists to the negotiating table, or
in the party’s own interest. If the various forces of French political
ecologism could be shepherded under the same umbrella as the PS, the
speculation went, then this might represent a sufficiently powerful elec-
toral force to keep the right out of power for the foreseeable future.
Fabius spoke in the preparation for the 1992 regional and cantonal
elections of the need to work with ‘the Mouvement des Radicaux de
Gauche, France Unie, the two ecologist parties, the Communist renovators,
other communists . . . all those who form the Left and the progressives
in the 1990s in all their diversity’.4 However, the offer of an early electoral
pact foundered in the absence of structural changes to the electoral
system to facilitate ecologist progress.5 The ‘all-conquering’ Greens were
resolutely unimpressed by such offerings.
Fabius may have overestimated PS strength, or lacked the strategic
vision to see the possibilities of a left–Green alliance. Perhaps he was
reluctant to contemplate changes to the electoral system which would
have the epiphenomenal effect of advancing the FN’s cause. Fabius
nonetheless played his hand badly. He attempted to repair bridges by
‘greenwashing’ the party’s discourse,6 then took the extraordinary step
of deciding to withdraw unilaterally from second-round ballots in seats
where the ecologists were ahead after the first, despite a lack of any
electoral pact (Boy, 1993: 164–5). After this abject failure, Mauroy attacked
Fabius and held the courant system responsible for the ill-adapted
electoral strategy of 1993. ‘The courants . . . made us forget a realistic
and adapted strategy . . . We refused to understand that the only possible
dialogue with the ecologists had to start with the adoption of a mixed
electoral system, responding to the demands of democracy given the new
political configuration.’ 7
Whether Mauroy would have handled things any differently, had he
remained First Secretary a little longer, we will never know. The point,
however, is that the intra-party debates over relations with electoral allies
dealt with issues of such fundamental importance to the operation of the
French party system as whether or not an offer of electoral system reform
should have been made to the ecologists. Had Mauroy, not Fabius,
presided over the negotiations, the shape of the French party system
might be very different. If the smaller political movements of the left in
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all its diversity could have been brought under the same umbrella, could
the catastrophic defeat of 1993 been avoided? Probably not, but the PS
might have avoided plummeting quite as low as it did. The overall vote
polled by the ecologist movements was 10.8 per cent in 1993. Had the
PS been able to count on some of that support in the second ballot, it
could have drastically reduced the scale of its defeat.
Episode 2: Rocard’s ‘big bang’ – the attempted restructuring of the
French party system
In the wake of the crushing defeat of French Socialism, the PS’s rela-
tionship with the French party system underwent a series of fairly rapid
changes. In order to understand fully the shifts in direction and rationale
which ensued, we must look to the ascendancy or otherwise of various
factional groupings. Fabius resigned, leaving his factional rival Rocard
with scope to redesign the party’s electoral strategy. Rocard’s proposed
big bang claimed to tap into secular changes within the French electoral
context. The big bang sought to take account of the changes both in
voting behaviour and the socio-economic structure of society. This was
an electoral strategy designed to work in the context of what Gérard
Le Gall, the PS chief electoral strategist, has called ‘sociological quasi-
indeterminism’ (1993). Heightened electoral volatility and the declining
relevance of socio-economic position to voting behaviour, had been
factored in to Rocard’s analysis.
The PS would, he hoped, ride the waves of these changes, and herald
a restructuring of the French party system. Having criticised PS’s tradi-
tional ‘submission’ of its allies, Rocard envisaged a ‘vast movement, open,
modern and rich in its diversity, . . . [which] will encompass the reformism
of ecologists, the loyalty to a social tradition of centrisme, and the authentic
renovatory impulse of communism.’ To facilitate the construction of this
movement, Rocard advocated institutional changes to the French party
system. ‘Attached as I am to the majoritarian system, I think it indis-
pensable to add to it a dose of proportional representation into the
present system’, Rocard implored all concerned to confront the obstacles
to ‘the political big bang to which I aspire’.8 Rocard’s radical project
caused a stir, not least because it seemed to threaten the end of the PS.
Rocard was proposing a rééquilibrage – redesigning the political landscape
and reinventing existing political parties (Charlot, 1994: 270). The explicit
advocacy of alliances with the centre had long been the Rocardian political
strategy of choice, but his conversion to electoral reform gave the big
bang a novel air.
In 1993, Rocard’s position as both president of the party and candidat
naturel for the presidency suggested that a rééquilibrage along these lines
could have been possible. However, Rocard’s idea never really weathered
the storm that followed the 1993 defeat. The centrists firmly associated
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themselves with the parties of the right, some joining the Balladur
government, others dissolving their own parliamentary group. Thus the
realignment was only likely to happen within the left, since the centrists
had raised the drawbridge. However, even this smaller-scale realignment
was hampered. The spectacular failure of Rocard’s gamble is largely
explained by intra-party fighting, and the ongoing factionalism within
the PS. Mitterrand was determined to derail Rocard’s big bang,9 part of
his implacable opposition to Rocard’s bid to succeed him as President.
Mitterrand’s friends within the Party accordingly backed Tapie’s Energie
Radicale list in the 1994 European elections against Rocard’s official list.
This split in the left vote helped the PS list plummet below 15 per cent
– a humiliating result even given the PS’s very low expectations in the
wake of 1993.
Even before the European election results finally destroyed Rocard’s
political credibility, however, his intended redrawing of the political
landscape was not proceeding entirely as he envisaged. Competing fac-
tional visions endured within the PS over the party’s point of insertion
into the French party system, who were the best allies, and on what
ideological territory to meet them. Rocard’s ambition for the Assises de
la transformation sociale, a set of meetings with all potential allies, and
supposedly the first institutional manifestation of the big bang in action,
was to approach civil society groups and centrists. While Rocard happily
involved Communist ‘renovators’ such as Herzog, he did not aim to
reconstruct the union de gauche. However, those organising the Assises –
Jospin, a disciple of mitterrandiste political strategy, and Cambadélis, a
one-time Trotskyist and loyal Jospin ally – did not share Rocard’s strategic
vision.
Although marginalised in the party and contemplating leaving politics
at the time, Jospin saw the Assises as an ideal opportunity to explore the
potential of the Rouge–Rose–Vert coalition. Rocard became aware that the
direction being taken by the Assises deviated from his vision, but Rocard’s
lack of a hegemonic position within the PS analogous to that enjoyed
by Mitterrand when steering the party’s political strategy in the 1970s
meant that he could not impose his vision. Furthermore, Rocard’s lack
of hegemonic authority within the party was mirrored by the PS’s lack
of hegemonic authority on the left of the French party system. Fabius’s
experiences with the Greens prior to 1993 indicated that the PS elite
was no longer at liberty to dictate the terms of relations with competitor
formations. In the period 1993–94, articles in the PS weekly Vendredi on
electoral strategy contain the disclaimer, ‘in the spirit of partnership,
exempt from any desire for hegemony, and respecting the autonomy of
each formation’.10
How genuine this newfound modesty really was is questionable, but it
nevertheless hints at a real impediment to the desired restructuring
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process. The PS did not seem the appropriate body to orchestrate the
rééquilibrage because it was too tarnished and powerless a body to deliver
on any pacts it formed with other political formations, not least because
changing the electoral system requires being in government. Both inter-
nally within the party, and externally within the party system, Rocard
was not in a position to deliver his big bang. Indeed, the late Pierre
Guidoni argued that bargaining only really began from a position of
relative strength, in the wake of Jospin’s creditable 1995 presidential
election defeat, which was a necessary precondition of re-establishing
alliances. ‘In reality, we pursued our alliance strategy only when we
regained electoral hegemony, it was at that moment that we could start
offering presents.’ 11
Episode 3: The birth of the gauche plurielle
Internally, the context of factionalism changed after 1995, when the prize
everyone was fighting for – the presidency – was lost. Jospin ended 1995
as defeated presidential candidate, but also the unassailable leader of
the left in France. Jospin converted his political capital gained by his
‘successful’ defeat into security of tenure and an hegemonic position
within the PS by becoming (before the process had reached the party’s
statute book) the first directly elected PS first secretary (Clift, 2000). At
that point, just as had happened earlier under Mitterrand, a ceasefire
descended, making coordination of electoral strategy much easier. In
stark contrast to the early 1990s, once Jospin’s internal (and external)
ascendancy was assured, his hands were freed to proceed as he wished
in shaping PS electoral strategy.
In hindsight, the Assises de la transformation sociale in 1993–94 constituted
vital groundwork which paid dividends when Jospin was re-elected first
secretary. The four programmatic conventions under Jospin, and the
programmatic elements for the meetings with the PCF and the ecologists,
were all traceable back to the Assises. The dynamic of recovery set in
train by 1995 heralded a renovation, with significant modifications, of
the union de gauche. In its rassemblement of the whole of the left, Jospin’s
political strategy displayed some Mitterrandist continuity, but, with the
addition of the Greens, the gauche plurielle represented a novel structur-
ation of the French party system.
Within the PS, Jospin’s internal hegemony represented an enormous
asset in dealings with potential allies. Jospin’s orchestration of candidate
designation (a process facilitated by the haste-inducing surprise dissolu-
tion) for the 1997 legislative elections leaving room for alliance candidates
clearly demonstrated this. The trick was to ‘organise the legislative
elections as if they were proportional elections’.12 This attested to a degree
of centralised organisation which, as Rocard found, is difficult to achieve
when the de facto leader of the party does not enjoy widespread support
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within the party. The spectacular failure of Hollande’s gauche unie in
June 2002 can be traced in part to his lack of his internal hegemony
analogous to Jospin’s. Protracted, ill-tempered PS–PCF–Verts–PRG elec-
toral negotiations eventually achieved only 34 single candidacies, not the
577 that Hollande had hoped for, with an additional 136 ‘partial agree-
ments’ involving a candidate ‘wearing the colours’ of at least two of the
four formations at the first ballot.13
Internal developments within the PS’s ally formations were also im-
portant preconditions of the gauche plurielle. This point, which further
highlights the importance of analysing intra-party politics when conside-
ring party system change, can be illustrated by briefly considering the
case of the Greens and the PCF. In the mid-1990s, Voynet and Cochet
overcame internal opposition, and the Greens emerged as the dominant
force in French political ecology (O’Neill, 1997: 195–209). Under Voynet’s
direction, the Greens came to abandon their ‘neither right nor left’ stance
in the face of electoral difficulties at grass-roots level. The modest
performance in the 1994 cantonals, no seats in the European elections,
and the difficulties they had fielding candidates on a national level 14
further underlined what Daniel Boy (1993) has termed the ‘coming back
down to earth’ of the ecologists in the period after 1993. The eschewal
of all alliances contradicted the institutional logic of the system. When
only Dominique Voynet made it to the second ballot of the 1993 legislative
elections, these difficulties were brought home to the Greens.
With PS recovery after 1995, the Greens realised there was no longer
the political space available. This very different political context, facili-
tated, prior to 1997, the first alliance being concluded between the
PS (supporting 29 Green candidates) and the Greens (supporting 77 PS
candidates). In terms of structural changes, Jospin made encouraging
noises about PR to woo the Greens. In 2002, four of the single gauche
unie candidacies were Green, and the PS supported 59 Green candidates
(albeit in safe right seats), who in turn supported 94 Socialists. Despite
increased Green first-round vote share (from 3.6 per cent in 1997 to 4.5
per cent), the vagaries of the electoral system left them with only three
deputies.
The significant developments in the PCF’s internal politics were three-
fold: ongoing decline, the increasing importance and autonomy of the
PCF ‘red’ notables, and the change of leadership. The PCF’s continuing
decline shifts the terms of trade against the PCF, reducing its room to
manoeuvre (despite the surprisingly resilient return of 21 deputies in
June 2002). Second, as David Bell has noted in this volume (Chapter
2), local politics has become of increasing importance to the PCF as it
declines nationally. The need to retain ‘political reality’ at the local level
constrains the PCF at the national level, due to the autonomy which
local notables derive from their local power bases and consequently allows
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them to pave the way in areas where alliance is mutually advantageous,
for closer PS–PCF cooperation. Thus the PCF is condemned to the
Union.
Third, with the arrival of Robert Hue some foresee a steady reduction
in the distance between the two historic rivals. Such predictions paper
over certain significant cracks – the pace of reforms and European policy,
for instance, not to mention the legacy of eighty years of hostility.
Nevertheless, the PCF has few other strategic options, beyond a dangerous
radicalisation which, as Bell has also noted in this volume (Chapter 2),
could result in the destruction of the left’s electoral coalition. As a result
of partial ‘social democratisation’ under Hue, and the shifting terms of
trade in the Socialists’ favour, the fundamental differences which produced
the deux cultures have dissipated as the price to pay for union with the
PCF reduced.
Conclusion
Early in the 1990s, the PS attempted root-and-branch restructuring both
of itself and the French party system. The restructuring failed, for both
external reasons, in the form of adverse electoral results, and internal
reasons, namely the falling from grace of the strategy’s key proponent,
or the sabotage of the strategy by factional rivals. The success of Jospin’s
post-1995 restructuring owes a great deal to the fact that, internally,
despite recent structural changes, the basic institutional logic which once
underpinned Mitterrand’s dominance of the party underpinned Jospin’s
incontournable position within the PS. Furthermore, externally, a similar
strategic vision which once inspired the union de gauche, rooted in the
‘institutional cement’ of the rules of the game of the French party system,
was seen by Jospin as a sine qua non of political success and underpinned
the gauche plurielle.
The gauche plurielle owed a great deal both to Jospin’s internal hege-
mony, and to the reestablishment of PS electoral hegemony on the left.
The 2002 defeats may reopen debates about increased proportionality,
which could fundamentally alter the institutional logic which cemented
the gauche plurielle, creating uncertainty about the future shape of, and
strategies within, the left pole of the French party system. The first
attempt at a successor strategy, the gauche unie, proved incompatible with
the institutional logic of dual-ballot elections, and failed given record
abstention, the continued decline of the PCF, disappointing results for
the Greens and increased fragmentation of the left, which could not
agree to cohere around a damaged but still dominant PS. In its wake,
it is unclear whether the conditions exist to rebuild a governing coalition
of the left within the French party system.
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Notes
1 Set at 5 per cent of those voting in 1958, revised to 10 per cent of the
registered electorate in 1966, which was in turn raised to 12.5 per cent of
the registered electorate in 1976.
2 The proportional list elections (regional, European) involve a high degree
of central input into list construction. For cantonal and municipal elections
candidate selection is, on the whole, decided at the section level. For
parliamentary elections, candidate selection takes place at the departmental
or federation level, where the degree of national-level interference also varies
(see below).
3 The strength of any given courant is determined by the votes its motion
receives. The bottom line is a mathematical equation between proportion of
votes obtained and proportion of internal positions of responsibility. The
federal structures mirror the national, where, at the departmental level, all
factions are represented proportionately on the Federal Executive (Bell and
Criddle, 1988: 210–16 and Figure 10.1).
4 PS Info no. 512 (18 April 1992) – proceedings of the Comité Directeur 12
April 1992.
5 In part as a means to appease the Greens, the multi-party Vedel Commission
had been convened in 1992 to look at electoral reform, ultimately recom-
mending a compromise position of a mixed AMS (German-style) system,
with 10 per cent of National Assembly seats decided proportionally. Prime
Minister Bérégovoy (a close associate of Fabius) decided not to proceed with
electoral reform ahead of the 1993 elections.
6 Fabius claimed Bérégovoy’s government was engaged in a model of growth
he called ‘eco-development . . . nothing less than an ecological restructuring
of society’ Journal Officiel de l’Assemblee Nationale, 8 April 1992, p. 381.
7 PS Info no. 544 (17 April 1993) – proceedings of the Comité Directeur, 3
April 1993.
8 All quotes taken from Rocard’s speech at Montlouis-sur-Seine, 17 February
1993.
9 Despite personally favouring a shift to proportional representation, for
example in the 1993 elections (Favier and Martin-Roland, 1991: 266, 383).
10 See. e.g., La Lettre de Vendredi no. 31, 21 October 1994; communiqué commun
PS/PCF 18 October 1994.
11 Interview with Pierre Guidoni, PS National Secretary for International Re-
lations, 24 September 1997.
12 Ibid.
13 The PS agreed to withdraw from 105 constituencies, 13 in favour of the PCF
and 33 in favour of the PRG. In exchange, the Socialists benefited from
Communist support in 36 constituencies, and from the PRG in 515 consti-
tuencies. Of the 34 single candidacies, 14 were PS, 12 were PCF, 4 PRG
and 4 Greens (Libération, 18 May 2002).
14 Only 37 per cent of constituencies had a green candidate in the cantonal
elections, and they gained only 3.9 per cent of the vote.
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Introduction
‘Utopia has come to French history’, declared René Dumont on 26 April
1974. Conscious of the necessity of establishing such a utopia, he was of
the opinion that the newly founded ecologist movement should ‘organise
so as to establish itself permanently as an influence in French political
life’ (Dumont, 1974: 5). Twenty-five years later, this utopian movement
has been replaced by a complex organisation. In a quarter of a century,
the Greens have had the opportunity to try out a number of organisational
approaches and to test various electoral strategies and to develop novel
internal practices based on their own particular motivations and identity.
Gradually, however, they have been forced to accept a dose of political
reality and adapt their membership practices in the interests of electoral
success. In carrying out our organisational, electoral and ideological
analysis, our aim is to explore how the Greens have tried to maintain a
coherent identity while facing up to the new responsibilities which have
recently been placed at their feet.
Structure and membership
The democratic formality of the party is an attempt to save the
Greens from oligarchic tendencies as well as to establish the following
principles: free engagement, enshrined in membership regulations;
free expression within the party, to fight against the tendency of the
individual to disappear under the force of militancy; and the revitalisation
of democratic practice, in particular participatory democracy. The
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organisational structure is meant to lower the boundaries between politics
and civil society: the ‘movement’ should remain a policy tool and nothing
more. The Greens abide by these founding principles, maintaining a
collective memory of the party’s origins as well as transforming it to cope
with contemporary political challenges.
Building a ‘different’ party
Comparative analysis has revealed that, in general, ecology parties in
Western Europe abide by similar principles in their organisational struc-
tures (Richardson and Rootes, 1995, Vialatte, 1996). Their organisations
are based on five principal characteristics: plural leadership; rotation;
limitations on multiple office-holding; the absence of a professionalised
leadership; and regulated gender parity (Rihoux, 2001: 123). Their aim
is to build a ‘different’ party whose rationale lies in the importance of
grass roots democracy (Poguntke, 1993: 136–48).
For the French Greens, the organisation should formally ensure equality
for all members, regardless of their function or power within the move-
ment. Four principles derive from this: the primacy of regions (regions
have complete autonomy as to their organisational structure); collective
decision-making (the National Inter-Regional Council (NIRC) and the
Executive College (EC)); direct democracy (by means of internal ref-
erenda); and gender parity. Between 1984 and 1994, the regions directly
appointed three-quarters of the NIRC, the legislative body of the move-
ment with over 100 members. The Annual General Meeting (AGM)
was the sovereign body of the movement within which policy direction
was decided and the remaining quarter of the NIRC were elected by
proportional representation. The NIRC and EC were both bound by its
decisions, demonstrating the importance of the equality principle for
each member.
New statutes were passed in 1994, in order to provide a more effective
policy tool. The main change was the abandoning of the AGM, to be
replaced by a meeting of regional delegates every two years. This congress
occurs in two stages. First, a ‘decentralised AGM’ where national and
individual motions are introduced and voted upon takes place at the
same time and with the same agenda in all the regions. 1 Delegates to
the Federal Assembly (FA) are also elected at this stage, by proportional
list vote. The second stage takes place one month later. During the FA,
the delegates vote on motions which have not yet been passed or validate
amalgamations of different motions. They also designate the remaining
quarter of the NIRC (around 30 delegates) by a proportional list vote.
However, there is still a regional AGM which meets annually to consider
matters and motions pertaining to that region. Every two years, the
regional members of the NIRC are elected. The list of delegates to
the national council is consequently based upon local alliances.
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These statutory changes were accompanied by a change in membership
activity. In terms of finances, the Greens experienced a major boost in
the mid-1990s. Between 1984 and 1989, membership dues had been the
main source of income,2 the Greens refusing company or other groups’
contributions. From 1989, the pooling of representatives’ allowances, and
in particular those of MEPs, increased revenues. However, the major step
up occurred with the new party finance regulations that began to be
introduced from 1988 onwards. From then on, all parties were financed by
the State according to their results in legislative elections – worth around
$1.7m for the Greens in 1997. Moreover, like all parties they had benefited
since 1995 from the public financing of campaigns which substantially
increased the budget allocated for this purpose. Overall, in 2001 the Greens’
budget was around $3 m. This has given the Greens the opportunity to
employ a small internal bureaucracy, and to give its members stipends
somewhat beyond the token gesture they had previously been paid.
The increase in members’ participation within local bodies has led to
a more professionalised and effective operation (Boy, et al., 1995). This
institutional structure has also established membership somewhat at a
distance from their original participatory principles (Villalba, 1996: 149–
70). The Greens may have tried to establish a democratic framework,
but they have progressively adapted this to try to integrate themselves
more fully into the political system. Certain basic rules (no multiple
office-holding, rotation of positions, non-professionalisation, collective
decision-making, and so on) have all been compromised, with the key
exception of gender parity.
The importance of militants
At the moment of the creation of the Green Party in 1984, membership was
low and spread across only about twenty departments (Vieillard-Coffre,
2001: 122–30).
High-population density is the first reason for this unbalanced spread
(see Figure 4.1).3 Attachment to ecological ideas is particularly strong in
urban areas, due to greater consideration being given to improvement
in the quality of life. Second the presence of leaders with strong local
support can contribute to membership size (for instance, Antoine Waech-
ter and Solange Fernex in the Haut-Rhin). Lastly, mobilisation around
important environmental issues (infrastructure routes, nuclear power
plants, inter alia) can also explain higher membership, although not
entirely (for instance, anti-nuclear protest has little purchase in the
Seine-Maritime department).
In 1986, nationalising the party was a principal concern of the Greens.
A transformation of the party’s internal functioning was necessary to do
this, particularly in integrating unwilling local groups into the national
framework. It was also necessary to reconcile ideological differences
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between the various regions. Electoral campaigns provided the main
means of slowly nationalising the party. By the end of the 1980s, there
had been an increase in the number of members across practically the
Source: Bennahmias and Roche (1992), and Green Party official figures
All maps produced by Sylvie Vieillard-Coffre
FIGURE 4.1 Green membership by department
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whole country, even if the increases themselves were as unevenly spread
as the original membership. The departments with the highest number
of members were the ‘historic’ zones (Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Haut-Rhin
and Bas-Rhin, Rhône and Drôme, the Breton departments, Gironde,4
Paris, Essonne, and certain Mediterranean coastal departments). Other
regions have ‘gone greener’ more recently – Franche-Comté and Corsica
in 1989, for example, the latter after an electoral alliance with the
nationalists led by Max Siméoni.
However, since its creation, the membership body has undergone
important changes. The Greens have to live with a high level of mem-
bership turnover (30 to 35 per cent per year) either because of fluctuating
electoral fortunes or because of internal wranglings (31 per cent left after
Waechter’s departure in 1994). Significant drops have been particularly
noticeable in Haut-Rhin and some Alpine departments such as Alpes de
Haute-Provence or Hautes-Alpes, although certain areas have been on
the up (in the Jura, where Dominique Voynet is based). When the Greens
manage to present a clear vision of their political project, membership
usually rises, as was the case between 1987 and 1993 after the adoption
of the autonomy principle, or since 1994 when the party has placed itself
clearly on the left.
The end of the 1990s marked a new stage in the movement’s stabili-
sation. The effects of the split had largely disappeared, and public opinion
was once more open to Green themes. From 1994 onwards, the clarification
of the party line, closely linked to the institutionalisation of the Green
Party after its entry into the National Assembly and into the Jospin
government in 1997, solidified the party structure. Since then, all depart-
ments have had their own local affiliates,5 even if these are still unequally
spread. For instance, the Ile de France has more than 2,000 members,
Corsica only 44, out of a total of 10,372 members in April 2001.
Sociologically, the Greens are essentially taken from the least popular
classes. Workers and employees only represent 15 per cent of members.
Their education level is higher than the national average, with 22.7 per
cent of members holding a Masters or equivalent qualification. Many of
them proclaim themselves to have grown up in a left-wing household
which ‘talked politics’. More broadly, many members live in a milieu
of friends and partners sharing their ecologist convictions and having
frequent contact with other members.6
A hesitant electoral journey
A relatively unstable electorate
The Green electorate is very close to the party membership in terms of
its sociological profile. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the bulk of the
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ecology electorate lay in the middle classes, educated, with medium to
high incomes and on the edge of the intellectual set. At the beginning
of the 1990s, it began to display a more popular profile (Boy, 1990).
Increasing numbers of blue- and white-collar workers began to vote this
way, but with important fluctuations according to the period – 28 per
cent in 1989, 19 per cent in 1993, and with an overall drop towards the
end of the 1990s. On the other hand, retired and inactive voters are no
more known for their ecology vote than small business owners and
farmers. The gender split was roughly equivalent to that of the population
as a whole between 1984 and 1990, with a feminisation in the mid-1990s.
As concerns age, the Green electorate is on average younger than other
party electorates. The 1990–95 period accentuated this rejuvenation,
except in the 1995 presidential election, and since then younger voters
have again become more important; 79 per cent of the Cohn-Bendit list
voters were less than 49. Along the left–right continuum, the majority
of voters place themselves on the left, followed by in the centre, and
some elections have reinforced the leftist position – for example, the
1988, 1995 and 2002 presidential elections. The bulk of voters will choose
a left-wing candidate in the second round, if one is present.
At the level of issues, voters are principally motivated by environmental
concerns, a facet which has remained relatively stable across time. The
questions which concern them are less along the lines of mainstream
politicking.7 However, geographical analysis of the spread of this elec-
torate shows that there is no simple correlation between the occurrence
of a local environmental crisis and a strong vote for the Greens. Beyond
the purely environmental, the vote is motivated by considerations about
the nature of democracy, for instance participation, or derives from
circumstance – the decline of the PS at the beginning of the 1990s, a
rejection of the traditional political system, and so on. Lastly, many votes
derive from exchanges with neighbouring parties, notably the PS and
sometimes the right (Boy and Chiche, 2002).8 Consequently, the devel-
opment of the ecologists remains heavily dependent upon the situation
of other political actors. Together, these factors at least partly explain
the high volatility of this electorate.9
The 2002 presidential election reinforced this pattern. Noël Mamère
may have won 350,000 votes more than any previous Green candidate,
but the national result was not up to Green expectations. The party was
unable to exploit electorally the various environmental disasters which
had affected France in recent years.10 Furthermore, the extreme-left
parties had fought the Greens for part of their electorate. Lastly, one
cannot ignore the unfavourable internal situation within the party
which had demoralised the membership during the campaign. In the
subsequent legislative elections, the total national vote had risen by a
little more than 200,000 votes since 1997 (4.5 per cent as opposed to
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3.6 per cent in 1997) but the Greens lost four deputies from their 1997
total of seven.
The instability of the Green vote weakens the party’s competitiveness
and in 2002 particularly opened it to the problems of high abstention
and tactical voting. The back-to-back timetabling of the elections helped
to minimise the importance of the ecology vote in a context where the
right was mobilising for a presidential majority in the National Assembly
to put Jacques Chirac’s programme into action. Within the left, the
absence of Lionel Jospin from the second round of the presidential
election provoked a backlash in favour of the Socialists in the legislatives
to the detriment of the other gauche plurielle members.
The electoral learning-curve and managing competition
Despite its short life to date, the Green Party has tried out a number of
electoral strategies. By carrying out an independent campaign or by
participating in more or less ephemeral alliances, they have gradually
mastered their electoral technique. However, one can still ask questions
about their territorial implantation. The departments with the highest
ecology scores in presidential elections between 1981 and 2002 give an
interesting picture of the party’s regional strength (Figure 4.2).11 The
areas of predominance are from Brittany to the north of Pays-de-la-Loire
and across to Basse-Normandie, together with Alsace, Vosges, the Jura
and the Arc Alpin.
This map shows certain areas of weakness as compared with the
membership bastions, in particular Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the Mediter-
ranean coastal departments.12 On the other hand, other areas, such as
the Alps, see strong electoral support despite the weaker membership
presence. Clearly, there is no necessary connection between level of
membership activity and level of electoral success, nor is there any
evidence of a link between areas of electoral strength in the most recent
elections and those which preceded it. PR regional election results broken
down by department provide a good example of this (see Figures 4.3
and 4.4).
The results show strong contrasts among themselves. In 1986, some
departments in Corsica, Aquitaine and Poitou-Charentes did not have a
Green list, and overall these elections mark a fall-back from the position
at the previous elections. This coincides with the end of the construction
of political ecology (1974–88). René Dumont obtained 1.4 per cent in
the 1974 presidential election and the ecologists won 4.4 per cent
(2.2 per cent across the whole of France) in the 1978 legislative elections.
With 4.5 per cent at the European elections of 1979, two formations
contested the 1984 Europeans and won 3.4 per cent (Greens) and
3.3 per cent (Entente Radicale Ecologiste pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe,
led by Brice Lalonde), respectively. The 1986 regionals, despite being
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held under PR, were hardly more favourable with 3.4 per cent in
departments where a list was presented, and 2.4 per cent and three
councillors nationally – Didier Anger in Manche, Antoine Waechter in
Haut-Rhin and Andrée Buchmann in Bas-Rhin.
The end of the 1980s marked a turning point for the Greens with
good results in the March 1989 municipal elections – 8.1 per cent in
towns with more than 9,000 inhabitants. By this time, the Greens held
a virtual monopoly of the ecology label, and benefited from a favourable
Source: Sainteny (2000), and Green Party official figures
FIGURE 4.2 Green presidential election results (1981–2002)
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cultural and institutional context (Sainteny, 2000: 117–42). Politically,
the PS was particularly weak after a litany of scandals, incumbent weariness
and the experience of cohabitation between 1986 and 1988, and part of
its electorate turned to the ecologists.
The creation of GE in 1990 by Brice Lalonde aimed to create a
competitor for the Greens, developing an ecological perspective closer
to that of the PS and presenting an image of ‘realistic reform’. The
FIGURE 4.3 Ecologist regional election results by department (1986 and
1992)
Source: Official Green Party figures
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March 1992 regional elections bear witness to the success of this action,
with GE and the Greens obtaining almost an identical number of votes
– 7.1 per cent and 6.8 per cent respectively. The best scores were won
where the two lists were in competition.13 Where the Greens were the
only ecology list,14 their results were better than in 1986, but weaker
than the combined GE–Green scores in the previous departments. For
example, in Haut-Rhin the Greens won 14.6 per cent of the vote,
whereas in Bas-Rhin, the Greens’ 11.14 per cent and GE’s 7.25 per cent
FIGURE 4.4 Green electoral strategies by department (1986 and 1998)
Source: Official Green Party figures
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represented almost 18.4 per cent between them. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais,
the Greens, led by Marie-Christine Blandin won their only regional
presidency. For the party, this region was henceforth treated like a
political laboratory, to test and prove their capacity of functioning at the
institutional level (Villalba, 1999).
For the 1993 legislative elections, the Greens and GE united. The
so-called ‘Ecology Entente’ won one of their best results under the
two-ballot system, with 7.9 per cent of the vote, and around 11 per cent
in the constituencies where they fielded candidates. However, these
elections also indicated the weakness of the ecology label. Many other
groups calling themselves ecologists suddenly appeared a few weeks
before the first ballot and ate into the Entente vote (Dolez, 1997). The
same was true of 2002.
In the following cantonal, 1994 European and 1995 presidential
elections, with scores of 3.5 per cent, 2.9 per cent – their worst ever
European result – and 3.4 per cent – with Dominique Voynet as the
sole ecology candidate (Szac, 1998) – respectively, the Greens returned
to the electoral wasteland. The 1995 municipals were also deemed
‘unsatisfactory’ by the Greens themselves, returning 6.5 per cent in the
constituencies where they stood. Evidently, the ecologist split between
the Greens and GE and the split within the Greens themselves were
both partly responsible for the drop. In September 1994, Antoine
Waechter created the MEI 15 but was unable to challenge the Greens in
elections, despite the ideological challenge.16 For its part, GE progress-
ively moved towards the liberal–Gaullist right, a process which caused
significant internal divisions 17 and inexorable electoral decline – 2 per
cent at the 1994 Europeans; no presidential candidate in 1995; little
presence in the 1997 legislatives; and only three councillors elected in
the 1998 regionals. GE’s remnants placed themselves in DL’s orbit before
once again attempting an independent electoral strategy, but with no
greater success.18
Electoral results in the gauche plurielle
At the AF in Le Mans in 1995, the Greens decided to engage in a strategy
to federate the ecologists on the left. After difficult negotiations and
statutory modifications, the Parti Ecologiste, parts of the Alternative
Rouge et Verte (AREV) and of the Convention pour une Alternative
Progressiste (CAP) and the CES were integrated between the end of 1997
and the beginning of 1998. The unified programme reinforced the central
position of the Greens as the principal representative of political ecology.
GE was unable to turn itself into a centre- and centre-right-oriented
ecology pole for the 1997 legislative elections. Nevertheless, the Greens
were not the only repository for the ecology vote. A series of small
formations also contest this vote, among others AREV, CAP and the
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rightist Ecologie Bleue, composed of old members of GE who intended
promoting environmental issues from inside the UDF. These formations
only obtained weak results but showed that there is an available pool of
ecology voters who will move to ‘independent’ ecology candidates (Boy
and Villalba, 1999: 143–62).
The 1997 legislative elections opened a new electoral phase, with the
Greens engaging in an alliance with the PS while simultaneously trying
to maintain an autonomous political strategy. At the first round, the 455
Green and Green-endorsed candidates won just over one million votes,
or 5.1 per cent – at the national level, 4.1 per cent. But hundreds of
Green candidates did not reach the 5 per cent threshold. In the 1998
regional elections, the Greens tried to adopt a strategy of alliance, as
well as maintaining the principle of autonomy for the regional federations
in the electoral procedure. Fifty-four full gauche plurielle lists and five
partial ones were entered. The 37 other lists presented by the Greens
were the so-called ‘Green and open lists’. In all, they won 5.6 per cent
(Boy and Villalba, 1999). The map of the ecologists’ results reflect this
double strategy. The results of the Green lists are less good than those
of the ecologists in 1992 (Greens plus GE plus other ecology lists) but
only just below that of the 1992 Green lists on their own (Figures 4.3
and 4.4). In terms of representatives, the Greens lost 38 of the 105 seats
won in 1992. Without doubt, then, this is a downward trend. At the
cantonal elections, they obtained 7.6 per cent in the 718 cantons where
they fielded candidates. Finally, in the 1999 European elections, despite
a head of list with a strong media presence, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a
number of salient environmental themes – GM crops, ‘mad-cow disease’,
etc. – and weaker competition from other ecology lists, the 9.7 per cent
score was still below the 1989 and 1994 results.
For the municipal and cantonal elections of 11 and 18 March 2001,
the Greens repeated this double strategy, presenting 180 independent
lists (which won an average of 14 per cent) and taking part in around
300 full or partial gauche plurielle lists. The ensemble of ‘left’ lists (the
gauche plurielle without the independent Green lists) won 36.4 per cent
at the first round and 38.84 per cent at the second in those communes
with more than 3,500 inhabitants. At the final count, the Greens won
over 1,000 municipal councillors, including around 40 mayors. Only four
mayors were elected on independent lists – three in the Ile-de-France
and one in Territoire de Belfort – and 25 were elected on ‘communal
interest’ lists,19 mostly in communes with fewer than 3,500 inhabitants.
Thanks to the gauche plurielle, the election of mayors in the largest
communes, such as Les Mureaux, Saumur, Lyon I or Paris II, reinforced
the credibility of the programme, addressing local politics from their
own perspective. The Greens also presented more than 700 candidates
in the cantonal elections (and endorsed 100 gauche plurielle candidates).
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They obtained 13 general councillors, bringing their total number of
elected representatives to 17 (excluding the Parisian councillors who
follow a slightly different procedure). Of these 13, 9 were supported by
the other parties from the governing majority.
Since 1974, then, political ecology’s electoral results have alternated
between phases of growth and phases of decline. Overall, the Greens
can only rely on 5–7 per cent of the vote. Well managed within the
alliance, these votes have brought important benefits. The peak at the
end of the 1990s, when they returned to results on a par with those at
the beginning of the decade, resulted from their taking into account
both the weight of the Fifth Republic’s majoritarian logic and of the
left–right cleavage, and even more so the importance of environmental
themes to public opinion. Even though the Greens still suffer from a
lack of credibility outside the environmental field, their participation in
government and strategy of agreements with the gauche plurielle have
more than made up for this programmatic weakness.
However, they do not seem to have known how to exploit their
governmental participation and presence in the National Assembly in
the 2002 elections. Although they presented an unprecedented 451
candidates, only 11 of these broke the 30 per cent barrier, with 22
winning more than 20 per cent. For the Green leadership, even a
ministerial candidate had no guarantee of success with Dominique Voynet
and Guy Hascoët both being defeated in their respective Jura and Nord
constituencies. Only Yves Cochet, the former minister for the environment
in his new Paris seat and Noël Mamère in Gironde managed to win
re-election, together with Martine Billard, also in Paris. Billard, the only
new deputy, ironically comes from the left–libertarian stream of the
Greens, which had been very critical of its own party’s time in government.
Partner within the gauche plurielle government
To understand the relationship of the Greens with the plural-left majority
between 1997 and 2002, it is necessary to look at the changes in the
party’s political and ideological priorities.
Implantation on the left
In 1984, the Greens hesitated over the strategic direction that their party
should take. For two years, certain influential figures within the party –
Jean Brière, Yves Cochet and Didier Anger – prudently shifted their
focus towards the left. However, the strong 68 per cent support for
Antoine Waechter’s motion, ‘Ecology is not for marrying!’ placed the
Greens in a position which proclaimed the irrelevance of traditional
political cleavages (‘Neither right nor left’), the important of alternative
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values (the importance of the environment, the alternative challenge to
economic growth) and destined the party to fight for a new ‘cultural
majority’ in France. This radical vision may have allowed the Greens to
occupy their own niche in political space and, despite their marginality,
to hide a thin manifesto demonstrative of its ideological weaknesses.
Gradually, however, this approach became more and more contested by
those with a more pragmatic view of political action. Indeed, by 1993,
the Greens had ceased to consider the autonomy principal as an absolute
block on any political alliance. Waechter was repudiated. Henceforth,
the Greens have clearly presented themselves as part of the left. The AF
of Le Mans in 1995 discussed the predictable political compromises
necessary for agreement with the left – the PS, PRG and PCF – and
even future electoral compromises. From January 1997, the Greens and
the PS divided up constituencies, agreeing unanimous acceptance of
Green leaders, desistment pacts and, last but not least, the financial
considerations linked to state financing of parties.
The Greens benefited from the programmatic agreement with the PS
in being allowed to promote certain themes which had always formed
part of ecology’s discourse (see Figure 4.5). Unlike in 2002, the agreement
between the Greens and its partners was predicated upon a negotiation
of programmatic contents. Particular attention would be given to job-
sharing, an issue to be found in Waechter’s 1988 campaign, and which was
also a fundamental part of Dominique Voynet’s (Voynet, 1995). Overall,
the contract dealt more with social than with environmental issues.
This strategic development won the Greens national posts: seven Green
Party or Green-affiliated deputies sat in the National Assembly 20 and
Lionel Jospin gave the Ministry of Territorial Management and the
Environment to Dominique Voynet. On 8 April 2000, Guy Hascoët was
named Secretary of State for the Interdependent Economy (Economie
Solidaire). The Greens had thus passed a further threshold of legitimation.
This approach seems to have satisfied ecology members. In 1998, 79 per
cent of them thought that governmental participation was a positive thing.
The members believed that their representatives had principally been
influential in the areas of the environment (70 per cent) and gender
parity (61 per cent) (Boy and Villalba, 2000). As far as ideology was
concerned, the Greens were seen as presenting a radical front which went
beyond the current policies or intentions of the gauche plurielle – for
instance, 67 per cent wanted the naturalisation of all illegal immigrants.
The European election campaign was an opportunity to show the
extent of Green ideology. Cohn-Bendit initially focused his campaign on
issues of concern to him, and notably the ‘liberal–libertarian’ vision of
ecology (Cohn-Bendit, 1999). Under pressure from Green members,
however, he reoriented his campaign to focus more upon social issues
and problems high on the French agenda – pensions, youth development,
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minimum income guarantees, etc. Nevertheless, he continued to promote
his ‘third left’ perspective as his own political strategy.
After the spring elections in 2002, the Greens asserted their desire to
revitalise the left camp via ideological renovation – ‘reaffirming left-wing
values’ and in particular those concerning social and environmental
policy. The influence of the electoral results and the need to reorganise
the balance of power on the left will have important consequences for
the internal development of the party.
Factional influence and its limits
Internal debate within the Greens has remained a source of tension
between factions ever since the party’s creation. They represent the support
of certain members for the leaders, and are based upon ideological or
strategic concerns. Increasingly, however, factions are becoming a means
of attacking other candidates or securing membership benefits. At the
FIGURE 4.5 The main themes of the Green–PS programmatic agreement
(1997)
• Economic and social clauses
Wholesale reduction in working hours via a law on 35-hour working week
with no salary reductions; further decrease to 32 hours by 2003; creation of
a ‘tertiary sector’ of social and ecological utility; minimum income guarantees
for 18–25 year-olds
• Democracy and citizenship clauses
Suppression of article 16 of the constitution; no multiple office-holding;
gender parity; adoption of statutes for local representatives; reinitiation of
decentralisation of the regions; re-establishment of asylum law and droit du
sol
• International clauses
Social and environmental charters to be introduced into a new Maastricht
Treaty; establishment of sustainable development criteria for single currency;
elimination of weapons of mass destruction
• Territorial and environmental clauses
Moratorium on building of nuclear reactors and MOX production until 2010;
closure of Super-Phoenix reactor programme; reduction of nuclear waste stocks.
 Reviewing of waste treatment in the Hague, and no new contracts signed
by France; an energy law by 2005 at the latest; development of the rail network;
moratorium on motorway construction; review of taxation on fossil fuels;
introduction of eco-tax on pollutant energy sources; abandoning of
Rhine-Rhône canal project; implementation of ‘Natura 2000’ directive
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Toulouse Congress on 11–12 November 2000, six main factions vied for
power.21 The ideological differences were sometimes difficult to discern,
and it was particularly on matters of electoral strategy that divisions
appeared. In fact, the unequal geographic distribution of members
strongly affects the political influence of the factions (Vieillard-Coffre,
2001: 147–50). Thus, certain departments had an effect on the vote –
Dominique Voynet won in the Jura, of course, but also in six of the eight
regions where membership is high, and in particular in the largest, the
Ile-de-France (see Figure 4.6).
But the result at Toulouse was also in part due to the confrontation
of two major and fairly similar factions: Maison Verte and Dynamiques.
The first opposed Dominique Voynet’s strategy, while the second chose
to ally with her. The Maison Verte list led by Marie-Christine Blandin
and Stéphane Pocrain won in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais with half of this
region’s votes and just over 100 in the Ile-de-France. In contrast to this
list, the one led by Noël Mamère and Guy Hascoët was important not
in the regions of its two leaders, but in those with the most members
(251 votes in Ile-de-France and 122 in Languedoc-Roussillon, as opposed
to 63 votes in Aquitaine and 80 in Nord-Pas-de-Calais). The weight of
a faction thus comes from its success in the regions with the most
members, even if the faction itself does not win.
The primary to elect the ecology candidate for the 2002 presidential
election demonstrates the limited use of factions. Five candidates took
part. A 21-year-old candidate, Alice Crété, was supported by ALV – she
won 12.59 per cent. Verts Ecolo and Dynamiques put their support behind
Etienne Tête (9.71 per cent) and Noël Mamère respectively. The writer
and regional councillor, Yves Frémion, was not supported by any faction
and won 8.20 per cent; nor was Alain Lipietz, although he is considered
to be a member of Dominique Voynet’s inner circle. In the first round
in May 2001, Mamère won 42.78 per cent of the vote, with Lipietz taking
25.55 per cent. These two candidates insisted that their candidacies did
not reflect a game playing upon the support of different factions. Alain
Lipietz won the surprise victory, managing to gather a majority of the
second-round vote without the official support of a faction or of the Green
leadership. He won 3,528 votes against Mamère’s 3,183. Lipietz’s victory
was based principally on the level of constancy in the different regions’
support for him. While Mamère scored highly in certain regions, Lipietz
at least doubled his score in every region (see Figure 4.7).
However, Lipietz’s candidacy did not satisfy certain national leaders.
Making good use of certain media faux pas committed by Lipietz, the
party apparatus forced him to submit to a second approval process by
the members. On 29 October 2001, with 81 per cent of the vote
demanding his removal, Lipietz stood down in favour of Noël Mamère.
At this stage, it is less the factions and more personal rivalries and media
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scrutiny which determine the balance of power within the party. From
now on, membership support will not be a guarantee against the party’s
interests as perceived by the Green leadership.
Conclusion
For the first time in their history, the Greens are able to assess their
participation in a governing coalition. They had ceased to be a marginal
FIGURE 4.6 Motions in the Toulouse Congress and regional assembly voting
Source: Green Party official figures
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and idealistic member of the party system, and had become an important
partner within the gauche plurielle. However, this unprecedented situation
should not be allowed to disguise two uncertainties. First, the Greens
cannot claim the ecology vote for themselves alone as the 2002 elections
showed once more.22 Without any doubt, managing an independent
left-wing ecology pole will become a major issue in the near future. The
evaluation of their time in power is the second uncertainty: what have they
gained from this systematic power-sharing with the PS? Unsurprisingly,
internal debate over this has been rife.
FIGURE 4.7 Green presidential primaries in 2002
Source: Green Party official figures
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For some Greens, such as the Autrement les Verts, Ecologie et Démo-
cratie or Vert Ecolo factions, government policy was not sufficiently
swayed by Green policy. They have denounced the failure of the 1997
Green–PS agreements, and in particular the continued pursuit of a nuclear
strategy, the ignoring of thousands of illegal immigrants, the renaissance
of road and motorway construction, insufficient consideration of the
greenhouse effect, and the failure to introduce PR electoral reform for
2002. Some, such as Autrement les Verts, recommended leaving govern-
ment; others would have simply preferred to clarify and consolidate
the terms of the Green–PS agreement, and consequently to redefine the
policy priorities and electoral negotiations – the line taken by Dynamiques
Vertes, Maison Verte and Ouvert. Debate is equally as lively on what to
take away from their time in government.23 It is clear that constructing
a new political project will force the Greens to look long and hard at
their own agenda and organisation in order to ascertain the key positive
points from their time in power, and subsequently to use these to
strengthen the legitimacy which derives from their unique political stance.
Notes
1 All motions winning the required majority at the national level, once the
regional scores are added, are considered passed and are therefore not
debated at the FA.
2 The amount varies between regions, but the lowest amount is EURO 30,
equivalent to the national allocation.
3 This cartographic depiction of membership can also be calculated using the
number of members as a proportion of the departmental population. How-
ever, the raw figures illustrate more clearly the weight of certain regions
within the national organisation.
4 The influence of Noel Mamère is clearly significant, but needs to be put
into context. He became Mayor of Bègle and vice-president of the communauté
urbaine of Bordeaux in the 1989 municipal elections, standing on the presiden-
tial majority ticket. He subsequently moved to GE, before returning to the
Greens in 1997.
5 Aube and Cantal appear in white because the number of members is tiny;
Réunion and Guadeloupe each have a local organisation.
6 Source: survey by Daniel Boy (CEVIPOF), Agnès Roche (Clermont-Ferrand
University) and Bruno Villalba (CRAPS-Lille 2), 1998, with the cooperation
of the Greens. The data can be downloaded at http://www.les-verts.org/
documents/enquete.html
7 http://www.sofres.fr/etudes/pol/130700_references_n.html
8 Conversely, PCF bastions are often Green-electoral wastelands.
9 In 1995, 26 per cent of Voynet voters made their choice ‘at the last moment’,
compared to an average of 11 per cent; 17 per cent made their choice ‘in
the last few days of the campaign’, as against 10 per cent on average.
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10 For instance, the major storm in December 1999, the sinking of the Erika
and Ievoli Sun petrol-tankers off the Brittany coast in December 1999 and
November 2000 respectively, and the flooding of the Somme in the successive
winters of 2000–1 and 2001–2.
11 The 1974 election is distinct from the rest: for the first time the ecologists
fielded a presidential candidate, René Dumont, an agronomist not previously
known for his ecologist leanings. A political presence for ecology only began
to develop in the municipal elections of 1977.
12 It should be noted that the electoral results, in terms of valid votes, are
figures which take into account the size of the population, whereas the
membership figures do not.
13 Especially in the Parisian district: 20.75 per cent in Yvelines and 20.44 per
cent in Val d’Oise.
14 In Hautes-Alpes (9.94 per cent), Ariège (9.6 per cent), Corrèze (7.12 per
cent), Creuse (8.7 per cent) Haute-Garonne (8.18 per cent), Gers (12.42 per
cent), Haute-Loire (10.2 per cent), Haute-Marne (14.51 per cent), Nièvre
(7.8 per cent), Hautes-Pyrénées (9.16 per cent), Haut-Rhin (14.6 per cent)
Saône et Loire (9.01 per cent), Deux-Sèvres (10.68 per cent), Tarn (6.53 per
cent), Territoire de Belfort (14.43 per cent).
15 See their website: www.novomundi.com/mei/.
16 Electorally, they have had extremely indifferent results – no candidate in
the 1995 presidential election; 1.5 per cent in the 1999 European elections.
17 The following splinters were formed: 1992 – François Donzel’s Alliance pour
l’Ecologie et la Démocratie (AED); 1993 – Jean-François Caron’s Ecologie
Autrement (EA); 1994 – Noël Mamère’s Convergence Ecologie Solidarité
(CES), etc. Some were inclined towards the PS (AED) or negotiated agreements
with the Greens (EA). Others, after some hesitation, finally joined the Greens
(CES).
18 www.generation-ecologie.com/.
19 Representing that diverse group often labelled ‘apolitical’.
20 Marie-Hélène Aubert, Yves Cochet, Guy Hascoët and D. Voynet (Greens);
André Aschieri, Noël Mamère, and Jean-Michel Marchand (ecology deputies
in Radical, Citoyen et Vert parliamentary group); and Michèle Rivasi (ecology
deputy affiliated to PS parliamentary group).
21 Dynamiques vertes led by Guy Hascoët and Noël Mamère; Notre Maison
Verte led by Marie-Christine Blandin; Ouverts led by Dominique Voynet;
Autrement les Verts led by Martine Billard; Verts Ecolo led by Maryse Arditi
and Etienne Tête; and Ecologie et Démocratie led by Françoise Duthu.
22 In these elections, of the 32 formations presenting at least 50 candidates
nationally, 8 stood under an ecology banner.
23 See the CNIR debates of 23–24 June 2001, and the EcoRev dossiers (http://
ecorev.org).
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Managing the plural left:
implications for the party system
David Hanley
The left Managing the plural left
Introduction
The plural left marks a new type of alignment within the French party
system. Left parties had cooperated previously according to varying
formulae. The type of majority known as concentration républicaine (Goguel,
1946) is arguably the first manifestation, followed by the hegemony of
the délégation des gauches in the 1900s, which put through anti-clerical
measures of ‘republican defence’. The interwar period witnessed the cartel
des gauches – tactical electoral alliances of Radicals, SFIO and selected
‘left republicans’ – invariably unstable and short-lived. Famously, the 1936
Popular Front, a formal alliance of the three main left parties plus smaller
allies, managed to campaign on an agreed programme but, although a
government was formed and enjoyed some success, this too fell apart
under various pressures. After the Second World War, formulae for broad
left cooperation ran from tripartism (SFIO and PCF without any Radicals,
but including the new force of Christian Democracy) to the more restricted
and temporary defensive arrangement of SFIO, Radicals and centre
oddments in ‘Republican Front’ alliances excluding the by-now pariah PCF.
Under the Fifth Republic, the growing reality of bipolarisation drove
the left’s leaders to the inevitable – a pact between the PS (as it now
was) and the PCF, resting on a detailed and ambitious programme to
which the incoming coalition government would be committed. The
break-up of the Common Programme alliance generated sufficient move-
ment to bring about Mitterrand’s 1981 win and, significantly, for him to
feel obliged to involve the PCF in government for the first time in
thirty-four years. PCF failure to use this opportunity intelligently soon
led to further marginalisation, and by the mid-1980s the left-wing alliance
consisted of a large PS with an undisputed leader of high status capable
of winning a second presidency (and thus itself capable of winning a
majority or nearly), trailing in its wake a small ally (the left Radicals),
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and a shrinking PCF, not in total opposition to the PS and usually forced
at election time to agree a deal. This unbalanced left duly won the
presidency and a working majority in 1988. During this period a sizeable
Green vote emerged in France. Yet this new but unfocused challenge
was mostly ignored by the left parties (Boy, 1993).
All these cooperative attempts recall two underlying tendencies. First,
the left parties have usually been involved in some kind of alliance. The
winning of an outright majority by any one party has remained mostly
an impossible dream, even after the PS flash in the pan of 1981, though
this does not mean that rapports de force in a left alliance are necessarily
equal. Second, these alliances have usually been fragile, tactical and short
term. The object has been to win an election and govern as best one
could, basing government on the rapports de force within the winning
coalition. There has been nothing permanent about the pact; sometimes
there has been no agreed programme or even clear understanding beyond
discipline républicaine. Partners have felt free to drop out (PCF refusal to
join government in 1936) or change partners in mid-term (the Radicals
on numerous occasions between the wars, the SFIO after 1947) or even
to vote with the right (the PCF against Rocard after 1988). No party
leaders thought in terms of developing an ongoing alliance which respects
the different identities and contributions of partners while demanding
agreement and discipline on a number of policies and procedures. As a
result, little long-term commitment could be given; partners might have
to be changed. Hence it always suited the PS to keep alive the (increasingly
unlikely) threat that it could revive the old type of Third Force deal with
the Christian Democrats; or the PCF could threaten to withdraw into
total opposition, e.g., by leaving candidates in at the second ballot (again
an increasingly incredible scenario).
The seismic shock of the 1993 defeat shattered PS dreams of being a
natural party of government. Rocard, now party leader – in itself a symbol
of how low it had sunk – described the left as ‘a field of ruins’ and called
for a ‘big bang’ to revive the PS, hinting that it might even have to
merge with other left forces. Jospin’s emergence as a credible leader
after the European defeat of 1994 and Rocard’s departure stemmed the
decline and gave hope that the left could return to office. But Jospin
had realised that this could only happen if a new type of relationship
were established among its components. Thus was born a new concept
of left unity in the shape of the plural left. Negotiations between the
parties were direct and clearly focused, and carried out by a small team
from each – the PCF, MdC, PRG, and, perhaps most significant of all,
the Greens under Dominique Voynet (Amar and Chemin, 2002: 13–74).
Each party retained its own electoral programme, but it was understood
that all components would be in government if the plural left won.1
Such a strategy clearly has implications for the party system, both in
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terms of its individual components and of the dynamics between these
which constitute the party system per se. First, we need to examine the
motivations of the PS, principal mover in this strategy, but also to a
lesser extent, those of its partners. We need then to examine what the
plural left implies in terms of day-to-day relations between its components,
especially in the light of recent government experience. These analyses
may enable us to see how far the new experiment has actually transformed
the party system, not just in terms of relationships within the left, but
between the plural left and the rest of the system.
The PS and the plural left: strategy and motivation
As the motor force behind and principal beneficiary of the plural-left
strategy was the PS, we need to understand its analysis of the party system
and its motivations in pushing the plural left. Jospin’s team began with
the idea that the left–right polarity remains fundamental in French
partisan life (Duhamel, 1997, Mossuz-Lavau, 1998, Cambadélis, 1999:
71–83). This is not just due to electoral bipolarisation, which may be as
much a reflection as a cause; voters do still tend to split broadly along
the left–right axis, as they have done since republican democracy became
the norm (Charlot, 1993, Boy and Mayer, 2000). Obviously the values
that underpin left and right identities evolve, as do the partisan forces
that express them. But on election day, left-wing voters expect to find
an adequate supply in party terms for their aspirations. This supply
should normally confront a similar supply on the right in what was a
moderately polarised system.
The state of this supply in 1993 was problematic, however. Previously,
the PS thought of itself as embodying the only serious left. The PCF was
shrinking; allies like the PRG had long been vassalised. Even the newly
created MdC might not prove much of a nuisance, as Chevènement’s
followers might be more easily bought off from outside the party rather
than cause trouble from within. From this viewpoint, then, the PS bossed
the left and others fell in behind, with little input into policy and having
to bargain for what they could in terms of seats, patronage, etc.
All this changed with the scale of the 1993 defeat, when the PS lost
217 deputies (282 to 65) and only took half of its 1988 vote, sliding back
to the levels of the mid-1960s. Its allies, being smaller anyway, suffered
proportionately less. The left faced a long haul to reconquer voters, but
even if voters were to come back, there was no guarantee that they would
all go to the PS, especially as the sour end of the Mitterrand presidency
had degraded yet further the image of socialism. An alternative strategy
therefore seemed attractive: why not build on the very diversity of the left,
encouraging each of its components to draw in voters as widely as possible?
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Clearly, this meant a downplaying of the hegemonic role which the
PS had exercised since the late 1970s and a hard-headed assessment
that it could probably never again achieve the scores of 1981 or 1988
nor hope to dominate in the same way. Obviously in any new left alliance
the PS would be the biggest player and expect to lead in government;
pluralism is a ‘réalité hiérarchisée’ (Cambadélis, 1999: 136). But this position
differs from the previous winner-take-all arrogance. The PS would have
a more consultative, less domineering profile; it would also have to be
more generous in sharing seats, posts and resources.
This was a bold step, and Jospin was the right man to take it. Inclined
by temperament to a less personal style of leadership, he was also favoured
by the institutional context; a plural-left win in 1997 would not be a
presidential one (with all its implied legitimacy for one man and his
programme). Rather it would be a parliamentary win, a win for parties;
any government would have to be based on those parties, even if it was
then to govern under cohabitation. The PS thus accepted a changed role
for itself within the subsystem of the left. It did so as the best way to
preserve its longer-term interests; better to be consensual leader of a
broad-left coalition with some chance of gaining office than to be hugely
dominant within a divided left with much less chance.
The plural-left strategy also reflected PS views about the left-party
sub-system. It divided allies into three categories. The small parties (MdC
and PRG) were seen essentially as notable movements with particular local
strengths. MdC, with its vigorous republican nationalism, would refuse
such a description, and certainly its ideological profile promised to cause
problems. But in terms of putting together an alliance, these were small
organisations with whom one could broker a deal. This meant a guarantee
of a few seats for sitting deputies and a place in government, which the
PS had indicated its willingness to provide. Previous republican alliances
had done no differently.
In a different category was the PCF. Even in the 1980s the PS had
arguably never pushed home its advantage, in terms of candidacies for
seats or town halls, despite a clear drift of voters towards it away from
the PCF. The hope was that the PCF would gradually prove redundant.
Realistically, though, this would take a long time, as the party hung on
in its last bastions. The PS thus resigned itself to the continuation of a
sizeable number of PCF deputies, crucial to its majority, as well as
Communist presence in government. This did not rule out hard bar-
gaining at local level, but it did imply a willingness not to tread too hard
on the PCF’s toes. The PS also sought to influence the PCF’s internal
development. By incorporating it in a new majority, the PS could only
increase the tension between modernisers who broadly supported Hue
and who needed positive results (in terms of influencing policy) and the
older, pure oppositionists (Hage, Auchedé, etc.) who wanted the PCF to
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immure itself in a ghetto of protest before the Trotskyists usurped its
role in such arenas. The party’s internal process remains problematical,
and largely independent of PS intervention; but if the PCF were to
‘social-democratise’ itself yet further and lose some of its hard core, then
the possibility of absorbing the social-democratic remnants back into the
PS might arise (Cambadélis, 1999: 133ff.). The PCF itself did not believe
that the PS’s weakening in 1993 opened up any new space. As Lajoinie
revealingly told Cambadélis, the only way forward for both parties was
together (1999: 26).
The Greens were a case sui generis, and PS treatment of them is arguably
the boldest and most system-modifying part of the plural-left strategy.
Pro-Green sentiments continued to rise among voters, despite finding no
successful partisan outlet (Boy, 1993). Several factors ensured this, includ-
ing division among Green elites, the entry barriers imposed by the electoral
system to all new parties and even sharp practice (for instance, Interior
Minister Quilès allowing the registration of numerous doubtful ecology
candidacies in 1993, thus scattering the Green offer confusingly). The Greens
were even unable in 1994 to re-elect their MEPs from1989. Undoubtedly
their challenge could have been ignored by the plural left, which could
easily have stopped them winning seats under the two-ballot system.
A bolder alternative was to recognise that the Greens’ own ineptitude
and the electoral system might not keep them out of Parliament forever,
and certainly not without risk. Even if they could only mobilise a
first-ballot electorate, it might not be deliverable to the plural left on
the second. In other words, the Greens might have some blackmail
potential. Taking them into coalition held problems; their demands were
far-reaching, not just on environmental questions. But cold-shouldering
them was just as risky an option.
The PS grasped this nettle resolutely, with an offer of seats and a place
in government. It sought to decant the Green movement, to sort out
those interested in political responsibility from those concerned with
protest; it sought to distinguish politicians from ideologues, realists from
moralisers. It did so with admirable succinctness; the main body of Greens
followed Voynet into the plural left. This passage from periphery to
centre stage was dramatic; no party can assume such a brusque change
of status overnight. By decanting the Green movement and bringing its
mainstream firmly into the plural left, the PS knowingly affected not just
the internal functioning of the Greens but the workings of the whole
party system. It also gambled that the Greens could be fitted successfully
into the left, challenging the assumption that they represent a new
cleavage (centred on the environment), unassimilable into the left–right
matrix. As for the far left, by now capable of around 5 per cent of the
vote, the plural left took the common-sense view that its voters are
unlikely to support a reformist politics (at least on the first ballot). But
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since its representatives were unlikely to figure on the second, it could
for coalitional purposes be ignored.
The anchoring of Greens and PCF has also blocked any evolution of
the party system towards a two-tier variety. Before 1997, concern was
regularly voiced at declining turnout and an increasing tendency to vote
for ‘protest parties’ as opposed to potential government parties. Such
worries about a crisis of representation depended on an ontological
characterisation of certain parties as being mere protest vehicles, hence
unfit for government. Such dubious assumptions fed anxieties; critics
dwelt on the increasing share of the first-ballot vote won by such peripheral
parties, as opposed to the core of serious parties.2 Apart from the FN
and Trotskyists (Pingaud, 2000), the main members of the peripheral
crew were the PCF and Greens.
If one accepts the hypothesis of a core–periphery division within the
party system, one must note that it was nullified at a stroke by Jospin’s
voluntarism. The plural-left pact tied the Greens and PCF into the
responsible camp, leaving the protest to the Trotskyists (rising slowly)
and an FN soon to be victim of gross self-mutilation. Suddenly the
proportion of core party voters climbed by some 16.8 per cent, leaving
only about 18 per cent voting for the peripherals and casting doubts on
the extent of the crisis of representation. Seen thus, PS strategy seems
not only a voluntaristic attempt to recast the party system but also a
profoundly civic action, bringing back into the fold a large percentage
of voters and reducing citizen alienation. Such happy coincidences of
civic duty and one’s own strategic interest are infrequent.
The PS triggered a voluntaristic recomposition of the party system.
Within the historic left–right cleavage, it energetically re-organised the
left pole. This strategy involved downgrading its own position somewhat,
while continuing quasi-clientelistic relationships with small allies. But the
dynamic counterpart to this was the challenge thrown out to Greens and
Communists; they were offered measurable rewards in return for their
cooperation. Yet acceptance of rewards put pressure on them as parties,
highlighting their internal contradictions as they moved into a new role
of responsibility as opposed to criticism. The PS pursued a calculated
strategy of interference in the affairs of other parties, aiming to modifying
their behaviour, the better to reshape the whole party system. The strategy
sought to make the broad left viable again. It worked quicker than
expected, but the experience of government opened a new chapter.
The plural left in government
The management of intra-left relationships is seen first in terms of
distribution of rewards and second in the regulation of tension between
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partners. The basic reward for any party is places in government. Jospin’s
smallish government respected electoral weight in its shareout of posts
but not to the extent of the proportionality used to compose Italian
cabinets under partitocrazia; pluralism is indeed a hierarchised reality (see
Table 5.1).
TABLE 5.1 Vote–position ratio in first Jospin government
Ministers
(N)
Government posts
(%)
Share of total Left vote
(%)
PS 19 70.4 50.0
PRG 3 11.1 3.1
PCF 3 11.1 21.8
MdC 1 3.7 2.4
Green 1 3.7 14.5
Other left – – 8.2
27 100 100
The second Jospin government in 2000 was again based on PS supre-
macy, but added an extra dimension to the formula. It brought in the
Fabius tendency, neutralising Jospin’s only serious rival for leadership
of the PS. Jospin also added Mélenchon and his gauche socialiste, main
source of internal party criticism. After this internal rebalancing only the
Poperenites, persistent old-left militants, remained outside the magic
circle.3 Thus groups within the PS became part of the balancing process
alongside allies from outside the party. This new government also saw
an extra junior post for the Greens, a deliberately belated recognition
of their success in the 1999 Euroelections.
Jospin played the numbers game, but only on his terms. Ministers
from smaller parties tended to be confined to specialist areas. Thus
Voynet was given Environment and specifically denied Health; Hascoët’s
junior ministry was environmentally tagged. The Communists received
social ministries, including Transport, where access to unions is still
important. Even the placing of Chevènement at Interior showed that the
most republican force in the government had its very specific place (but
no other?).
If distribution of rewards was relatively mechanical, control of this
delicate alliance was complex. Jospin was a hands-on prime minister, at
the heart of policymaking and attending personally to relations with
allies. He used formal and informal contacts, from traditional weekly
breakfasts with senior PS ‘elephants’ to formal meetings with other party
leaders,4 as well as less visible social contacts with the latter. While a
relatively high degree of public argument was tolerated, the PS was
clearly leader of the coalition. Regular complaints about PS hegemony,
by Voynet in particular but also Buffet, are one indication of this.5 A
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more convincing one is the semi-public slapping down of allies for
crossing a line in the sand. This happened to Voynet after she launched
into Jospin’s leadership style in a regional council of her party; she
simply took the lesson on board and did not resign, suggesting that the
Greens had to accept PS primacy in the last analysis.6 Voynet’s late
departure from government was not a rejection of Green participation
in a plural-left government but a career move to become mayor of
Dôle – a failure, but she did become party leader (Amar and Chemin,
2002: 218–27).
More subtle techniques were also used by the PS to maintain its
ascendancy, notably attempts to influence the internal workings of other
parties, as described above. Jospin held contemptuous views about the
chronic fissiparity of the Greens which he strove to increase.7 Hascoët’s
appointment was a masterstroke, as he and Noël Mamère, the vocal
Bordeaux deputy who criticised Voynet’s failure to obtain more radical
environmental policies, formed increasingly a pole of opposition to Voynet
within the Greens. While differences between the factions may well be
exaggerated, each was keen to secure the nomination as Green candidate
for the 2002 presidentials, as Villalba and Vieillard-Coffre demonstrate
in this volume (see Chapter 4). The more divided the Greens were, the
less their first-ballot impact and the bigger Jospin’s score, in theory.
Thus putting both groups in government might have increased tension
within the Green Party and weakened their electoral appeal. In party
system terms, therefore, the PS sought to weaken competition within the
left sub-system from the inside, by modifying the behaviour of one of
its protagonists.
A major source of tension was clearly policy-making (Szarka, 1999).
Examination of the policy process since 1997 requires a separate study,
but several points can be made. First, the plural left generally found
agreement easiest on libertarian matters like PACS or parity legislation.
Second, PS partners continued to argue for their favourite radical policies
(wealth tax for the PCF, regularisation of all sans-papiers and commitment
to phase out civil nuclear energy for the Greens) while knowing that the
PS would not accept them, at least in untrammelled form. Third, the
junior partners had to swallow some bitter pills (adoption of the Euro
for the PCF, burial of nuclear waste or reactivation of the Phénix nuclear
reactor for the Greens). That said, however, many government bills were
the product of horse-trading between the parties, a classic example being
the hunting bill, which Voynet defended in Parliament although it was
not fully to her liking. The last-minute withdrawal of PCF opposition to
the social modernisation bill in June 2001 saw compromise stretched
to the limits. The PCF accepted face-saving amendments to a bill which
in the end removed protection from workers.8 Tension was frequent, but
a deal was usually struck.
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The major clash was undoubtedly over Corsica. The special arrange-
ments proposed by Jospin were denounced by Chevènement’s MdC as
incompatible with republican principles. Jospin could not withdraw from
an arrangement whose impact might prove as spectacular (initially, at
least) as the Ulster Good Friday agreement, in order to appease a minor
ally. No public row occurred, and each side expressed its views; but
Chevènement resigned (Amar and Chemin, 2002: 204–17). He was
replaced by a Jospin loyalist Vaillant; but MdC did not get even a junior
post in compensation. This reflects the lack of talent in MdC, but also
the PS’s calculation that it could tough this challenge out, as the blackmail
potential of MdC was small. This was a grave miscalculation. MdC’s
blackmail potential would be seen on the evening of 21 April 2002 to
amount to some 1.5 million votes; the margin of Jospin’s defeat, which
put him out of the second ballot, was only 190,000. Retrospectively,
MdC’s exit was probably the moment when the plural left lost the 2002
elections. At the time, MdC made clear its continuing commitment to
the coalition, but the damage was done.
The Greens could muster more immediate blackmail potential, how-
ever, as they showed in a cantonal by-election in Ardèche by maintaining
their candidate on the second ballot and costing the PS the seat. This
was doubtless connected with the length of time it took to appoint
Hascoët, some nine months after the Greens had ‘earned’ the seat by
their European election performance. Jospin had also leaked it out that
he wanted the Greens to have a group in the next Parliament (even if
the threshold had to be reduced), which meant that he expected to offer
them some winnable seats. Clearly, rapports de force were perceived dif-
ferently; the Greens were respected more than MdC because it was felt
that they could do more damage. This was despite PS annoyance at the
Greens’ political style, notably their constant moralising about the low
standards of public life in France. This is a dossier the PS would rather
have buried, as it had its own Mutuelle Nationale des Etudiants Français
(MNEF) scandal to set alongside Tibéri and the Paris mairie. But it dared
not revenge itself too heavily on the Greens, because they could cost it
seats.
The PCF position was always going to need subtle handling both by
its leaders and the PS. The PCF could logically pose only as the radical
pole of the coalition, seeking to drag it further towards progressive
policies without being irresponsible, to criticise constructively without
being disloyal. It had to be a Janus, sending a populist message to its
constituents and a more consensual one to its partners. Generally it
managed this balancing act about as well as any could have. Initial
hostility to the euro never led the PCF to vote against this key measure
of the government, though it never abandoned its criticisms. Demon-
strations planned against the second round of legislation on the
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thirty-five-hour week in October 1999 seemed unacceptable for a gov-
erning party and led observers to ask whether this was the line in the
sand. But Hue needed (and got) a big demonstration on an economic
issue like this, to persuade his people that the PCF still counted and
could mobilise people. The circle was squared by presenting the protest
as directed not against government but against the Mouvement des
Entreprises de France (MEDEF), which was trying to block measures in
favour of workers. An indulgent PS under Hollande even pretended to
endorse this strategy. Clearly the PS calculated that the PCF needed
some visible protest in order to comfort its natural base and that this
was a way of keeping the PCF at a certain strength, for the time being
at least. Again it had too much blackmail potential to be alienated
brutally, hence the protest could be accommodated. The resultant com-
promise suited both sides; lines in the sand have sometimes to be
moveable.
By such devices was the balance maintained between coalition partners,
albeit with a fairly visible degree of dissent; Szarka notes a ‘pragmatic
level of cohesion’ (1999: 31). Problems as awkward as the Kosovo crisis
or the launch of the euro were managed. Two major sets of elections
(municipal and European) saw either joint lists or competition kept within
amicable bounds. There was no major crisis of the type that plagued
coalitions in previous republics, and no party voted down government
bills. The plural left sustained a viable social-democratic government up
to the 2002 elections.
These were traumatic for the plural left, though it remains to see how
far they have rendered the concept invalid. All the component parties
ran a presidential candidate, even the PRG whose black, female and
overseas candidate, gifted most of her 500 signatures by the PS, seemed
a living symbol of the diversity of the left today. Conventional wisdom
has it that this plurality cost Jospin his place in the second round and
let in Le Pen, but this is simplistic. The timidity of Jospin’s campaign
(downplaying all reference to socialism) and his late and unconvincing
attempts to climb onto the law-and-order bandwagon were fatal. His
inversion of the electoral calendar was absurd; why did a man running
as leader of a governing party give first priority to a contest where
personality and stature override partisan considerations? The argument
about plural candidacies is also misleading. Every party must put up a
candidate if it is to be taken seriously; previously, PCF, Greens had always
done so, making their point in the first round before mostly supporting
the Socialist in the decisive vote. A plural left should logically imply a
plurality of candidates, but capable partners should be able to bargain
enough to prevent plurality from degenerating into fragmentation.
The problem with this was Chevènement, whose candidacy sanctioned
an ego trip in preparation for over thirty years. For all his talk of
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overcoming the irrelevance of the left–right cleavage (language already
heard in the Third Republic), the ex-PS leader was really targeting left
voters worried about law and order and the economic consequences of
European integration. Like the Trotskyist candidates who took over 11
per cent and played, in different words, on similar fears, he bit deep
and knowingly into Jospin’s reserve of votes. He was quite entitled to
point out that Jospin had lost 2.5 million votes after five years in
government. But one can retort that without his candidacy Jospin would
have easily made the second ballot, with a good chance of beating Chirac.
Chevènement’s motives, and his support, deserve painstaking investiga-
tion; but he dealt the plural left a body blow. The June parliamentary
elections found it struggling against the tide. All the parties campaigned
on their own platforms, but with enough residual unity, helped by fear
of letting the FN onto the second ballot in numerous seats, to prompt
a high degree of concerted candidacies. Thirty-four seats saw one joint
candidate (14 PS, 12 PCF, 4 PRG and 4 Greens).
Variable geometry prevailed elsewhere: the PS made way for 31 PRG
and carved up 130 seats with the Greens (70 PS, 60 Green) and 28 with
the PCF (15 PS, 13 PCF); only one PS–PCF dogfight took place, in
Marseilles.9 The plural left turned on the MdC with some relish, running
candidates in all its seats; only one incumbent survived out of eight, and
angry voters sent Sarre and Chevènement to comprehensive defeat. This
revenge was meagre consolation for an outcome which left the PS with
146 deputies (from 250), the PCF 21 (from 36), the PRG 7 and the
Greens a bare 3; overall, the left went from 319 to 177 and faced a block
of 399 right-wing deputies.
Dramatic developments had been occurring on the right since the first
presidential ballot. Sensing the magnitude of his victory over Le Pen,
Chirac seized the opportunity to pressure the right’s parties into a merger.
The measure, often adumbrated in the past, seemed feasible at last. In
the new chamber, the President’s embryonic new party UMP and its
satellites boasted 363 seats; Bayrou’s maintained UDF scraped 29. A
special congress in autumn would officially launch the new party and
consecrate the disappearance of the RPR and DL. Faced with what looked
like a mass conservative party, solidly ensconced in office, the battered
left had plenty of time to take stock. Despite the hurt of defeat, however,
it is questionable how much has really changed in the situation of the
party sub-system, which we term the plural left.
Consequences for the party system
The plural-left experiment has clearly had consequences for the party
system, mostly for the left sub-system, though also for the system as a
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whole. The left sub-system has been reorganised voluntaristically, from
above. What exists now is a semi-permanent constellation of parties
around a hegemonic pole, the PS. To use neo-Weberian analysis (Gaxie,
1996, Offerlé, 1987), an entrepreneur, the PS, has cartellised the com-
petition within its sector of the market, guaranteeing itself and its cartel
allies a larger share. As this move came about after a huge loss of market
share, we could even parody political-market language further and say
that it had turned a reverse into an opportunity.
The PS gambit assumes that the left can normally enjoy at least half
of the electoral market; it has to make sure that internecine competition
does not stop it from realising its share. To identify its product to
customers, the plural left branded itself firmly as such. Its discourse picks
up classic left themes; in economics, it is Keynesian and regulatory, striving
for full employment; in social affairs, it stands for ‘cultural liberalism’
and inclusion. Politically, it is republican and laïc. The gambit also assumes
a certain division of labour, with each party picking up a distinct electorate
(Giacometti, 1998); these can then be reconciled under the broad headings
just described. Far-left voters are assumed to be of a distinct type and
the hope is that many will support the plural left on the second.
The plural left has involved its components more closely than most
previous arrangements of this type. There were joint declarations, if not
a common programme, and joint lists (or failure to put up a rival
candidate) seemed as frequent as traditional désistements. The work of
Parliament seemed subject to the same process of compromis majoritaire,
even if smaller allies complained that executive decisions were dominated
by the leading party. One might agree with Cambadélis (1999) that the
left parties are being changed by their participation in the plural left;
they are becoming more used to a culture of compromise. This does not
mean that they are will lose their identity or merge, but they seem likely
to be increasingly attracted to coalitional logic. The plural left looks set
to become a lasting feature of the political landscape, notwithstanding
changes of nomenclature. The alliance produced electoral victory and
workable government for five years; it then lost but not hugely. What
does this suggest about the future of the plural left and of the party
system generally?
First, relatively little has changed within the components or within the
dynamics between them. To take the protagonists in turn, the PS still
remains the biggest party. It faces a period of intense leadership struggle
in the short term, but that will be resolved. It will continue to have
difficulty in defining what socialism really means today. Its linguistic
rigours and ideological traditions make this task harder than for some
sister-parties, but that is a detail. The PS and all social-democratic parties
are all struggling with the same problem, which Rosanvallon summarised
neatly: finding out how to reconcile the increasing individualism of
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modern societies with that desire for security which the left saw as needing
collective solutions.10 There is no easy answer to this question, and failure
to provide a ready-made one will not stop the PS or any similar party
from winning elections again. When the left wins again, then the PS will
be the major player in that victory.
Its partners in the plural left remain in its dependency. The PRG will
never be more than a local satellite. The PCF continues to lose lifeblood
but is far from dead. It saved its parliamentary group and it still runs
84 towns of over 10,000 and two conseils généraux. It lost money in the
presidentials, as Hue took less than 5 per cent. It too will undergo a
leadership struggle, linked to an identity crisis, as it oscillates between
protest and the aspiration to be a government party.
The Greens are still stuck with the same contradictions. Mamère’s
pragmatic campaign rescued them from the electoral consequences of
undiluted radicalism and saved their election expenses. But the tension
between governmentalists and radicals remains, the more so as even Mamère
began to cast doubt on whether the PS could be relied upon to deliver
enough (with particular reference to the commitment to wind down the
nuclear power programme). But the Greens’ modest electoral appeal
probably means that they can maintain a presence in a left alliance but
not twist the arm of the leaders. Portelli wonders if the movement has
fully accepted the logic of being a party as opposed to a social movement.11
All of the above was true when the plural left began life in the
mid-1990s. So was the fact that one segment of the party system, the far
left, remains hostile to the whole notion of a reformist left alliance. Its
thus remains a potential threat, capable of biting indiscriminately into
the left’s electorate. What has really changed in the dynamics of the
plural left is the role of the MdC. Chevènement’s movement is at war
with the plural left. It did fatal damage in the presidentials, but its
parliamentary performance was poor. It remains to be seen whether,
with considerable debts, the movement can go very far in its attempt to
draw together républicains des deux rives, basically Jacobin nationalists of
left and right. It could prove to be a mere club for intellectuals and
politicians at the end of their career, but remains for the moment a
residual threat for the left parties. This one minor exception does not,
however, invalidate the concept of the plural left for the future.
One of the strongest consequences of the plural left was, perversely,
its effect on the opposite side of the partisan spectrum. The plural left
put itself into the driving seat of party politics in France with only 44 per
cent of the vote in 1997. This had implications for the right. It had
always hitherto understood the logic of bipolarisation better than the
left. It usually managed to present voters with an agreed programme and
arrange a highly sophisticated carve-up of constituencies and/or places
in government, with measurable criteria (Hanley, 1999b). Logically it
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ought to have responded to the plural left with a display of tighter unity;
but its recent history has been one of internal strife compounded by the
rise of the FN. The European elections saw the right’s offer fragmented
into RPR, a UDF which had lost its liberals (now DL) and the sovereignist
RPF, not to speak of the two branches of the ex-FN.
Strategists hypothesised about the creation of a plural right, which
would take in RPR, RPF, DL and UDF in the hope of further marginalising
the far right. France would then have a polarised two-bloc system, with
a radical element (Trotskyists and FN) on either side. Given the small
size of the radical elements, it would be a moot point whether such a
system deserved to be called ‘polarised pluralism’. That one could even
envisage such a two-bloc system shows how far the party system has
moved from the days of the quadrille bipolaire of the 1970s. Within the
many-membered left bloc there is a clear dominant pole; within the right
the RPR would have to claim a similar position of ascendancy. The plural
left, by its successful take-off, put major pressure on the right sub-system.
However, there seemed little positive reaction by the right until the
‘divine surprise’ of Le Pen’s presence on the second ballot of the 2002
presidentials. The presence of this bogeyman allowed Chirac to pressure
the right parties towards a merger that shows every sign of being
more workable and lasting than anything previously attempted, even if
the maintaining of the UDF outside the UMP umbrella means that the
‘French Tory party’ is less than complete. Certainly the right sub-system
appears to be in a process of radical and further-reaching reorganisation
as a result of what has happened on the left. Within it, the RPR would
appear to have played a dominant role similar to the PS on the left and
the new party will be very much under its influence.
Faced with the dramatic movement towards unity on the right, some
have expressed the wish that the left follow and create a broad-based
party. This is unlikely. The smaller parties have distinct identities and
ideological traditions, somewhat divergent electorates and above all
apparatuses keen to preserve their prerogatives. Leaders such as Hollande
seem perfectly aware of this and are not pushing for any sort of merger.
Some PS leaders are counting on the demise of the PCF, but that will be
some time in coming. In the meantime, a politics of alliance seems the
only way forward, with separate identities, but regular electoral alliances
and a broadly agreed programme of government. The parties will have
to work more closely on a day-to-day basis and manage their unity without
taking it for granted. In other words, they will have to carry on doing
what they learned to do in 1997–2002. The French party system will not
be suddenly bipolarised à l’anglaise. But a much more unified right will
now confront a left whose success will depend on a constant ability to
work out a creative tension between unity and difference.
One final point must be made. The success of the plural left brings
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out a constant of the French party system ever since it first became
recognisable in the late nineteenth century (Hanley, 2002). This is the
ability of party elites to collude when necessary in order to modify or
restrict competition. Such a strategy has usually necessitated fine judge-
ment and readiness to act boldly; the agents had to challenge the
structures in which they operated in order to modify them. Looked at
in long-term perspective, the plural left – and its imitators on the right
– are simply repeating this pattern.
Notes
1 In competitive terms, PS and MdC agreed not to challenge each other’s
incumbents; PS also left the Greens a free run in 30 seats. PCF and MdC
agreed 48 joint candidacies. PS and PCF signed a joint electoral declaration,
focusing on demand stimulation and job creation, the thirty-five-hour week,
tax reform, an end to ongoing privatisations and a new immigration law
(Szarka, 1999, Buffotot and Hanley, 1998).
2 By this logic, in 1993 only 58.98 per cent (of a 70 per cent turnout) were
voting for potential governing parties and two-fifths of voters were mere
‘protesters’ (Habert et al., 1993: 300).
3 La Croix, 28 April 2000.
4 Le Monde 26 April 2000.
5 La Croix 2 June 2000.
6 Voynet claimed that there was no real collective strategy in government.
Major decisions were taken in ministerial meetings dominated by the PS or
during Tuesday morning breakfasts with PS ‘elephants’; future measures
were announced to PS summer schools, but not to ministerial colleagues;
smaller alliance partners were simply used for dirty jobs – nuclear waste to
herself, transport unions to the PCF’s Gayssot (Le Monde 23 May 2000).
7 Le Monde, 23 May 2000.
8 La Croix, 14 June 2001.
9 La Croix, 7 June 2002.
10 La Croix, 3 July 2002.
11 La Croix, 15 November 2000.
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Beyond the mainstream:
la gauche de la gauche
Jim Wolfreys
The left Beyond the mainstream: la gauche de la gauche
Introduction
In the summer of 1998 an article in Le Monde entitled ‘Quand la France
s’amuse’ compared the apparently beatific state of mind of the French
in the wake of the national team’s World Cup victory with that evoked
by Pierre Viansson-Ponté in his celebrated essay ‘Quand la France s’en-
nuie . . . ’ written on the eve of the May ‘68 events.1 As with the original
article, such complacency proved at odds with a powerful undercurrent
in society which, from the mid-1990s, had seen a backlash against
neo-liberalism gather pace against a backdrop of growing social inequality.
The backlash took the form of a so-called ‘social movement’ encompassing
the revival of working-class militancy signalled by a major public sector
strike in November–December 1995, a wave of occupations and demon-
strations by immigrants, the homeless and the unemployed, the rebirth
of the engaged intellectual, and unprecedented electoral success for the
revolutionary left, whose two presidential candidates, Lutte Ouvrière’s
Arlette Laguiller, and the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire’s Olivier
Besancenot, achieved in 2002 a combined score approaching three
million. The growing influence of la gauche de la gauche was accompanied
by the mushrooming of various militant groups and associations cam-
paigning against racism, unemployment, homelessness and homophobia,
boosted from the turn of the century by an emerging anti-capitalist
movement spearheaded by individuals like the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu
and the anti-globalisation campaigner José Bové, and by groups like the
Attac association against financial speculation.
The class conflict and political polarisation at the heart of the 1995
strikes appeared to confound orthodox analyses which saw late twen-
tieth-century France as a society of consensus and institutional stability
(Furet et al., 1988). This polarisation, however, was expressed almost
exclusively outside the major political parties. Yet the political system
91
itself, despite the turbulence of intra-party relations, underlined by a
series of splits from the RPR and UDF in the wake of the left’s return
to power in 1997, appeared relatively stable in the period following the
strikes. In particular, Lionel Jospin appeared to have consolidated the
revival signalled by his showing in the 1995 presidential poll through
his management of the governmental plural-left coalition, not least in
helping to nurture the PCF through its transformation into a mainstream
social-democratic party, and in facilitating the integration of the notori-
ously indisciplined Greens into the party system. Indeed, the most
dramatic split to occur, that of the FN, was interpreted by some, although
not this author (Wolfreys, 1999), as a triumph for the absorptive capacity
of the system, drawing former FN chairman Bruno Mégret into its orbit
and leaving Le Pen severely weakened.2 Since April 2002, however, the
credibility of all claims about the system’s capacity to neutralise anti-
establishment forces must be questioned. When, as happened on the first
round on the 2002 presidential election, fewer people choose to vote for
all of France’s mainstream parties combined than opt for the extreme
right, the Trotskyist left, abstention or spoiling their ballots, the term
‘crisis of representation’ no longer seems excessive.
This chapter will argue that the phenomenon of the ‘social movement’
is the product of a process of social and political polarisation to which
France’s party system has been unable to respond, largely because of the
broad consensus which now governs most areas of policy. We begin with
an outline of the way in which fundamental ideological differences between
the parties of the mainstream left and right are being eroded. The
perception among grass-roots activists that the PS in particular is no
longer either able or willing to provide solutions to long-term problems
like unemployment, job insecurity and discrimination, is a major reason
for the development of the social movement, or gauche de gauche, whose
principal elements will be assessed below. The argument put forward in
this chapter is that behind an atrophied party system, a culture of protest
and dissent is developing which opposes neo-liberalism but has yet to
put forward an alternative vision of society of its own. This lack of a
clear ideological focus limits its ability to provide clear political solutions,
contributing to a general political climate characterised by both stagnation
and volatility.
Changes in the party system
Belated industrialisation, the Socialist–Communist split and longstanding
ideological divisions have all been cited as factors delaying the formation
of modern, disciplined party machines in France. Long into the twentieth
century, the political system incubated numerous parties, most of them
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with weak structures and limited militant bases. Under the Fifth Republic,
revision of the electoral system forced parties to combine in alliances.
This, along with various other changes linked to economic modernisation,
meant that the number of parties represented in the National Assembly
was greatly reduced during the post-war period. The subsequent estab-
lishment of what is quaintly known as the quadrille bipolaire, a left–right
polarisation dominated by the four main parties, was generally held to
be a consequence of newfound constitutional stability which derived from
a number of factors, notably the consensus over major policy issues after
the Socialists’ emergence as a party of government; the experience of
cohabitation between a president and prime minister of opposing tend-
encies; and the decline of ideological factors linked to class and religion
which accompanied the emergence of a post-industrial or post-materialist
society. ‘It took centuries to establish [the] ideological structures [of
France]’, wrote Emmanuel Todd in 1988, ‘and only five years to liquidate
them’ (cited in Safran, 1998: 89). But no sooner had this model been
established than it began to disintegrate. New parties, in the shape of
the FN and then, to a lesser extent, the Greens, emerged as major
players. Three authoritarian nationalists, the Gaullist Charles Pasqua,
who broke from the RPR, the aristocratic Philippe de Villiers, who broke
from the UDF, and the republican Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who
broke from the Socialists, emerged as significant minor players. This
fragmentation of the party system, although partly based on personal
ambition and petty rivalries, was also a product of the dilution of
three major ideological currents in post-war French politics; socialism,
communism and Gaullism.
In the late 1980s a debate took place within the Socialist Party about
whether its commitment to managing capitalism, confirmed by the aban-
donment of its reform programme and the adoption of austerity measures
in the early 1980s, was robbing the party of its specific identity. By 1991,
former Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy was redefining the party’s role as
that of a brake on the excesses of the market, while the Rocard government
was responding to the crisis of Keynesianism in an era of globalisation
by championing the ‘reform of the infinitely small’ (Moreau, 1998: 291–6).
The dangers of this approach were signalled by Henri Emmanuelli in
1989, who warned that if the Socialist party were ‘to limit itself to
managerialism’ by renouncing its vocation ‘as an instrument of social
transformation’, it would lose its identity (cited in Moreau, 1998: 285–6).
Jacques Moreau has argued that the Socialists’ hesitancy and loss of
direction during Mitterrand’s second septennat derived from an inability
to come to terms with the retreat to austerity in the 1980s. Whereas in
the past the left had concluded that failure to deliver on electoral promises
required a redoubling of revolutionary ardour, allowing leadership and
rank and file to be reconciled around an ostensibly class-based analysis
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of society, no such reconciliation took place after 1983. This was partly
because the party’s founding Epinay programme of 1971 was not rooted
in any doctrine that would allow it to learn from failure and lay the basis
for regeneration. But the ‘presidentialisation’ of the PS during the 1980s
further prevented party activists from drawing lessons from the experience
of office or even discussing party policy, a shift of authority underlined
most dramatically by the imposition in 1988 of the Letter to all the French,
written by Mitterrand and embodying a ‘reformism without principles’
(Moreau, 1998: 278). While in office the Socialists had in any case
dismantled many of the tools that would have permitted state direction
of the economy, through financial deregulation and integration into the
European monetary system. Although most European social-democratic
parties emerged from the 1980s with neither Marx nor Keynes as points
of reference, the history and traditions of France’s political culture made
the abandonment of the rhetoric of radical change particularly proble-
matic (Hincker, 1997: 123). In particular, greater French integration into
the world economy called into question the French left’s allegiance to
republican nationalism. How could the defence of service public be recon-
ciled with privatisation? How could the universalism of the social security
and health system be defended in the face of moves to privatise pension
schemes and health insurance? Such questions, as we shall see below,
were to be taken up and thrown back at the Socialists by activists angry
at their perceived abandonment of republican principles.
Although the plural left was essentially an electoral alliance, it grew
out of an initiative to re-establish links with ordinary activists and revive,
‘more modestly than before’, as Jospin once put it,3 the notion that the
Socialists could act as a brake on the market. Efforts at a recomposition
of the left had begun with Michel Rocard’s Assises de la transformation
sociale, which brought together Socialists and various ‘progressive’ forces.
Jospin and his allies continued to pursue the initiative long after others
had forgotten it (Mercier and Jérôme, 1997: 144–7). Jospin’s strategy of
seeking alliances with the left, rather than the centre, along with his
1997 election platform, promising to fight unemployment and reduce
the working week, sent out a message that the left would attempt to offer
regulation and state intervention to ensure job creation and the preser-
vation of public services. In 1981 it was Jospin who had wondered aloud
whether there would be ‘a clash or a compromise’ between the government
and French capital (Moreau 1998: 272–3). After his election in 1997, he
famously attempted to provide his own answer to the question, claiming
to want ‘a market economy but not a market society’.4 But having held
out the prospect of a break with the neo-liberal orthodoxy, his government
chose not to act when workers at Renault-Vilvorde, Michelin and Danone
called on Jospin to make good his campaign promises to make it harder
for companies to make mass redundancies.5
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By 1999, he appeared resigned to the impotence of government before
the market, announcing on national television that ‘I do not think our
role is to administer the economy’.6 His attempts to emphasise that there
remained a left–right divide were increasingly reduced to symbolic acts,
provoking angry clashes with the opposition by calling for the rehabili-
tation of First World War mutineers and accusing the right of being on
the wrong side in the Dreyfus affair. But the most symbolic of all the
government’s acts, Martine Aubry’s long-awaited thirty-five-hour week,
with all the evocations of the Popular Front government this brought to
bear, failed to live up to expectations. Michel Rocard’s references to Paul
Lafargue’s Le Droit à la Paresse during Jospin’s 1995 presidential campaign
seemed a far cry from the flexible working practices, proliferation of
short-term contracts and increased job insecurity which the measure was
to produce (Fondation Copernic, 2001).
When the 2002 campaign came around, Jospin appeared to have
returned to the hesitancy of the early 1990s, initially denying that his
programme was Socialist before re-emphasising his identification with
the left as election day neared. Voters, three-quarters of whom claimed
to be unable to tell the manifestos of Chirac and Jospin apart, were
unforgiving, and Jospin’s result was the worst of any Socialist presidential
candidate since the party’s formation. The PCF was hit even harder. Its
leader, Robert Hue, in a typically gauche turn of phrase, had warned in
1998 that the left would fail if it did not ‘have a symbiotic relationship
with the social movement’.7 But participation in government, not least
that of PCF transport minister Jean-Claude Gayssot, who oversaw the
‘partial’ privatisation of Air France, undermined whatever relationship
the party might have had with the movement in the first place. In 2002,
Hue’s electorate fell to a level which more or less approached parity with
what the party had claimed in membership only twenty years previously.
Although economic growth and the introduction of the thirty-five-hour
week had led to a fall in unemployment, Jospin’s coalition left office
with the problem of job insecurity unresolved. Despite the introduction
of various youth employment schemes since the 1980s, in the 1990s only
20 per cent of the 17–24 age group entered the job market on indefinite
full-time contracts (Mouriaux, 1998: 146). The practice of issuing part-
time contracts for all workers continued until by 1998 they made up one
fifth of all contracts issued. By the end of the decade almost one third
of all workers felt that their jobs were in danger (Filoche, 1999: 127).
The role of the Socialist party, then, in the absence of either a doctrine
or a radical reform agenda, appears once more reduced to a predomi-
nantly systemic function, devoted to ‘the organisation and legitimisation
of the electoral process’ (Yanai, 1999: 6–7). This view would seem to be
supported by the changing social composition of the mainstream left’s
electorate. In the 2002 parliamentary election, as in 1997, the PS won
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the support of a greater proportion of senior managers (35 per cent)
than either white-collar (30 per cent) or manual workers (33 per
cent).8 Studies have shown that the activist base of both the Socialist and
Communist parties is now older and less working class than ever before.
Only 5 per cent of Socialist Party members are under 30. The average
age of Socialist party members (55), Communists (49) and even Greens
(47) tells its own story.9 All these factors, in a context of rising inequalities
and scepticism about the Socialists’ commitment to reform, help to explain
what has given rise to the emergence of the autonomous groups and
associations which make up the ‘social movement’, to which we now turn.
The ‘social movement’
The literature on social movements generally stresses their emergence
in two waves, the post-1968 liberation movements (gays, women, immi-
grant workers, ecologists) and the post-1981 movements typified by SOS
Racisme. New social movements in general, the argument runs, are linked
to the decline in traditional areas of conflict such as class or religion
(Kriesi et al., 1995). They espouse ‘post-materialist’ themes and use
unconventional forms of participation (Dalton and Kuechler, 1990). While
the orientation of the first, post-1968 wave centred on policy, with
movements cultivating close links with political parties, the second wave
has been characterised by a desire for autonomy from traditional institu-
tions and shaped by motives which are held to be expressive and affective
rather than instrumental.
Conflicting interpretations of this shift in emphasis have been offered.
The most orthodox contends that political opportunity structures hold
the key to understanding the interaction between state institutions and
social actors. The Mitterrand election victory of 1981 recast relations
between the state and civil society, giving rise to a new kind of social
movement which, disaffected with the refusal of the Socialists to provide
such groups with the political opportunities they sought, radicalised and
followed a more autonomous path after 1988 (Fillieule, 1997). Others
have argued that new social movement theory offers an inadequate
framework for explaining the emergence of these grass-roots currents,
which instead embody a new form of active citizenship (Waters, 1998).
Where once new social movements operated within the political system,
the second wave forms a ‘civic front’ in defence of specific groups all
united by a desire to defend basic rights and freedoms. Their altruistic
outlook, ad hoc structures and identification with ‘civic humanism’ rep-
resent a democratic revival (Duyvendak, 1994, Waters, 1998). Their new
model of flexible regroupements based on medium-term engagements has
also been cited as evidence of a new type of activism stripped of both
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the republican notion of individuals as citizens and the communitarian
sociabilities which, despite everything, managed to insert themselves
between the citizen and the nation to structure the work of voluntary
groups (Ion, 1994: 36–7).
Clearly, during the 1980s the relationship between the mainstream left
and social movements, once fairly close, changed significantly. Sympto-
matic of this change is the experience of SOS Racisme. By the end of
Mitterrand’s first term of office, it was suffering from widespread disillu-
sionment with its image as a satellite of the Socialist Party. Cynicism about
the Socialists’ commitment to confronting racism in general and the FN
in particular led to the adoption of a different strategy by rival anti-racist
groups in the early 1990s. Where SOS had attempted, with some success,
to mobilise a new generation of activists around the republican ideal of
equality, new groups, such as Ras l’Front and the Manifeste contre le
Front National were more focused on specific, immediate objectives, than
the pursuit of equal rights for all (Fysh and Wolfreys, 1998).
At the same time, the apparent ‘exclusion’ of those at the bottom of
society, brought home to many by the parliamentary debate on the
Revenu Minimum d’Insertion and the growing proportion of long-term
unemployed among the rising numbers of those without work, led to the
development of a crise de l’avenir as the realisation spread that the
continuous post-war rise in living standards was now being reversed. A
number of protests took place in the early 1990s which appeared to
contradict some of the assumptions made by social scientists during the
1980s about greater affluence leading to ‘post-material’ forms of protest.
Those taking strike action and marching through the streets were now
the professional classes, not usually associated with labour militancy:
Air France pilots and bank workers, or those anxious about entering
professional life like the school students who demonstrated in 1994
against the Balladur government’s youth employment scheme (Castel,
1993: 717–18).
The tendency to seek autonomy from established institutions began to
generalise. In the trade unions a movement had surfaced with the student
protests and railway workers dispute of 1986, which were led not by the
official bureaucracies, but by strike committees or coordinations (Futur
antérieur, 1996). Rejecting negotiation and compromise by delegated
officials in favour of a more militant approach, the coordinations set
great store by the participation of rank-and-file activists in decision-mak-
ing. Some of these structures became unions in their own right, activists
expelled from the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail
(CFDT) setting up Coordonner, Rassembler, Construire (CRC) in the
health service and the Fédération Solidaire, Unitaire, Démocratique des
PTT (SUD–PTT) in the post office, both of which now form part of the
Groupe des dix federation of independent trade unions. SUD, which
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recruits a high proportion of previously non-unionised workers and has
won significant support in elections to post and telecommunications
workplace committees, was to play a prominent role in the social move-
ment which emerged in the mid-1990s (Coupé and Marchand, 1999:
244–5).
At the heart of this movement were the sans groups of ‘those without’.
The association of the homeless, Droit au Logement (DAL), formed in
1990, and the civil rights group, Droits devant!! (DD!!), formed in 1995,
pushed the issue of homelessness up the political agenda with an occu-
pation in the rue du Dragon in the Saint-Germain area of Paris during
the 1995 presidential campaign. The most prominent of all these groups,
the sans papiers, immigrants made ‘illegal’ by government legislation
introduced in 1994, won broad public support when their occupation
of the Saint Bernard church in Paris was broken up by riot police. In
the winter of 1997–98, associations such as Agir ensemble contre le
Chômage (AC!), formed by the left opposition within the CFDT, and the
Communist-led Association pour l’Emploi, l’Information et la Solidarité
(APEIS) organised a wave of protests demanding increased state aid for
those out of work. Act Up, a dynamic and highly visible Aids-awareness
group, was founded in 1989 as a the result of similar frustrations with
the institutionalisation of associations and the shortcomings of the left.
It used shock tactics (during one protest a giant condom was fitted over
the obelisk at the Place de la Concorde) to advance its argument that
the inadequacies of state action leave the most marginal and vulnerable
disproportionately affected by Aids, making it a ‘political disease’.
In Le Nouvel Esprit du Capitalisme, Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) offer
an explanation for the emergence of these movements. The decline in
influence of Marxism, they argue, both as a political force and an analytical
tool, means that the concept of exploitation has given way to the notion
of exclusion. When society is viewed in these terms, attention tends to
focus not on the system of relations which produces economic inequalities
but on those who suffer. But without a sense of where exclusion fits into
the broader picture, it becomes harder to develop a vision of an alternative
society. The consequences of this were twofold: on a practical level,
political engagement shifted during the 1980s to humanitarian work and
the defensive reflex to relieve suffering, while in theoretical terms macro-
socio-historical critiques have given way to the micro-analysis of specific
situations. In other words, with social criticism no longer able or willing
propose alternative solutions, those who oppose social injustice are left
with little recourse other than to express indignation in the face of
suffering. The humanitarianism of the 1980s, represented by initiatives
such as Coluche’s Restaurants du cœur or Bernard Kouchner’s Médécins
sans frontières, operated outside the frame of reference of the labour
movement, and tended to represent the dispossessed as victims. Hence
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the identification of the excluded as those without: the sans parole/
domicile/papiers/travail/droits, and so on (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999:
416, 429). These groups combined aspects of 1980s humanitarianism,
through their appeals to the rights of man and their high-profile direct
action, and elements of 1970s activism, both via individual veterans of
Maoist and Trotskyist groups and in their use of the ‘geste transgressif ’
designed to expose institutional bad faith (Boltanski and Chiapello,
1999: 434).
They have also demonstrated a capacity to unite over specific concerns
for a limited period around a loose, ‘fluid’ concept of citizenship based
on a minimal definition of rights rather than any ideologically charged
notion of republicanism. For Boltanski and Chiapello, the historical
significance of the new forms of protest resides in their ‘morphological
homology’ with remodelled capitalism (1999: 434). Where the bureau-
cratic organisations of the traditional labour movement find their ability
to effect change stalled, flexible groups uniting around precise issues are
able to ask participants for specific commitments over a limited period.
Delegation and action by proxy are replaced by the authenticity of direct
engagement in protest activities.
Leaving aside the more contentious aspects of the ‘network society’
paradigm deployed in a series of recent influential studies (Boltanski and
Chiapello, 1999, Hardt and Negri, 2000, Castells, 1998), specifically the
notion that a fundamentally new social structure has taken shape, it is
clear that some of the transformations they describe, in particular the
simultaneous crises of global capitalism and the nation-state and the
reconfiguring of their relations, have had a profound effect on parties
and protest groups alike. For Hardt and Negri, social movements today
represent a fundamental break with the past. Traditional distinctions
between economics and politics are dissolving as conflicts take on a wider
‘biopolitical’ dimension and each struggle ‘leaps to a global level’ (Hardt
and Negri, 2000, 56). Certainly, as we shall see below, it is true that
groups setting out to address specific concerns are increasingly being
drawn into wider struggles, while the decline of social democracy gives
an intensely political dimension to the movement.
Anti-capitalism and the far left
We have seen how in the early 1990s a limited and sporadic revival of
labour militancy took place alongside the mushrooming of autonomous
associations. In the presidential election of 1995, a third important
development occurred when the Trotskyist candidate Arlette Laguiller
passed the 5 per cent barrier for the first time, indicating that a sizeable
electoral constituency was emerging to the left of the established left.
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The effect of the November–December 1995 strikes and their aftermath
was to bring all these tendencies to the fore. The main trade union
federations were forced to come to terms with the threat posed by the
rank-and-file coordinations, which led to far greater democratic partici-
pation than in previous strike waves. There was also much greater unity
between different unions and between different branches of industry. In
some areas, such as the twentieth arrondissement of Paris, mass meetings
were open to all and attended by teachers, postal workers, railway and
metro workers, along with members of various associations. On demon-
strations led by public sector workers, anti-nuclear protesters joined
contingents from anti-racist groups, unemployed and homeless associ-
ations and Act-Up, indicating that the frequently made distinction between
the ‘old’ labour movement and the ‘new’ social movements is in fact far
less clear-cut.
After December a process of generalisation took place. This was partly
due to the context of the demonstrations themselves, which reacted
vociferously to the contrast between the Juppé plan and Chirac’s 1995
populist campaign theme of the fracture sociale. Subsequent protests by
the sans associations and by teachers, truckers, students and school students
all made reference to this general context. The intervention of the
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu also played an important part in ensuring
that the strikes developed into a wider reaction against the neo-liberal
consensus forged in the late 1980s by the mainstream parties and sub-
sequently propagated via a range of publications and think tanks. Bourdieu
consciously attempted to polarise the situation, linking the neo-liberal
content of Juppé reforms to the broader question of corporate-led glo-
balisation. In doing so, a shift in the intellectual climate took place. A
famous quarrel flared up over a petition in the journal Esprit, when various
leading academics backed the emollient stance towards the reforms taken
by the CFDT leader Nicole Notat. Bourdieu condemned those behind
the initiative, like the sociologist Alain Touraine, not just for signing it,
but for putting their expertise at the service of the state which such
movements were directed against, making them, as Bourdieu declared
with some relish, ‘lackeys of the establishment’ (Wolfreys, 2000).
Bourdieu engaged in a series of initiatives which aimed both to broaden
the scope of the movement and to politicise it, principally through the
use of his publishing house, Liber/Raisons d’Agir, which produced ac-
cessible and polemical publications bringing some of his theoretical
preoccupations to a wider audience. A Raisons d’Agir association was
formed and provided the launch pad for Bourdieu’s November 1996
call for an Estates General of the Social Movement, followed, in April
1998, by an article entitled ‘For a left left’ 10 in which he called on the
various components of the social movement to oppose the neo-liberal
policies of Europe’s newly elected social-democratic governments in an
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‘international of resistance’, a call which later formed the basis of an
appeal issued at a European level.
The proposal for an Estates General of the European Social Movement
argued that the inability of social democratic parties to offer an effective
alternative to ‘growing inequality, unemployment and casualisation’
necessitated the development of an ‘authentically critical counter-force’
capable of bringing these issues ‘constantly back onto the agenda’. The
search for such a counter-force explains the phenomenal development
of Attac, perhaps the most striking indication to date of the size of the
audience for groups operating beyond the mainstream. Set up in 1998
by various trade unions, associations and radical journals following an
influential article by the editor of the Le Monde Diplomatique entitled
‘Disarm the markets’, Attac’s goal was the imposition of a so-called Tobin
tax, or ‘global solidarity tax’, on financial transactions. The money raised
would then be used to fight global inequality and fund sustainable
development. According to Bernard Cassen, the association’s first presi-
dent, the call for a Tobin tax is symbolic of the desire to defend democracy
against the threat posed by the freedom of capital to circulate. Attac’s
success – by the turn of the century it had formed well over 100 local
committees in France with over 40,000 members, along with an inter-
national network covering around twenty countries – underlines the
growing impact of the anti-capitalist current which first came to light
internationally with the November 1999 protests in Seattle against the
World Trade Organisation (WTO).
One of the most prominent symbols of this emerging movement is
the unlikely figure of a middle-aged sheep farmer from Larzac, José
Bové. In 2002, Bové was sent to prison for his part in the dismantling
of a McDonalds in Millau in the Tarn by members of his Confédération
Paysanne in protest against la malbouffe, mass-produced processed food
and the economic and environmental threat which it poses. As with other
initiatives of recent years, from the anti-FN protests at Strasbourg in
March 1997 (organised by a Comité de Vigilance uniting dozens of
organisations) to the wave of mobilisations that followed Le Pen’s first
round presidential success in 2002, Bové’s trial in Millau brought together
a range of groups from across the social movement, both in France and
elsewhere, in a 50,000 strong demonstration in June 2000. His trial was
an illustration of both the breadth of the movement and of the way in
which it was generalising. Around the figurehead of Bové, then, groups
which had started out occupying derelict buildings in Latin Quarter
back-streets now found themselves making common cause with interna-
tional protests against global capitalism sparked off by demonstrations
against the WTO on the north-west coast of the United States.
Clearly this is a period of transition when old relationships are breaking
down and the ideas and aspirations which shaped and coloured them
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are being recast. This raises an important point about autonomy. In 1998
a number of groups, including DD!!, SUD and the AC! unemployed
association signed a declaration asserting the autonomy of the ‘social
movement’ (Brochier and Delouche, 2000: 163–71). While the intention
may have been to avoid recuperation by the mainstream left, the way in
which the movement was developing showed that ‘autonomy’ did not
really exist, neither in the sense of discrete groups working towards their
own particular ends, nor in the sense that the movement could lay claim
to a distinct and independent political standpoint of its own. But just as
the shrinking ambitions of social democracy were creating an expanding
space for these groups to occupy, so political questions previously debated
within its institutions were being transposed onto the social movement.
Groups like Attac therefore found themselves called upon to adopt
positions on issues that went far beyond anything contained in the
proposal for a Tobin tax, from the war on terror to the question of
whether to vote for Chirac in the second round of the presidential poll.
Such questions formed part of much bigger debates on broader points
of strategy and principle, the most important being that of Attac’s role.
Was it essentially a radical anti-capitalist association based on grass-roots
campaigns and direct action, or a lobbying group whose aim was win
the support of political parties for a Tobin tax? Perhaps it was both?
Since such groups achieve unity on the basis of identification with a
relatively narrow set of aims rather than a general political outlook, these
debates tend to be dealt with either in a piecemeal fashion, responding
to events as they occur, or by organisational manoeuvres, highlighted by
Bernard Cassen’s attempt to place his supporters in positions of respon-
sibility when he stepped down from the presidency.11 The absence of a
general political platform is both the strength and the weakness of the
social movement, providing on the one hand the basis for unity and the
capacity to mobilise widely, but carrying with it the risk either of cooptation
by political parties or of paralysis, as the ability to act decisively is
sacrificed for the sake of unity (Sommier, 2001: 97–110).
The search for political alternatives beyond the mainstream is an
important element in the electoral success of the far left. Since Arlette
Laguiller won 1.6 million votes in the 1995 presidential poll, LO and
the LCR have gone on to perform impressively in elections at local,
national and European level, sending five deputies to the European
Parliament in 1999 and winning more votes between them than the
combined scores of Hue and the Green candidate Noël Mamère in 2002.
The respective campaigns of Laguiller and Olivier Besancenot highlighted
some of the differences between the two organisations. Laguiller drew
large gatherings to her campaign meetings in towns affected by job cuts,
such as Nancy, Caen and Reims. Her calls to prevent companies in the
black from making redundancies, and to make public the details of
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the bank accounts of major firms and their directors, won her the support
of 10 per cent of manual workers, compared to 3 per cent for Hue
(www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/poll/7549.asp).
Besancenot, meanwhile, a previously unknown postal worker, won over
one million votes, his sensitivity to the social movement reflected in his
post-election call for the unity of anti-capitalist forces. LO’s rejection
both of this proposal and the LCR’s offer to stand joint lists in the June
2002 parliamentary election stemmed partly from the organisation’s
preoccupation with building its own organisation rather than engaging
with other parties or movements. This has led it, outside of election
campaigns, to focus its activities on the workplace, dismissing develop-
ments like the anti-WTO protests and the Attac associations as distractions
which would serve no useful purpose.12 Neither of the most explicitly
political organisations associated with the new mood in French politics
have as yet found a way of addressing the question of the political
direction of the social movement. If the LCR’s enthusiastic involvement
in a range of groups linked to the social movement, notably Attac and
SUD, leaves it vulnerable to the same weaknesses as the movement itself,
then LO’s defence of its independent political stance is at times so fierce
as to risk alienating it from those outside its ranks. Despite the echo
which Besancenot’s proposal met, the thorny question of the relation-
ship between the broad movement and whatever specific, organisational
political form it might take will not be resolved overnight.
Conclusion
The progressive estrangement of French voters from the political process
can be gauged from their response to recent elections. The 1999 European
elections produced the lowest turnout for an election under the Fifth
Republic, with 53 per cent of voters abstaining. Pollsters concluded that
as much as 71 per cent of the population used the election to express
dissatisfaction with political elites (Méchet, 2000: 21). In the September
2000 referendum on the reduction of the presidential term of office,
even this figure was exceeded when nearly 70 per cent of voters abstained,
while almost two million of those who actually went to the polls only did
so to spoil their ballot papers. In the two elections held in 2002 the
number of abstentions on each of the first round votes meant that France
was to find itself with a president backed by under 15 per cent of the
registered electorate and a parliamentary majority with the support of
less than one quarter of those eligible to vote. Surveys have shown that
the majority of the population neither believe that politicians are working
for their benefit or feel represented by a political party.
Consensus, then, instead of bringing a more stable and ordered party
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system, has accentuated a crisis of representation, while post-materialist
society, as we have seen, has proven a surprisingly fertile ground for
protests over material issues. In the late 1980s Herbert Kitschelt argued
that although France had a societal potential to generate left-libertarian
parties, its concrete political opportunity structure remained unfavourable
to the emergence of such organisations. The effect of neo-liberalism and
attacks on the welfare state in most western democracies, moreover,
meant that left-libertarian concerns such as feminism, ecology, energy
and anti-nuclear issues would fade and give way to ‘economic distributive’
issues (Kitschelt, 1988). By the late 1990s, however, it was clear that such
distinctions between ‘new’ and ‘old’ struggles were beginning to break
down.
France has witnessed both the growth of parties and associations
generally associated with left–libertarianism and the emergence of or-
ganisations and networks whose primary focus is on class issues. The
slow dissipation of the ideological and organisational reserves of parties
of both left and right is symptomatic of the growing divide between
political parties and society. This in turn explains the attraction of the
diverse components of the social movement. These currents are neither
‘post-material’ nor can they be described as simply a ‘new citizenship
movement’. What we are witnessing is a revival of collective protest at
social inequality which is reconfiguring the relationship between a bur-
geoning associative network, the labour movement and the political left.
But it remains a movement whose own lack of political and organisational
focus has so far hampered its ability to mount a meaningful challenge
from beyond the mainstream. That distinction belongs to Le Pen.
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Introduction
The principal dynamic of the French party system under the Fifth
Republic has been that of the so-called ‘bipolar quadrille’. By the end
of the 1970s, four parties of approximately equal strength were monop-
olising over 90 per cent of the vote in their respective left and right
blocs (Parodi, 1989). Nevertheless, this end-state had taken twenty years
to produce, concluding in 1978 with the formation of the UDF. The
UDF managed to create an unprecedented alliance between liberal,
Christian democrat and radical currents,1 taking its place as the second
right-wing pole next to the Gaullist RPR. The UDF represented the
desire to institutionalise the centrist coalition formed around Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing, who had been elected president four years earlier. At
the same time, however, none of the constituent parties of the new
confederation had ever agreed to merge themselves into a single organi-
sational entity.2 It was only on 16 May 1998, by a single motion passed
by its national congress, that DL ended twenty years of the ‘moderate
alliance’ by withdrawing from the confederation.3 DL represented the
largest component of the UDF, accounting for around one-third of its
members and elected representatives. Its separation allowed the creation
of a significant new party, even if some of its members did not defect
from the UDF. With a parliamentary group of 44 deputies in the National
Assembly, together with 46 senators,4 DL immediately asserted itself as
an indispensable partner.
These events by no means marked the end of the UDF, but the
secession did significantly alter its format. Lacking one-third of its
former activists and a large chunk of its liberal wing, the balance of
power noticeably shifted within the UDF. In particular, the descend-
ants of the Christian democrat courant have become the dominant
force. From this, a fusion of the remaining components into the New
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UDF – although only partial – was announced at the Lille Congress
in December 1998. At the same time, François Léotard, the former
President of the Parti Républicain (PR) who was elected to the head of
the UDF in 1996, resigned, to be replaced by the leader of Force
Démocrate (FD), François Bayrou. In simultaneously giving birth to a
new party actor and significantly weakening one of the main existing
parties, the UDF split would seem to signal major changes within
the party system. However, the bipolar quadrille had already been
shattered by the emergence of the FN, a new actor excluded from
coalition, and by the shifting equilibrium between the two partners in
both blocs.
Since the initial pendulum swing of 1981, the RPR had established
itself as the dominant partner on the right (Schonfeld, 1986). However,
the results of the 2002 elections introduced a novelty, namely the ap-
pointment of Jean-Pierre Raffarin, a member of DL, as Prime Minister.
This is the first time since 1981 that one of the two heads of the executive
has been filled by a member of a party other than the RPR while the
right is in government. But this novelty should not be exaggerated,
reflecting less a new development in the right bloc and more a reward
for loyalty to Chirac’s ‘clan’.
Indeed, the split in the UDF seems even less significant for the French
party system when one realises that its direct consequences, beyond the
formation of the new parliamentary group in 1998, are difficult to identify.
Two reasons can be given for this. First, the split of the UDF was not
accompanied by a challenge to the existing governmental coalitions,
unlike cases where a split in one party leads to the collapse of an alliance
or a change in the systemic status of such an alliance.5 The new UDF,
DL and the RPR still constitute the moderate-right coalition and all
participate in the new governing coalition since the 2002 electoral victory.
DL was not excluded, by dint of being a close partner of the RPR, a
role from which it did not try to distance itself. Second, the organisation
of the UDF itself has tempered the consequences of the split. For twenty
years, the UDF had been considered a party living on borrowed time,
such were the internal divisions within its ranks. The threat of defection
had been one of the basic negotiating tools within the confederation. In
this respect, the difference between a heavily factionalised party and a
coalition is minimal.
However, the very presence of the threat of defection throughout the
old UDF’s twenty-year existence shows that its stability was at issue, and
that its disappearance should therefore have some consequences. Within
a weakly institutionalised organisation such as the UDF, it is difficult to
argue routine behaviour as the source of stability. Such consequences
can be seen in the shifting of these parties in political space, as well as
in the modification of intra-bloc dynamics on the right.
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The split and the modification of parties in political space
The logics of electoral coalition on the one hand and of demarcation
between the different moderate-right parties on the other are obviously
mirrored in the definition of ideologies within each organisation. The
split occurred around reactivated latent cleavages and has broadly led
to a relocation of the party positions in political space, consequently
potentially affecting the general balance of the party system (Lane and
Ersson, 1987).
Two main cleavages were key to the split. The first, social in nature,
opposed two spiritual families, one descended from a liberal heritage,
the other from a Christian democrat background. The second, more
strategic, concerned the issue of relations with the extreme right. The
split fundamentally separated the descendants of liberalism, regrouped
in the DL splinter, from the Christian democrat successors, who now
form the majority of New UDF. Each representing their specific spiritual
family, despite the weakened contemporary nature of the cleavages,
liberals and Christian democrats took different lines, especially on re-
ligious matters. Despite a lack of data on the subject, certain
characteristics of this divide can be discerned through a survey of
delegates to the PR (liberal) and CDS (Christian democrat) national
party congresses (Ysmal, 1992).6 All of the delegates were in agreement
on most items pertaining to economic liberalism, but inheritance tax
divided them – only 39 per cent of CDS delegates wanted its removal,
as opposed to 65 per cent of the PR. In cultural-attitudinal terms, PR and
CDS delegates shared some liberal positions (for instance, 21 per cent
of CDS delegates and 20 per cent of PR delegates condemned homo-
sexuality) but there was no consensus on the death penalty (almost 65
per cent of the PR wanted its re-establishment, as opposed to less than
40 per cent in the CDS) or abortion (45 per cent of CDS delegates
against 34 per cent of PR delegates wanted to make it more difficult to
obtain). The different components of the UDF were thus sensitive
to different social issues. Finally, immigration preoccupied the PR more
than it did the CDS.
In withdrawing from the UDF, DL finally confirmed its liberal identity,7
starting with its change of name. Moreover, Alain Madelin announced
the split in the name of liberalism:
There are many French men and women who expect us to provide a future
for their country and for their children which is different to the one the
Socialists are proposing. This future can only be a liberal one. Throughout
the world, people are rallying to those values and ideas which are our own.
And so, my friends, we are not now going to fold up our flag, and dilute let
alone dissolve our liberal heritage.8
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For DL, the split was also the chance to present a manifesto inspired by
liberalism. Beyond classic state reforms, the lowering of taxes and the
simplification of legislation, DL’s programme emphasised the promotion
of intermediary associations and the value of autonomy for individuals,
local organisations and public services, starting with the education sector.9
Even so, it is difficult to maintain that the UDF split has re-established
a fundamental cleavage in French society. Christian democracy and
liberalism are not bitterly opposed, after all, particularly since religion
is no longer a central concern today. These two families are not to be
found on opposing sides of a single cleavage (Seiler, 1984). Moreover,
conflicts between Christian democracy and liberalism may be rooted in
unarguable historical fact in France (Kalyvas, 1996), but today these
conflicts have been superseded by fights between right and left. Third,
New UDF does not play upon its Christian democrat heritage – indeed
any such reference is completely absent – except in its belonging to the
European Popular Party.10 This absence of explicit ideological bench-
marking is hardly surprising, given the extent to which the UDF is still
a highly composite structure. Whether radical, liberal or even social
democrat, the non-Christian democrat minority is still significant none-
theless. More broadly, the collection of moderate-right formations plays
host to a heterogeneous bunch within their organisations, despite their
own fragmentation. The position of CDS and PR leaders mentioned
above shows not only the differences between the different constituents
of the UDF, but also no less significant internal oppositions between
each constituent. On subjects as sensitive as abortion, the death penalty
or the fortune tax, they tend to divide into one-third versus two-thirds,
or sometimes 50–50. Similarly, the liberal credo vaunted by Madelin has
caused difficulties within his own party in those areas touching upon
society. His abstention in favour of the PACS, or his position on the
decriminalisation of soft drugs on the one hand have not been followed,
and on the other form part of his presidential campaign.
In sum, despite the apparent link to ideological streams which support
the UDF split, no social cleavage has truly emerged or even re-emerged.
Obviously, differences exists between New UDF and DL, but these are
more a matter of nuance than of fundamental opposition, and revolve
increasingly around the salience of certain issues such as European
construction, in New UDF’s case, or the defence of small traders and
business owners, in the case of DL. Both find themselves in a politically
conservative space, associated with economic liberalism. Despite the frag-
mentation in organisational terms, the moderate right are undergoing
a certain ideological homogenisation, questions about Europe, decen-
tralisation or the role of the state no longer dividing them (Ysmal, 2000).
This homogenisation has no doubt resulted from the general dissemi-
nation of liberal ideas, which DL has helped to spread despite not reaping
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any significant reward from doing so. More fundamentally, however, it
is the rise of the FN which has obliged this ideological tightening,
providing as it has a point of negative identification for the moderate
right. Furthermore, the FN has not only posed an ideological conundrum
to the moderate right, but also a strategic one.
The split in the UDF resulted in part from an internal debate over
the attitude to adopt towards the FN after the 1998 regional elections.
In five French regions, these elections had led to a relative majority of
the left where previously the right had dominated. The right, however,
had the possibility of retaining control were it to have the support of
the extreme-right councillors. Five former regional council presidents
opted for this possibility in order to keep their title, against the advice
of the national party headquarters. François Bayrou, then vice-president
of the UDF, condemned anything which resembled an agreement with
the extreme right, be it collusion or collaboration. Conversely, Alain
Madelin asserted that the question of the FN could not be allowed to
get in the way of the political programme, that to fight it one should
fight its ideas. Without explicitly condemning the regional council presi-
dents in question, and even supporting some of them, Madelin believed
that to ask whether FN support was viable or not was to play the left’s
game. Many of his colleagues even drew parallels with the PS and PCF
alliance in the 1970s.
This difference deeply divided the moderate-right camp. Its birth had
direct consequences for party locations and thus for their coalition
potential. In a position more to the right, DL was notably one of the
groups where Millon’s network in the shape of La Droite had more
success.11 Conversely, New UDF found itself in a centrist position, which
allowed it to win the Rhône-Alpes regional presidency, thanks to Socialist
support. Nevertheless, the FN split in 1999, which destroyed most of its
coalition potential,12 and Jacques Chirac’s continued opposition to any
alliance, prevented this new cleavage from becoming entrenched. On the
other hand, New UDF itself became more entrenched in the centre in
broadening its catchment area, while DL located itself more closely to
its RPR partner.
The interplay between party demarcation and coalition integration
should prevent the appearance of polemical debate on ideology between
the different parties of the moderate right. Only strategic questions, such
as the attitude towards the FN or the 2002 electoral calendar, cause real
opposition. In the end, it is the articulation of different interests and
party locations more generally which differentiate New UDF from DL.
The UDF split did not engender polarisation, even within the moderate
right. Certain cleavages may have appeared, but today they have dissi-
pated. This evident proximity in ideological terms on the right betrays
the clear divergence in organisational terms that has supported continued
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fragmentation within this bloc. Such differences have proved very bit as
divisive as programmatic considerations.
The split and subsequent dynamics on the moderate right
The modification of the number of relevant parties in a system will
modify the mechanics of inter-party relations therein (Sjöblom, 1968,
Laver, 1989).13 The formation of the UDF embodied this logic by reducing
the number of independent actors in the game. In 1978, the UDF was
initially created as a common electoral banner for the PR, CDS and
Radical Party. The legislative elections of that year presented two dangers
to Giscard d’Estaing. First, a left-wing victory could provide an electoral
surge sufficient to secure François Mitterrand’s election three years later
in the presidential race; second, the Gaullists, under Jacques Chirac’s
leadership, had been engaged since 1976 in an internecine fight with
the president from their position in the governing coalition. The re-
grouping of the parties under the UDF banner was primarily designed
to field common candidates at the first round of the two-ballot legislative
elections. Without this, separate candidatures against the Gaullists risked
seeing the latter reach the second round on their own, leading to the
disappearance of the moderate camp from the legislature.14 Since 1958,
the moderate bloc had undergone a steady erosion in its parliamentary
representation, from almost 200 deputies in 1958 to fewer than 100 in
the 1970s. The 1978 elections in fact finished with the moderates
victorious, achieving parity with the RPR.
This success ensured the permanence of the UDF by providing it with
an organisational dimension above and beyond its cartel status. First and
foremost, the UDF provided a stable arena for negotiation between its
constituent parts, reinforcing the cohesion of a deeply divided coalition.
In providing voters with a pole with which to identify, the UDF’s existence
strongly discouraged any strategy of defection to the left or right. Threats
of secession may have been numerous, but none came to fruition until
1998 because their role was limited to that of a simple bargaining tool.
The UDF can therefore be considered as a unitary actor throughout its
twenty-year existence, even if the total was little more than the sum of
its parts (Hanley, 1999b). Presidential and European elections are the
important exceptions to this rule. For these elections, candidatures have
rarely corresponded to narrow party delineations anyway, whether under
a united right (such as the European elections of 1984 and 1994) or a
divided UDF (European election of 1989 and the presidential elections
of 1988 and 1995). Between 1981 and the split, the UDF had never
presented itself as a united party at these elections.
Conversely, at the 1999 European elections, a single UDF list opposed
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a joint RPR-DL list.15 Similarly, each of these three parties has fielded
a candidate for the 2002 presidential elections – Jacques Chirac for the
RPR, Alain Madelin for DL, and François Bayrou for New UDF. DL’s
return to independence, despite the component being formed before the
formation of the UDF itself, can be considered the appearance of a new
party. The split forced it to change arena, reintegrating directly into
the party system, and no longer limiting its room for manoeuvre to the
UDF’s internal space.
The reappearance of DL on the right should not be seen as a preface
to any major change. The third and dominated partner on the right,
DL no longer seems to be an actor able to use the threat of coalition
break-up. The political survival of DL relies from now on upon its
continued participation in a moderate-right electoral alliance. Its own
electoral pool, estimated at less than 5 per cent of the electorate,16 is
insufficient for a party which presents itself as ‘office-seeking’. Its position
on the right prevents it from any strategy involving overtures to the left.
Its possible role as a pivot between the moderate and extreme right
seems unlikely given the fragmentation of the extreme-right bloc 17 and
Chirac’s own opposition to it. Furthermore, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s second
place in the presidential race has definitively excluded him from future
alliances. Conversely, New UDF’s position is more flexible, due to its
centrist location. A rejection of the current alliance in favour of the left
at the moment seems unlikely, as much from the status of the PS, PCF
and Green Alliance as much as from the internal opposition which such
a strategy might provoke. However, this pivotal position can be used by
the UDF under certain conditions, much in the same way as the CDS
tried, albeit somewhat unsuccessfully, in 1988.18 For instance, part of the
UDF and the PS has already formed an alliance in the Rhône-Alpes
region, to elect Anne-Marie Comparini (UDF) to the regional council
presidency. This game played out between part of the right under Charles
Millon’s command, allied with the extreme right, 19 and a centrist pole,
combining part of the UDF and the PS.
Nevertheless, these alliances are unstable and circumstantial. The split
is thus unlikely to rearrange the structure of coalitions within the party
system. Indeed, it seemed more likely to strengthen the RPR’s domination.
Paradoxically, if anyone seemed likely to derive benefit, it was the New
UDF, and until the spring of 2002, this seemed to be the case. RPR,
New UDF and DL fielded their own presidential candidates and simul-
taneously negotiated candidacies for the legislative elections. For twenty
years, the single first-round candidate has become the rule for at least
local and legislative elections.
Legislative and presidential elections nevertheless follow two separate
logics. For the former, alliance is favoured inasmuch as the goal is the
maximisation of elected candidates. For the latter, differentiation is key
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where only one position is at stake. The UDF may be an ineffective
presidential machine,20 but the post-split parties have included this
election at the heart of their agenda. The presidential ambitions of
François Bayrou and Alain Madelin were, moreover, considered to be
key to the split. It should be noted that DL and the UDF obtain their
best scores in opinion polls for the presidential election, their respective
candidates receiving about twice as many voting intentions as their party
in the legislative polls.21 For the parties, the logic of differentiation and
support of the leader is predominant. This has resulted in a frank
discussion of the hegemony of the president over his own camp. The
emergence of ‘affairs’ concerning Jacques Chirac or his entourage are
subtly played upon, for instance. Cohabitation also reinforces this com-
petition as far as the president is more or less directly involved in
governmental business.
Conversely, because the French president and the RPR have a say in
the selection of candidates for the next legislative elections, the majority
of DL and New UDF deputies are in favour of a strategy based upon a
single presidential candidate in the first round. A strategy too dependent
upon differentiation could in the end threaten the legislative election
alliance and therefore in turn threaten many deputies’ re-election. Con-
sequently, there is a growing dissociation within each organisation between
their different manifestations. Notably, New UDF and DL are witnessing
growing conflict between their party headquarters and parliamentary
groups. In 2002, the legally fixed deadlines for the renewal of assembly
and presidential mandates would have meant that the deputies had put
themselves before the polls in advance of the President, a departure
from Fifth Republic tradition. A bill put forward by Lionel Jospin’s
government proposed prolonging Parliament for a couple of weeks in
order to return to the traditional order. The Communists and Greens,
however, refused to support it, depriving the government of its majority
– it was only thanks to one third of the UDF parliamentary group that
the bill was finally passed. However, in the meantime, the Conseil National
of the UDF had already unanimously adopted a proposal to support this
bill strongly. The majority of the UDF parliamentary group, in disagree-
ment with this, could thus have opposed a direct order from party HQ.
The novelty of this situation is not so much the autonomy of the
parliamentary group, but that it could take a clear line at all. The split
in the UDF has thus served to fog the source of power, the parties
seemingly more and more uncohesive.
This schism between DL and New UDF’s parliamentary and party
organisations gradually increased, peaking in the aftermath of the first-
round presidential elections. Initially, the split of DL from the UDF
produced a multiplication of apparatuses at the local and national level.
The split of the party leadership into New UDF and DL was accompanied
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by similar splits among members and grass-roots organisations, but these
latter were less problematic due to their already being largely separated
out. However, these changes, particularly among groups of repre-
sentatives, seem somewhat artificial. They may have come off at the
national levels, with the National Assembly group separating into two –
the Démocratie Libérale et Indépendants and the remaining UDF – but
at the local level, such developments were far more limited: the old UDF
partners continue to sit mostly in the a single group. Moreover, Jean-
Pierre Raffarin created the Chiraquian club Dialogue et Initiative in 1998
with Jacques Barrot, Dominique Perben and Michel Barnier, in order to
try to structure coordination and programmes on the moderate right.
However, the main initiative in this respect was the creation in spring
2002 of Alternance 2002, an association formed in April 2000 by a group
of RPR, DL and UDF deputies. Since its creation, two of its guiding
principles make it a possible alternative to existing parties: individual
membership, regardless of party status; and the creation of a common
electoral banner for its members, effectively designed as a presidential
majority banner. Nevertheless, this association did not emerge as a
political party until its transformation after the second round of the 2002
presidential elections into the UMP.22 At this point, the UMP stated four
conditions for its supporting candidates. The UMP candidates had to
provide a written undertaking to support the new government for the
entirety of the first legislature; their candidacy must only be registered
under the symbol of the UMP, and no other;23 they must become a
member of the UMP parliamentary grouping; and they must take part
in the founding congress of the UMP. Thus, the UMP placed itself
squarely in competition with the other political parties.
New UDF and DL’s respective reactions to this challenge were different.
François Bayrou opposed it utterly. Three-quarters of the UDF par-
liamentary group requested UMP candidacies, but the remainder of New
UDF decided to present its own candidates.24 Conversely, Alain Madelin
supported the UMP (given that his parliametary group joined the new
party directly), dissolving DL in September 2002.25 In general, however,
the situation remains confused, given that none of the parties has excluded
any of its members, with many members of the UMP remaining in
executive positions within New UDF and DL.
The 2002 elections have resulted in a novel party sub-system on
the right, characterised by two main changes from its recent past: the
hegemony of the UMP, which holds 365 deputies in the National Assembly
against only 29 for the New UDF; and the end of unique right-wing
candidacies in the first round of legislative elections. In this sense, the
moderate right has returned to its state in the 1960s or 1970s, but with
a hegemonic Chiraquian party rather than a dominant Gaullist party.
Furthermore, the similarities with the 1970s extend to the restrained level
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of competition between the moderate-right partners. The UDF only stood
under its own symbol in 151 constituencies, in which the UMP only failed
to field its own candidate in 19 cases. Thus, competition between the
UMP and UDF only occurred in less than one-quarter of constituencies.
However, even in these cases, true competition was rare, with one or
other of the candidates having no chance of winning, either due to the
strength of the incumbent or due to a failure to engage in a productive
campaign.26 To this extent, the 2002 legislative elections perpetuated the
principal of ‘fair share’ put forward by Hanley (1999b) if we ignore
the UMP umbrella label. Even today, the RPR receives around one-half
of the candidatures, the DL one-fifth, and the CDS one-seventh,27 with
the rest distributed among the other coalition members.
Nevertheless, between 1978 and 2002, a clear tendency towards a shift
in balance between the two main components of the UDF occurred (see
Tables 7.1 and 7.2). In 1997, FD managed to get more of its candidates
elected as deputies than the PR. The 2002 elections also confirmed this
tendency inasmuch as DL lost some more common candidacies to New
UDF, despite the latter only being partially integrated into the UMP.
This sheds a new light on DL’s fortunes after the schism. The double
logic of the UDF alliance within a right-wing alliance lost it the status
of second principal component of the French right,28 without any equi-
valent shift in electoral support. This development in the relative positions
of the different components within the UDF can mainly be explained
by the mechanism of candidate selection.29 The management of these
compromises were carried out almost systematically against the interests
of the dominant partner, leading to an overrepresentation of the sec-
ond-placed party. Moreover, the figures concerning RPR-UDF shares
give similar results, with the RPR losing out despite its own electorate
growing relative to that of the UDF.30 However, the split did not allow
DL to become the second-placed partner of the right. In the end, the
split did not allow it to cancel out this unfavourable dynamic.
The party landscape on the right appears uncertain subsequent to the
2002 elections. On the one hand, political supply has not been fun-
damentally changed by the UDF splinter by the creation of the UMP.
The principal of incumbent support has not changed, and the few
occasions where this has not pertained means that change is slow. Changes
in party name have been apparent, but their effects are also uncertain.
The creation of a UMP group in the National Assembly seems only to
confirm the general unity of moderate-right deputies which has been
implicit for a long time. Conversely, it will not present certain problems
linked to parties where group discipline is not the rule. The main change
has been the nomination of Jean-Pierre Raffarin as Prime Minister, albeit
under the close scrutiny of the Elysée.
On the other hand, if the UMP turns out to be a long-term stable
116  The right
organisation, presenting an alternative to New UDF, the change will be
significant in that it will confirm the implantation of an essentially biparty
system, substituing bipolarised multipartism. Deprived of their parliamen-
tary presence, New UDF can no longer rely upon strong organisational
or popular support to ensure their survival against the UMP. The UDF
split may not have had direct consequences, but it did provide the first
stage in French party system change due to the weakening of one of the
poles of the bipolar quadrille. Without the split, the UDF might have
been able to oppose the formation of a Chiraquian movement not only
because of its electoral strength but also because the UDF appears a
posteriori more coherent than its other manifestations.
Conclusion
The UDF split may seem to have had little impact on the French party
system, but it nevertheless represents the beginning of changes which
might represent a substantial change in the French party system, creating
a single dominant moderate-right party in the shape of the UMP or one
of its successor. In essence, the split has opened up more possibilities
rather than exercised direct effects. One of its unwanted and paradoxical
effects would be the initiation of a period of unification via a fragmenting
dynamic. The dilemma between differentiation and integration would
thus have been resolved in favour of the latter as a result of the legislative
elections’ dynamic, rather than the presidentials. The French political
system thus still conforms to its semi-presidential model where winning
a coherent parliamentary majority is indispensable to the president.
TABLE 7.1 Party affiliation of single candidates fielded by the moderate
right (per cent)
1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002
RPR 55 53 51 51 50 52 51
DL/PR 18 22 18 19 20 17 15
New UDF/FD 8 12 13 13 11 14 23
TABLE 7.2 Party affiliation of moderate-right deputies (per cent)
1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002
RPR 53 59 55 50 54 55 52
DL/PR 24 21 21 22 23 15 15
New UDF/CDS 12 13 14 19 13 19 25
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Although voters on the right have largely supported a single right-wing
organisation since the 1990s, the parties themselves have gone in the
opposite direction until 2002. The parties of the right have thus con-
tributed to their own delegitimation, giving the appearance of private
clubs run according to individual whims. New UDF and DL are conse-
quently skeletal in their corpus, with less than 50,000 member, putting
themselves at risk of being overtaken by some new initiative, such as
Millon’s which managed to garner 30,000 members in the space of a
few months. Can the creation of the UMP thus be interpreted as a
reconciliation of the right and French society? So far, the organisation
has not gone down this road. Above all a parliamentary body with no
real membership, the UMP elite appears to have little legitimacy given
their lack of democratic mandate to their hegemony. The birth of the
UMP has thus only been the first stage in a more generalised refoundation
which should follow. The success of this will determine the long-term
chances of the UMP. Too much prevarication might otherwise give New
UDF a chance to rise from its ashes. With a parliamentary group and
an electoral label, François Bayrou has not yet given up hope.
Notes
1 The three founding parties of the UDF in 1978 were the PR, from the liberal
stream; the CDS, successor to the Christian democratic movements; and the
Radical Party.
2 There were five components to the UDF on the eve of its break-up: DL, the
new label for the PR since the election of Alain Madelin as its president in
1997; FD, the fusion of the CDS and the Parti Social Démocrate (which
included Socialists who had rejected the Communist alliance in the 1970s);
the Radical Party; the Parti Populaire pour la Démocratie Française, a splinter
from the PR; and lastly direct UDF members.
3 The ‘moderate’ label is a practical label for UDF members in the tradition
of the ‘independent’ notables. Political moderation is a negative definition,
more defined by its opposition to the left, the extremes and Gaullism than
by its own content. Above all, it evokes a political culture more than a
position, being closer to centrism than to the centre (Hazan, 1997).
4 The Républicain et Indépendants group in the Senate is part of the liberal
family along with DL. Despite DL’s numerical domination, the Républicains
Indépendants (RI) group includes a broader spectrum of parties, including
several members of the UDF. It contains 46 senators and is thus the fourth
largest group in the Senate.
5 The UDF had already undergone a split in 1994, when Philippe de Villiers’
MPF was created for the European elections. The MPF diverged sufficiently
to be excluded by the moderate right, and failed to make any alliances at
the local level.
6 DL is directly descended from the PR, and New UDF mainly from members
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of the former CDS. Unfortunately, no data exist since the SOFRES–Le Monde
survey of 1990.
7 DL corresponds closely to the ‘challenger’ party identified by Lucardie (2000).
8 Alain Madelin, speech to the DL party conference (16 May 1998).
9 See the DL programme (Dix Choix Forts – Ten Strong Choices) at www.dem-
lib.com
10 Since 1999, however, it should be noted that both RPR and DL MEPs sit
in the European Popular Party.
11 La Droite is a political organisation started by Charles Millon in 1998 to
garner support no matter what its party affiliation. In 2000, La Droite was
transformed into a party, and renamed La Droite Libérale et Chrétienne.
12 The FN split may not have significantly damaged its electoral potential, but
Bruno Mégret’s failure to win away part of the FN’s support has hampered
any possibility of allying with the moderate right.
13 The crux of the argument lies in the fact that, as the number of parties
increases, so the number of possible coalitions rises exponentially. If we take
the UDF split as indicating a rise in the French party system from six to
seven relevant parties, the number of possible coalitions rises from 63 to
127.
14 Schlesinger and Schlesinger (2000) have shown that if the UDF managed to
improve its performance over the RPR at the second round, it would have
much the better performance at the first round. Coordinating candidacies
was thus indispensable for the moderate right to ensure qualification for the
second round.
15 The situation in 1999 is thus similar to that of 1989 when the PR joined
the RPR in a single list led by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing while the CDS ran
its own list under Simone Veil.
16 Vote intentions for DL candidates vary between 3 and 5 per cent, according
to the polling institute. The indicator has its weaknesses, not least because
of the electoral coalition, but shows DL’s tight margins. The party proximity
indicator gives similar results, with 2 to 4 per cent of the sample naming DL.
17 The political space between the moderate and extreme right has been heavily
contested by such actors as the MPF, the CNI and the Droite Libérale et
Chrétienne. DL, at the moment of the break-up, could also have been situated
among these, given that its position on the regional presidency affair was
more tolerant.
18 In 1998, a parliamentary group – the Union du Centre – had been created
by members of the CDS positioning themselves as a pivot to negotiate with
Michel Rocard’s minority Socialist government. However, these attempts
failed, particularly because of the left, and support was limited to yes votes
on a number of pieces of legislation.
19 The possibility of an overt alliance between Charles Millon and the extreme
right was much debated. Relations between Millon and the FN are hazy, but
there has certainly been an agreement between Mégret’s FN splinter, the
MNR and Millon.
20 Since 1981 and until 2002, the UDF has not managed to field its own
candidate. It more or less endorsed Raymond Barre and Edouard Balladur
in 1995, but both were beaten.
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21 The results of the 2002 presidential elections gave François Bayrou 6.94 per
cent and 3.96 per cent Alain Madelin. In the first round of the legislative
elections, separate UDF candidates won 4.19 per cent with DL winning no
significant share of the vote.
22 Alternance 2002 had already changed its name once before, becoming a
mouvement rather than a union. The UMP will adopt a new symbol after its
founding congress in the autumn of 2002.
23 See www.u-m-p.org; this condition is crucial, given the terms of state financing
of political parties.
24 In some cases, separate UDF candidates stood against former UDF candidates
who had decamped to the UMP.
25 Around twenty candidates stood under the DL symbol.
26 The decision to present separate candidates was only taken one month before
the elections, and so a number of candidates were only fielded at the eleventh
hour. Indeed, in some cases UDF candidates were in fact members of DL.
27 The growth of New UDF in 2002 (Tables 7.1 and 7.2) derive principally
from other components of the UDF which remained within New UDF.
28 In 1958, during the first legislative elections of the Fifth Republic, the
Independents of the CNI – the precursors to the PR – won 118 seats and
became the second largest group in the National Assembly. General de
Gaulle’s UNR nevertheless won more than 200 seats.
29 Three key principles govern the selection of candidates within the confeder-
ation: automatic reselection of incumbents and most previous candidates who
wish to stand again; a nationally negotiated distribution of constituencies
among the member parties; and the individual choice of candidates according
to their chances of victory (Sauger, 1998).
30 The electoral potential of the UDF and RPR is difficult to estimate precisely
because of their alliance. Using party proximity as an indicator, 19 per cent
of voters declared themselves close to the UDF in 1978 but only 10 per cent
did so in 1997. For the RPR, the proportions move from 17 per cent to
18.5 per cent during the same period (CEVIPOF national surveys, 1978 and
1997). During this time, the RPR group in the National Assembly lost 14
deputies, whereas the UDF only lost 10.
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Introduction
Most major European countries are content with just one major party
of the centre-right: Britain’s Conservatives, Spain’s PPE, Germany’s
CDU–CSU. France has always had at least two. The electoral cycle of
April–June 2002, however, held out the prospect of change by transform-
ing the fortunes of France’s centre-right in two ways. A double victory
at the presidential and parliamentary elections kept Jacques Chirac in
the Elysée and put a large centre-right majority into the National
Assembly. Second, most of the hitherto dispersed centre-right family
merged into a single formation, the UMP.
Why did this merger happen in 2002, and not sooner? The first part
of this chapter will consider what kept the mainstream right apart before
2002. The second section will show why the parties had less reason to
stay apart by 2002 than they had had five, ten or twenty years earlier.
The third will show how a more favourable context was used to advance
a concrete merger project, in the approach to and aftermath of the
2002 elections. The conclusion will assess both the UMP’s longer-term
prospects, and its more general impact on the French party system.
France’s divided right
For most of the Fifth Republic, three things have divided the French
right: real differences of ideology and policy; opposed organisational
cultures; and the logic of presidential competition. On the other hand,
although the right-wing electorate is far from homogeneous, divisions
among voters had rather little impact on divisions between the parties
– and voter demand was eventually to be important in the genesis of a
merged party. René Rémond’s classic study divided the contemporary
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French right into three familles spirituelles which he related to the nine-
teenth-century claimants to the French throne: legitimists, who rejected
en bloc the values of the French Revolution (the far right); Bonapartists,
standing for strong national plebiscitary leadership, and a ‘social’ inter-
ventionist state (the Gaullists); and Orleanists – Anglophiles who stood
for a moderate, socially and economically liberal monarchy supported
by local notables (the giscardiens) (Rémond, 1982).
Despite the imperfections of such an essentialist view of the right’s
divisions, its proponents would have found empirical support in the
policy differences between the Gaullists and the non-Gaullist moderate
right in the first two decades of the Fifth Republic. These include, for
example, the bitter disputes of the 1960s over French institutions and
European integration between Gaullists (and the small group of their
giscardien allies) on the one hand and the so-called ‘centrists’ (including
Christian democrats and a significant part of the non-Gaullist conservative
right) on the other. The Pompidolian succession in 1969 drew some of
the passion from these debates. However, fairly clear distinctions within
the French right survived into and after the 1970s. Jacques Chirac’s
relaunched RPR was generally more Eurosceptical, more dirigiste, and
more authoritarian; the Christian democrat and non-Gaullist right um-
brella UDF was altogether less jacobin, more Eurofriendly, and (usually)
more ‘liberal’ on both economic and societal issues; each disputed the
centre-right ground with the other (Colombani, 1984). The two sides
still, to a degree, marched to different tunes.
Second, minimal party organisation is a tradition on the French right.
France is the land, above all, of Duverger’s cadre party, the loose,
undisciplined, grouping of local notables of more or less the same
sensibility (Duverger, 1951). For the Gaullists, on the other hand, the
strong leader and the chain of command have been operating prin-
ciples since the Resistance. These principles have, it is true, been
imperfectly realised in practice. The first Gaullist party of any substance,
the Rassemblement du Peuple Français, was wrecked in 1952 by the
incorrigible independence of its notables. The Gaullist party of the early
Fifth Republic, despite its nationwide organisation and membership,
was materially far more dependent on its positions within the state
than its leaders cared to admit. Chirac’s relaunch of the party as the
RPR in 1976 failed to re-establish it as a truly ‘mass’ party (Schonfeld,
1981).
Nevertheless, there were clear organisational contrasts between the
Gaullists’ quasi-military structures and nationwide membership and the
much looser organisation of the non-Gaullist moderate right – local
notables for the conservatives, local notables plus Catholic associative net-
works for the Christian democrats. For Gaullists, ‘we’re a real party,
with real activists’, as one member said; ‘the UDF is a country club’.1
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UDF notables, on the other hand, described the Gaullists’ modus operandi
as fascisante (Frémontier, 1984: 180–1).
Lastly, the right was also predictably divided by presidential rivalries
under the two-ballot electoral system. First-ballot competition need not
damage the chances of second-ballot victory, provided the losing candi-
date in each camp endorses his better-placed rival for the run-off (which
has always happened, though with varying degrees of conviction). The
first five presidential elections of the Fifth Republic offered right-wing
voters a choice between two credible candidates at the first ballot (Table
8.1). Although the presidential election is in principle a confrontation
between individual candidates (rather than parties) and the electorate,
candidates need the backing of parties to be successful. A party merger
will therefore threaten the interests of any potential candidate who lacks
an overwhelming lead within his own camp. This had been the major
stumbling block to the first real attempt to confederate the RPR and the
UDF, in 1990, in an alliance called the UPF. The organisation of
presidential ‘primaries’ within the UPF, promised for 1995, never ma-
terialised because no candidate was prepared to surrender his chances
of a first-ballot run (though in the event, the UDF failed to run its own
candidate in 1995).
TABLE 8.1 The moderate right: presidential candidacies and share of
votes cast (1965–2002)
Gaullists Non-Gaullist moderate right
Year Candidate First-ballot
vote (%)
Second-ballot
vote (%)
Candidate First-ballot
vote (%)
Second-ballot
vote (%)
1965 De Gaulle 44.7 55.2 Lecanuet 15.6 –
1969 Pompidou 44.5 58.2 Poher 23.3 41.8
1974 Chaban-
 Delmas
15.1 – Giscard
 d’Estaing
32.6 50.8
1981 Chirac 18.0 – Giscard
 d’Estaing
28.3 48.2
1988 Chirac 19.9 46.0 Barre 16.5 –
1995 Chirac 20.8 52.6 Balladur* 18.6 –
2002 Chirac 19.9 82.2 Bayrou 6.8 –
Madelin 3.9 –
* Balladur: Gaullist anti-Chirac candidate supported by most of the UDF
Sources: Lancelot (1998) (for 1965–95), Le Monde (for 2002)
It should be noted, however, that while they have always been in
competition for the presidency, of its nature a post which only one
partner can win, Gaullists and the non-Gaullist moderate right have
always been ready to negotiate common candidacies at other levels,
and notably for municipal and legislative elections. Here, candidacies
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supported by both major components of the moderate right were the
exception rather than the rule. Thus in 1973, the Gaullists and the
parties making up the UDF presented 522 candidates between them for
the 473 seats available in metropolitan France, or 1.1 candidates per
seat; in 1978, a year of unusually intense competition between the parties,
the figure rose to 1.84 candidates per seat; it fell back, however, to 1.28
in 1981, 1.05 in 1988, 1.13 in 1993, and 1.01 in 1997 (Lancelot, 1998).
True, the total number of moderate right-wing candidacies was higher
than this (2 per seat in 1993, for example) because of the number of
right-wing candidates who stood without an official right-wing label –
and some of these had the more or less official blessing of the two major
right-wing groupings.
But in most seats and at most parliamentary elections, the RPR and
the UDF, usually after fierce negotiations at leadership level, joined forces
from the first ballot. Similarly, they ran joint lists at municipal elections
in some 210 of France’s 225 towns of over 30,000 in 1983, 1989 and
1995 as well as 2001 (Martin, 2001: 114, 130, 148, Le Monde, 19 January
2001). This was possible because few right-wing voters were very choosy
about which right-wing party they supported. Even in the parliamentary
elections of 1978, where they had a choice in four out of five constituencies,
only 55 per cent of RPR and UDF sympathisers voted in full accordance
with their party preference, with between a third and a quarter opting
instead for the rival right-wing formation on the basis of candidate
preference (Capdevielle et al., 1981: 239).
The parties of France’s moderate right were thus separated by their
ideological roots, their policy preferences, and their different organisa-
tional cultures, as well as by the ambitions of their présidentiables. At the
same time, the institutional framework, plus the fact that their voters were
less partisan than activists or elites, allowed the deployment of different
strategies for different types of election: open competition in presidential
races, maximum cooperation at parliamentary and municipal contests, as
well a mixture of the two for European and regional elections, held on
proportional representation. And of course every right-wing government
was a coalition of Gaullists and their non-Gaullist partners and rivals.
France’s convergent right
The electoral defeat of 1981 opened a slow and discontinuous process
of convergence between the policies and, to some extent, the organisa-
tional patterns of the Gaullist and non-Gaullist centre-right. Convergence
would not, however, have produced a party merger without the trans-
formation of the conditions of presidential rivalry that took place at the
end of the 1990s.
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Convergence: ideology and policy
Policy convergence on France’s centre-right after 1981 involved the broad
alignment of Gaullist positions on those of non-Gaullist moderate right.
To a significant degree, it was the work of Jacques Chirac. But it resulted
less from an ideological conversion, or from a grand strategy, than from
the instrumental, opportunistic, attitude to policy issues characteristic of
the man (Rémond, 1988). In particular, Chirac has sought to minimise
policy friction so as to maximise the support of the non-Gaullist right
at second ballots of presidential elections. Three episodes highlight this.
In the first place, within three years of 1981, the RPR abandoned much
of the dirigisme characteristic of Gaullism of the 1960s, as well as the
Euroscepticism. Instead, it adopted a panoply of neo-liberal policies
(privatisation, deregulation and tax cuts) and agreed to a joint list with
the UDF parliamentarian Simone Veil for the 1984 European elections.
The common platform signed by the RPR and the UDF in February 1986
confirmed this pro-European neo-liberal shift. Moreover, when the right
won the parliamentary elections the following month, Chirac flew in the
face of orthodox Gaullist views about presidential primacy by accepting
the post of Prime Minister from President Mitterrand – and thus the very
un-Gaullist principle of cohabitation that went with it.
Second, Chirac contributed to the 1980s relaunch of European inte-
gration by accepting the two key treaties that it embodied. It was the
Chirac government that piloted the ratification of the Single European
Act through Parliament in December 1986, thus ensuring, against the
preferences of Gaullist die-hards, a breach in the national veto for which
de Gaulle had opened the ‘empty chair’ crisis twenty-one years earlier
(Favier and Martin-Roland, 1991: 556). It was Chirac himself who, after
much hesitation and against the preferences of his own party, chose to
support the Maastricht Treaty, and in doing so probably saved its passage
at the 1992 referendum, thus ending the link between currency and
national sovereignty which de Gaulle had seen as essential (de Gaulle,
1970: 399–400).
The final episode was the 1995 presidential election and its aftermath.
The untidy line-up of support behind candidates in 1995 itself signified
a blurring of party differences: Chirac was backed by most of the RPR
and a minority of the UDF, Balladur by most of the non-Gaullist moderate
right and a number of the RPR’s national and local elected officials.
Chirac’s 1995 campaign was a sort of last hurrah for traditional Gaullist
values: he beat Balladur to the second ballot by promising to place an
absolute priority on reducing joblessness, regardless of the pressures of
the global economy and of France’s European commitments. But in
October 1995 Chirac abandoned his election rhetoric and recommitted
France to deficit reduction in line with the Maastricht convergence criteria.
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By effectively adopting Balladur’s programme, Chirac brought policy
convergence to its culmination. Policy convergence on the moderate right
did not mean uniformity. Even in the 1990s, there remained substantive
policy differences among the elites of the RPR and the UDF over the
state and the market, over European integration, over societal questions
(sexuality, drugs, policing, or immigration), and on the strategic issue of
relations with the FN (Habert, 1991, Ysmal, 1992).
But these differences no longer corresponded very well to party divisions
between the Gaullists and the non-Gaullist moderate right. Free market,
pro-European right-wingers like Alain Madelin, leader of Démocratie
Libérale and Nicolas Sarkozy, his RPR partner at the head of the
right-wing list for the 1999 European elections, had more in common
with each other than with a jacobin Gaullist like Philippe Séguin or with
a centrist Christian democrat like François Bayrou. Nor were these
differences very much greater than those that agitate a unified conser-
vative party. This was all the truer after the departure of leading
Eurosceptics from both parties: Charles Pasqua, Chirac’s former loyal
lieutenant, left the RPR to run a competing ‘sovereignist’ list for the
1999 European elections with Philippe de Villiers, who had himself quit
the UDF in 1993. They did well in 1999, beating the Sarkozy-Madelin
list by 13.1 per cent of the vote to 12.7, but their attempt to found a
new Eurosceptic party, the RPF, was a failure.
The crucial element of policy convergence was the effective disappear-
ance, as a package of policies, of Gaullism, the French right’s most
distinctive element for the previous half-century. Thus Serge Berstein
closed his history of Gaullism in 2001 with the assertion that ‘Gaullism
now belongs to history, and the party that is its last manifestation is
nothing but a fraction of the French right, into which it is doubtless
destined to merge’ (Berstein, 2001: 519).
Organisational convergence
The organisations of the RPR and the non-Gaullist moderate right
converged rather less obviously than their policies. Nevertheless, the
contrast of the 1980s between the creaky UDF federation and the
well-oiled RPR machine, dedicated to getting Chirac into the Elysée, was
far less clear ten years later. The main changes occurred, again, within
the RPR. They opened with Chirac’s severe defeat at the hands of
president Mitterrand by 54 per cent to 46 at the presidential election
of 1988. That provoked criticism of the party’s authoritarian leadership
style, and thence a reform of party statutes which allowed, for the first
time, policy differences to be expressed through organised currents. A
more or less open challenge to the leadership from Pasqua and Séguin
followed at the 1990 Le Bourget congress.
The Maastricht treaty offered a further occasion for dissent: Chirac’s
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decision to support a Yes vote at the 1992 referendum was personal
and he made no attempt to bring his party behind it. Two years later,
many of the RPR’s elected officials, including 126 deputies or senators,
withheld their support for their party leader’s presidential candidacy,
preferring Balladur. It was only the support of Alain Juppé, Chirac’s
second-in-command in the RPR, that brought the bulk of the party’s
cadres behind his candidacy, and probably only Chirac’s backers in the
UDF such as Alain Madelin or Hervé de Charette that gave Chirac his
crucial 700,000-vote first-ballot lead against Balladur.
The pre-1988 symbiosis between Chirac and his party had therefore
been badly damaged by 1995. Nor did Chirac’s presidential victory put
the clock back; quite the contrary. Heads of state and government tend
in any case to try and reduce their dependence on party and to appeal
to a wider electorate. This tendency is reinforced in France, where one
of the founding myths of the Fifth Republic is of the president ‘above
parties’ (Bell, 2000: 7). It was further accentuated by the division between
chiraquiens and balladuriens which continued, thanks in part to Chirac’s
own miscalculations, to poison the RPR well after May 1995 (Ottenheimer,
1996: 137–8). But if 1995 had left durable traces, the split between
Chirac and the RPR was consummated by the trauma of the right’s defeat
at the 1997 parliamentary elections, which the President himself had
provoked by an ill-judged snap dissolution of the National Assembly
(Knapp, 1999). The 1997 defeat almost lost Chirac control of his party:
the loyal Juppé, who had combined the posts of Prime Minister and
RPR President since 1995, was removed from the former post by the
voters and from the latter by an unholy alliance of Sarkozy and Séguin,
which left Séguin as effective party leader.
Chirac was never, it is true, without some supporters in the RPR. One
of them, Jean-Louis Debré, was elected to the key post of parliamentary
group president in September 1997; and a message from Chirac received
a twelve-minute standing ovation at the February 1998 party congress,
much to Séguin’s embarrassment (Hecht and Mandonnet, 1998: 40–9).
And the RPR still differed from the UDF in having a more or less
nationwide organisation. But as an instrument for the reconquest of
power, the RPR was infinitely less reliable for Chirac than it had been
a decade earlier. It was of uncertain loyalty; it was divided; it was
unpopular, with negative poll ratings outnumbering positive ones by
roughly 2:1, thanks in part to an association of the RPR with corruption
for which Chirac’s own performance as mayor of Paris before 1995 had
been very largely responsible;2 it was organisationally weakened (mem-
bership fell from over 142,000 in the late 1980s to under 100,000 by
1999, and activism had much diminished in intensity).
In short, the RPR had converged, though only partially, onto the
ramshackle UDF model. Chirac could do little to reinforce it; on the
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contrary, he was obliged to undermine Séguin even if it meant weakening
the RPR – a task completed by April 1999, when a series of provocations
led the ever-susceptible Séguin to resign his party posts (Séguin’s suc-
cessor, Michèle Alliot-Marie, elected party president in December 1999,
was not Chirac’s first choice, but nor was she an open threat). With the
RPR an inadequate base for the reconquest of power, the only alternative
was to draw chiraquiens from both the RPR and the non-Gaullist moderate
right into a cross-party network. That network would become the UMP.
The changed dynamics of presidential competition
The French voter has been kind to presidents who have suffered reverses
in parliamentary elections. François Mitterrand’s standing with the public
recovered briskly when he appointed right-wing governments of cohabi-
tation after the elections of 1986 and 1993. Chirac, too, was quickly
forgiven. Having plumbed the depths of unpopularity, in tandem with
his prime minister Juppé, throughout the year 1996, he was already
enjoying a modest rehabilitation by December 1997, just six months after
the election defeat. A year later, assisted no doubt by his skilful use of the
role of genial host at the 1998 World Cup, which France won, his ratings
had returned, more or less, to a positive balance. The French found him
warm, competent, tolerant and energetic, even if neither sincere nor
modest (Witkowski, 2001). Though not enough to guarantee Chirac a
second term, the recovery did restore the position as a credible contender
which he had temporarily lost with the fiasco of the 1997 dissolution.
What transformed Chirac’s limited recovery into a dominant position
on the right was the break-up of the UDF federation, as recounted in
Chapter 7 of this volume. Lacking strong presidential rivals from this
quarter, Chirac had established himself by 2000 as the only right-wing
candidate capable of a presidential victory; not since 1965 had the right
been so dominated by a single presidential candidate (see Table 8.1).
Moreover, after April 2001, when Parliament voted to hold the presiden-
tial election first and the legislative elections second (ironically, against
the President’s opposition), it was clear that the former would condition
the latter, and thus that a right-wing presidential victory, which could
only be a Chirac victory, would materially assist a right-wing parliamentary
win. For that reason, Chirac would henceforth find a critical mass of
parliamentarians, not just in the RPR but also on the non-Gaullist
moderate right, ready to support him from the first ballot. In other
words, the newly asymmetrical terms of presidential competition on the
right removed a crucial obstacle to a party merger.
Party convergence and voters
The Maastricht referendum of September 1992 was perhaps the last
occasion when a major distinction was discernible between electorates of
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the Gaullist and the non-Gaullist moderate right: RPR supporters voted
by 2:1 against the treaty, while UDF supporters backed it by 3:2 (Duhamel
and Grunberg, 1992). By the decade’s end, though differences between
supporters of the two parties had not disappeared altogether, they were
slight (Ysmal, 2000: 152–3). And, in any case, most moderate right-wing
voters had long since decided that their differences did not justify
continued party division: as early as 1989, a SOFRES poll indicated that
71 per cent of both RPR and UDF sympathisers wanted ‘a single right-wing
party with several currents’ (Bourlanges, 1990: 49). They readily saw the
moderate right’s divisions as having contributed to the long-term drop
in its share of the vote after the mid-1970s (Figure 8.1), and especially
to the defeats of 1981 and 1988; the third defeat, in 1997, would give
the Socialists a further five years in government, bringing their total to
15 of the 21 years after 1981, compared with the right’s 6 and further
exasperating the right-wing electorate.
By the turn of the century, existing party labels actually put off many
FIGURE 8.1 Votes for Gaullists and for all moderate right-wing parties at
parliamentary elections (1958–2002)
Sources: Calculated from Lancelot, 1998 (for 1958–97), and Le Monde (for 2002)
Note: figures for Gaullists are not available for 1986, an election held in proportional
representation at which RPR and UDF ran joint lists for most seats, and for 2002, when
RPR candidates ran under the UMP label (UMP 34.2 per cent, UDF 4.2 per cent, other
right 4.45 per cent)
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right-wing voters. The monthly SOFRES polls showed negative opinions
of the RPR and the UDF outnumbering positive ones by about 3 to 2
between 2000 and 2002. And moderate right-wing voters were increasingly
attracted to ‘various right’ candidates with no specific party label. Thus
in the 970 cantons where they ran in the cantonal elections of 1994 and
2001, ‘various right’ candidates led right-wing party candidates by 27.6
per cent against 21.5 per cent in 1994, and by 32.3 per cent against 15.3
per cent in 2001 (Chiche and Reynié, 2002). Again, in cantonal by-elections
during 2001, the official right-wing parties actually lost 15 out of the 56
seats at stake to ‘various right’ candidates. In other words, even in a year
when the right as a whole was regaining public confidence, the parties of
the right remained unpopular. Similarly, the right’s provincial gains at
the municipal elections of 2001, in Roanne, Toulon, Chartres or Tarbes,
Rouen, La Seyne, Drancy or Blois, were primarily achieved by candidates
who stressed their closeness to le terrain, not their party label.
Thus few of the reasons that had kept the RPR and the non-Gaullist
moderate right apart still applied at the turn of the century. The
ideological and policy gap had been bridged; the organisational contrast
had narrowed; presidential competition was no longer a real obstacle;
and the voters were receptive. But the existing parties did not melt away.
The president’s party was the fruit of a project undertaken outside of,
even against, the leaders of all three established parties of the moderate
right.
The genesis of the president’s party
The projects of a united right-wing party and that of a chiraquien grouping
were not necessarily identical. A chiraquien grouping, Bernard Pons’s
Association des Amis de Jacques Chirac, had existed since 1995. Its role
was to create a network of support for Chirac’s eventual re-election
outside party structures, comparable to the association which had initially
managed de Gaulle’s 1965 campaign. With the loss of a solid party base
for President Chirac after the defeat of 1997, Pons’s association, and its
anniversary banquets in celebration of Chirac’s election, acquired renewed
importance as a chiraquien rallying-point. But Pons, a Gaullist of the older
generation and former RPR secretary-general, never saw the association
as a vehicle for dissolving the RPR into a larger right-wing grouping.
On the other hand, a project of a united right-wing confederation, called
the Alliance, launched in May 1998 by Séguin and Léotard, was still-born
because it was obviously non- or even anti-chiraquien. The President had
not been consulted about it, and so opposed it, albeit discreetly; the loyal
Debré, at the head of the RPR deputies, would have nothing to do with
it; the Alliance had died by the year’s end.
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The first sketch of a united right-wing party that was also chiraquien
was set out in a note to Chirac from a young UDF Deputy, Renaud
Dutreil, in May 1999. Dutreil had supported the idea of a merged party
even before winning election to his Aisne constituency in 1994 (Dutreil,
1993). His memorandum recommended that the Association des Amis
de Jacques Chirac should provide a meeting-point for those who ‘within
each party of the right, sought to head off inopportune adventures’ (in
other words, to sabotage competing presidential candidacies). Further,
Dutreil argued that an essential second stage would be ‘the concentration
of opposition Deputies into a single movement, depriving the other
parties of financial means and of a parliamentary platform’.3 The novelty
was in this focus on the material organisation of a new party. Half of all
state funding for French parties is allocated on the basis of the number
of their parliamentarians, which in turn depends on the ticket on which
they choose to run for election. Within the National Assembly, debating
time and committee places are allocated on the basis of parliamentary
groups. Dutreil argued that if only a critical mass of parliamentary
candidates could be persuaded to accept a single right-wing ticket and
join a single group, then these institutional arrangements would ensure
the discipline needed to create a new party; and, crucially, that the new
party would not be a vague federation of existing ones, but would entail
their dissolution or asphyxiation.
Chirac took over a year to react, approvingly but privately, to the
Dutreil memo. In the meantime, his own interventions with the right-wing
parties were hopelessly counter-productive. Chirac had sought a single
right-wing list for the 1999 European elections; instead there were three,
and they attracted just 35 per cent of the vote between them. He promoted
the candidacy of Jean-Pierre Delevoye for the presidency of the RPR,
and was rewarded, in December 1999, with the election of Michèle
Alliot-Marie. Thereafter Chirac’s interventions in the structures of the
right passed through the discreet intermediary of Jérôme Monod, who
joined the Elysée staff in June 2000.
Monod, who had known Chirac since 1963 and had run his cabinet at
Matignon from 1975 to 1976 and the RPR (as secretary-general) from
1976 to 1978, had then spent nearly a quarter-century at the head of
Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez. Monod’s mission was to renew contacts with
the right-wing elite at all levels. He could do this more readily than
Chirac himself, or than other Elysée advisers, because he was both familiar
with the parties of the right (from his past, and also possibly because
Lyonnaise-Dumez had provided extensive legal and illegal funding to
parties) and remote from recent party conflicts. With rank-and-file par-
liamentarians of all three parties of the moderate right, Monod embarked
on a gruelling round of lunches aimed at clinching first-ballot support
for Chirac in 2002. At a higher level, he brought together a cross-party
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group of four former ministers to consider themes for the future Chirac
campaign: they were Dominique Perben (RPR) deputy-mayor of Chalon-
sur-Saône; the European Commissioner Michel Barnier (RPR);
Jean-Pierre Raffarin, the DL president of the Poitou-Charentes regional
council, and Jacques Barrot, the UDF deputy and president of the
Haute-Loire département council. Other former ministers, such as Antoine
Rufenacht, mayor of Le Havre, and François Fillon, the séguiniste president
of the Pays de la Loire regional council, joined the group from the
summer of 2001.
At the same, time Monod established relations with Dutreil, who, with
two other young deputies, Dominique Bussereau (UDF) and Hervé Gaymard
(RPR), produced an initial text for a joint ‘Alternance 2002’ grouping
in January 2001. Finally, Monod renewed his links with Juppé (whom
he had brought into the Matignon staff in 1976). The mayor of Bordeaux
and former premier, only half-rehabilitated within the RPR after the
debacle of 1997 but still enjoying the President’s support, became a
strong supporter of Alternance 2002 as well as a frequent presidential
visitor. These preliminaries over, Alternance 2002 was relaunched as the
Union en Mouvement (with Dutreil as president, Busserau as treasurer,
and Gaymard as secretary-general) on 4 April 2001, at the Paris Mutualité
before 1,500 national and local elected officials of the right. The timing
was auspicious: the right had just done unexpectedly well at the municipal
elections. And the UEM appeared to respond to four requirements: the
wishes of right-wing voters, the growing impatience of many right-wing
deputies with existing party structures, the need for a loose structure to
accommodate chiraquiens from the UDF and DL, and the need for a base
for Juppé’s return to national politics (Cathala and Prédall, 2002: 167–8).
At the same time, the clear threat that the UEM posed to the three
parties of the moderate right, the RPR, the UDF and DL, as well as its
early identification as a Juppé vehicle, provoked resistance not only from
outside the Gaullist ranks – Madelin was dismissive, Bayrou solidly
opposed – but from most of the RPR leadership too. Balladur, Séguin
and the RPR president of the Senate, Christian Poncelet, stayed away
from the Mutualité. Debré and Sarkozy turned up, but chiefly in order
to voice their misgivings. As late as December 2001, at the RPR’s silver
jubilee celebrations, not just Séguin but most of the RPR leadership,
including Michèle Alliot-Marie and even habitual Chirac loyalists like
Debré, Pons or François Baroin, queued up to declaim variations on the
theme that ‘the RPR does not want to die’.4
The RPR jubilee, however, was the last open act of Gaullist resistance;
in the new year, Chirac’s continued ascendancy in the polls, and the
approach of the presidential elections, secured silence from Alliot-Marie
and her colleagues. Sarkozy became a cautious supporter of the project;
Douste-Blazy, meanwhile, was instrumental in securing the goodwill of
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many UDF parliamentarians. Madelin never attempted to impose a line
on his DL deputies, almost all of whom rallied to the UEM project. Thus
by the time of the second launch of the UEM, at Toulouse in February
2002, the only clear voice of opposition came from François Bayrou.
Delegates were invited to support the right-wing candidate of their choice
at the first round, so long as they rallied to Chirac for the run-off –
entailing a clear (and realistic) assumption that the first round would
eliminate Bayrou and Madelin.
If pressing for the creation of a fully-fledged party before the presiden-
tial elections would have been premature, the results of the first ballot
of the presidential election might have been calculated to hasten the
birth of the president’s party. That it was Le Pen, not Jospin, who reached
the run-off practically ensured Chirac’s re-election. At the same time Le
Pen’s high first-round score (16.9 per cent) indicated both to the press
and to Chirac’s campaign team that at the parliamentary elections, the
far right could be the arbiter of the second-round contest in over 300
constituencies, with the clear potential to lose the election for the right
through three-cornered second-round races.5 That calculation, however
false – it exaggerated the far right’s second-ballot presence by a factor
of ten – alarmed most sitting right-wing deputies sufficiently for them
to seek protection under the UEM’s broad cross-party umbrella. The
price of that protection was spelled out when the UEM was relaunched,
again, as the UMP on 23 April 2002, two days after the first ballot – a
single UMP candidate, a single National Assembly group and participation
in the eventual founding congress.
For Gaullist candidates, the UMP ticket entailed a further constraint:
for the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic, they fought a
parliamentary election behind a non-Gaullist campaign leader, Raffarin,
whom Chirac had made premier on 6 May and who figured prominently
on all UMP campaign material. But discipline brought its rewards: the
June elections gave the UMP over one-third of the first-ballot votes and
369 out of 577 Deputies, compared to just 4.2 per cent and 22 seats for
the rump of Bayrou’s UDF, the only organised part of the right to stay
out of the new grouping. The first stage in the construction of the
president’s party had succeeded beyond all expectations.
Conclusion: prospects for the presidential party
Juppé’s ambition, to make the UMP ‘a modern party, expressing different
currents of thought, open to society’, like the CDU–CSU, or the PPE,
or Britain’s Conservatives, or even France’s Socialists in their heyday,
benefited from an exceptionally favourable context in June 2002. The
UMP’s assets in the aftermath of the June 2002 parliamentary election
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victory were fivefold. First, it possessed a merged party leadership: a
single parliamentary group chaired by Jacques Barrot of the UDF; a
50-member Founders’ Council dating from the UEM period, which had
elected a president ( Juppé), a vice-president ( Jean-Claude Gaudin, the
DL mayor of Marseilles), a secretary-general (Douste-Blazy); and a care-
fully balanced executive committee of 31 members, of whom 15 came
from the RPR, 9 from the UDF, and 7 from DL (15 of the 31 were also
members of the government).
Second, the June elections had won the UMP an undeniable legitimacy
as France’s majority party; it was only the third party in the history of
the Fifth Republic to commanded an overall National Assembly majority.
Third, it responded to voter demand; the UMP on its own won as good
a share of the vote in 2002 as the RPR and UDF had won together in
1997. The UMP electorate, though somewhat skewed to conservative
categories (with 46 per cent of the farmers’ vote and 50 per cent of the
over–70-year-olds) was not outrageously so: its support among blue-collar
workers was 26 per cent, among white-collar staff 30 per cent (higher
than the Socialists), among the under–25-year-olds 23 per cent. And it
attracted 16 per cent of Le Pen’s voters from 21 April, as well as 26
per cent of Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s and between 12 and 14 per cent
of voters who had supported the Trotskyist candidates Laguiller and
Besancenot.6
Fourth, the UMP had the President’s full backing; there was now no
question of Chirac attempting to distance himself from the party he had
helped call into being weeks before. Finally, having survived the par-
liamentary campaign period on a shoestring, with activists and money
borrowed from component parties, the UMP could now look forward to
an annual income from the state of nearly EURO 30 m. or some 45 per
cent of all public funding distributed to parties, over the 2002–7 legis-
lature, plus inherited assets from the RPR and PR. To the extent that
finance was the key to success, as Dutreil had argued, this was a political
as well as a merely material advantage.
At the same time, four elements helped to cast doubt on the UMP’s
prospects. First, despite the June victory, the moderate right’s electoral
support was merely at the upper end of its post-1978 trend (Figure 8.1).
It was less than half a percentage point above the level at which the
right had crashed to defeat in the 1981 parliamentary elections, and
fully ten points lower than the worst pre-1974 result. Second, despite
the merged leadership, and the opening of the UMP to new membership
applications, the UMP was not yet a party. Its founding congress – a
fourth launch – was scheduled for October 2002. Moreover, the fusion
of two quite dissimilar organisations presented real difficulties, especially
at local level. If the RPR’s superior activist base were given its full weight
in the new party, it ran the risk of being perceived as an ‘RPR mark 2’,
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with attendant consequences for its image. However, to downplay the
asset represented by the Gaullists’ nationwide organisation would demo-
bilise their activists and turn the UMP into something close to a cadre
party, reinforcing the original sin of the French right. A third danger
was that the old party divisions would fossilise within the UMP, turning
it into a holding company rather than a real party and preventing the
emergence of currents based more on real policy issues rather than on
superseded party loyalties. The careful dosage of leaders from different
parties in the UMP’s provisional organisation indicated the continuing
force of such party loyalties among the UMP’s elites in this initial period.
Closely linked to this issue of party ‘currents’ was that of party cultures:
the culture of intra-party policy debate, essential to Juppé’s ideal for the
UMP’s development, was largely alien to the Gaullists who still provided
the UMP’s big battalions.
Finally, the conditions of presidential competition, which had favoured
the UMP’s emergence, changed on the night of Chirac’s election because
presidential competition henceforth focuses on the succession to Chirac,
who will be 74 in April 2007. The UMP contains three présidentiables, at
least on their own estimation: Raffarin, Juppé and Sarkozy; Bayrou is a
rival on the outside. One challenge for the new party, therefore, will be
to canalise and control these rivalries, possibly establishing an intra-party
primary process. That, however, would run directly against the Gaullist
myth of the president, a man above parties who presents himself directly
to the nation.
The UMP’s possible impact on the party system can be considered at
three levels. In the first place, it is unlikely to make a radical difference
to the choices available to right-wing voters. The broad pattern established
in the 1980s and 1990s of untidy right-wing unity, with the RPR and
the UDF running joint candidates most, but not all of the time, and
facing dissidents here and there, is likely to be perpetuated. The 2004
European elections, for example, could readily see a UMP list competing
with a Bayrou list. Second, however, the UMP’s success could be expected
to reinforce existing tendencies towards bipolarity. The party system of
Fifth Republic France has been characterised by a fine balance between
the dynamics of fragmentation and bipolarity (Knapp and Wright, 2001:
264–5), and the electoral cycle of 2002 was an excellent illustration of
this. Fragmentation was expressed in a presidential first round that saw
sixteen candidates competing, extremes of right and left picking up a
third of the vote, and the candidate of the far right beating the Socialist
to the run-off.
The June parliamentary elections, on the other hand, were fundamen-
tally bipolar with, crucially, each mainstream coalition dominated by a
single partner, the Socialists on the left and the UMP on the right. The
UMP’s success would perpetuate this single-party dominance in each
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camp. A final dimension to the UMP’s impact depends on its ability to
fulfil Juppé’s ambition and resolve the difficulties outlined above. A party
of the moderate right that is capable of managing the inevitable com-
petition between its présidentiables, and of canalising intra-party conflict
into useful policy debate, would gain considerably in credibility by com-
parison with the right’s record in the recent past. It could even contribute
to reducing the widespread disenchantment with politics among French
voters. Probably the UMP’s leaders would settle for a less grandiose goal,
but one that has become the unattainable Holy Grail of French party
politics since 1981: the re-election of an incumbent governing coalition.
Notes
1 RPR activists quoted in Le Quotidien de Paris, 2 December 1986.
2 The figures were worse than those for the Communists: the monthly SOFRES
poll in the Figaro-Magazine (7 November 1998) showed that a mere 27 per
cent of respondents had a ‘good opinion’ of the UDF and 31 per cent for
the RPR, compared with 37 per cent for the PCF. Poor opinions ran at 60
per cent (UDF), 58 per cent (RPR), against 50 per cent (PCF).
3 Le Canard Enchaîné, 20 February 2002.
4 Le Monde, 30 November and 15 December 2001.
5 Le Monde, 24 April 2002.
6 IPSOS-France2 survey, www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/poll/7571.asp.
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The right FN split: party system change and electoral prospects
Introduction
The question of electoral change in France has received a great deal of
attention in the past fifteen years, as evidenced by the volume of literature
on French parties and elections. The rise of the FN and its ability to
establish itself as a serious competitor against mainstream parties of the
moderate right are clearly central to this question. The success of the
extreme right has largely contributed to altering the balance of forces
within the party system: while electorally irrelevant throughout the 1970s
and the beginning of the 1980s,1 Le Pen’s party has enjoyed high levels
of electoral support over the past decade with an average 15 per cent
of the national vote cast in the successive elections of 1995, 1997 and
1998 (see Table 9.1).
TABLE 9.1 The FN in national elections (1984–2002)
Year Election % Note
1984 European 11.4 10 MEPs elected
1986 Legislative 9.8 35 deputies
1988 Presidential 14.4 First round, Le Pen
1988 Legislative 9.7 One deputy, Yann Piat
1989 European 11.7 10 MEPs
1993 Legislative 12.4 No deputies
1994 European 10.5 11 MEPs
1995 Presidential 15.0 First round, Le Pen
1997 Legislative 15.1 FN + other minor extreme right candidates
1999 European 9.1 FN = 5.8%; MNR = 3.3%
2002 Presidential 19.2 First round, Le Pen = 16.9%; Mégret = 2.3%
– Second round, Le Pen = 17.8%
2002 Legislative 12.4 First round, FN = 11.1%; MNR = 1.1%
No deputies
Source: Ministry of Interior
137
In contrast to the interest aroused by the electoral dynamics of the
extreme right, there have been fewer attempts to formalise the various
dimensions of party system change at a time of growing electoral volatility
and increasing level of fragmentation within the system. The extent to
which the French party system has moved away from the long-lasting
dual format as a consequence of extreme-right success, particularly with
regard to the resilience of the traditional cleavage structure of French
politics, remains a debated issue (Cole, 1998, Hanley, 1999a, Guyomarch,
1995).
This chapter will first look back at the pre-1999 period to assess the
role played by the FN in challenging the traditional bipolar format of
French politics. It will then move on to analyse the historical and political
factors underlying the split, the electoral performances of the two parties
that emerged from this critical breakdown and the key features of party
ideology within the extreme, right pole. Third, it will address the electoral
prospects of the FN and MNR in the light of their results in the
presidential and legislative elections of spring 2002.
Extreme-right politics and party system change in the mid-1990s
A glance at the results of elections over the past fifteen years reveals the
amplitude of changes which have been taken place in the balance of
power between the main competitors in the French polity, and the crucial
role played by the rise of the FN in the weakening of traditionally two-bloc
politics.
Over the 1988–98 period, one key feature of mass mobilisation on the
extreme right has been the FN’s ability to secure its electoral support
between elections. Voting for the FN became more permanent and less
volatile. In the 1986 and 1988 legislative elections, the FN achieved
political relevance in about 90 per cent of the 555 metropolitan consti-
tuencies and gained around 10 per cent of the vote on both occasions.
The 1990s were to witness the growth and stabilisation of the far-right
electorate. In 1993, the extreme right attracted 12.4 per cent of the
legislative vote but failed to gain parliamentary representation. In the first
round of the 1997 general election, the FN candidates surpassed the
10 per cent threshold in over 80 per cent of the constituencies with a
total vote cast of 15 per cent. No fewer than 132 FN candidates went
forward to the second round to confront candidates of the left and the
moderate right. In the 1998 local election, the FN won 275 seats in
the regional councils under the proportional electoral rule and achieved
15 per cent in nearly half of the 96 metropolitan departments.2
With regard to party organisation, the strengths of the FN were well
in evidence by the end of the 1990s (Birenbaum, 1992, Ivaldi, 1998a).
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Individual membership rose from an estimated 15,000 in 1986 to 40,000.
The decade witnessed the development of the basic structures and
reinforcement of the entire party apparatus at both local and national
levels. This internal development was associated with the founding of a
large number of flanking organisations, newspapers and clubs, whose
main purpose was political lobbying within specific fields of concern or
particular social and professional sectors (Buzzi, 1994, Ivaldi, 2001).
Like other right-wing populist parties in Austria, Belgium or Norway,
the social basis of the FN’s electorate has become less heterogeneous
over the years and, by the mid-1990s, developed a predominantly male,
blue-collar worker and petty-bourgeoisie support, with low education
(Betz and Immerfall, 1998, Kitschelt, 1995). In addition, anti-partyism,
criticism of the ‘political class’ and recurrent attacks on both the left and
moderate-right coalition have enabled Le Pen’s party to generate in-
creasing support from young voters less socially and politically integrated
in mainstream politics (see Table 9.2).
TABLE 9.2 Change in the socio-demographic structure of the FN electorate
(1984–97) in percentages
Eur.
1984
Leg.
1986
Pres.
1988
Leg.
1988
Euro.
1989
Leg.
1993
Euro.
1994
Pres.
1995
Legi.
1997
Gender
 Male 14 11 18 12 14 14 12 19 18
 Female 8 9 11 7 10 13 9 12 12
Age
 18–24 years 10 14 15 16 9 18 10 18 16
 25–34 years 11 10 17 9 18 10 15 18 19
 35–49 years 12 11 17 8 12 13 10 15 15
 50–64 years 12 9 11 10 15 13 12 17 15
 65 years+ 10 6 12 10 12 13 7 9 12
Occupation
 Farmer, fisherman 10 17 13 3 3 13 4 16 4
 Shopkeeper, craftsman 17 16 27 6 18 15 12 14 26
 Professional/Manager 14 6 19 10 11 6 6 7 4
 Routine non-manual 15 11 13 8 9 13 9 16 14
 Routine manual 8 11 19 19 15 18 21 30 24
 Not working* 9 8 12 9 13 12 9 11 15
Education
 No education/Primary 8 8 15 7 13 13 7 14 17
 Secondary school 12 15 13 12 14 16 16 17 14
 Technical 17 12 18 12 11 14 16 21 19
 University 11 7 12 10 9 8 5 9 10
All 11 10 14.5 10 12 13 10.5 15.5 15
* ‘Not working’ refers to retired people, students and housewives who have never
worked outside of the home
Source: Perrineau (1997: 102)
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Particularly striking was the ability of the unitary FN to set foot on
working-class soil and bring together two sectors of the working popu-
lation – namely blue-collar workers and owners of small businesses –
which were traditionally opposed on the left–right continuum in France.
Changes in the FN social structure were discernible as early as 1988: in
the first round of the presidential election, Le Pen won 19 per cent of
the working-class vote and secured 27 per cent among shopkeepers,
traders and craftsmen, a group traditionally inclined to support the
extreme right. By 1995, the comparable figures were 30 and 14 per cent.
Looking more closely at the class structure of the FN in the general
election of spring 1997 shows the importance of the contribution by both
the lower-class and petty-bourgeoisie voters to the electoral dynamics of
the extreme right: together the latter groups accounted for nearly half
(46 per cent) of the whole FN electorate in 1997.3 On that occasion, the
FN candidates received 26 and 18 per cent of the vote among unskilled
and skilled manual workers respectively.4 In the subsequent 1998 regional
election, the lists presented by the extreme right won 17 per cent of the
vote cast among small business owners and 27 per cent among blue
collar workers.5
By attracting significant shares of the vote among secular blue-collar
workers and the traditional Catholic conservative petty bourgeoisie, the
party has managed to broaden its electoral appeal to disillusioned voters
characteristic of the two sides of the political spectrum (Perrineau, 1995,
Mayer, 1999, Evans, 2000a). The increase in electoral support from the
working class has led to a significant shift in party ideology in the
aftermath of the 1995 presidential election, with the FN clearly placing
more emphasis on securing social benefits for the lower social strata and
protecting France from the threat embodied by economic globalisation.
While stressing the need for economic intervention on the part of the
state, the party has continued to seek electoral support from the petty-
bourgeois component of the conservative right by rejecting state
collectivism and promoting liberal policies that would include tax reduc-
tion for small business owners. Another important explanation for the
party’s ability to step over the traditional ideological boundaries of French
politics lies in the development among extreme-right supporters of a set
of ethnocentrist, authoritarian and anti-system values which echoes the
hard stance taken by the FN on social issues such as law and order or
immigration, and tends to differentiate the extreme-right electorate from
those of both the left and the UDF–RPR.6
In terms of party system dynamics, however, there is a need for
considering another two important dimensions correlative to the estab-
lished change in the social support for the extreme right in French
elections. Looking first at changes in patterns of party cooperation and
competition, and the tactical manoeuvring which was developed as a
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response to the alteration in the balance of power between the moderate
right and their new challenger, it is true to say that the early 1990s
witnessed the end of the ‘conciliatory’ phase: the development of formal
links between the mainstream right and the FN became much less likely,
as it was evident from electoral outcomes that Le Pen’s party was the
only beneficiary of such a strategy. It would be difficult to argue that
contacts between the UDF–RPR alliance and the FN have never taken
place subsequently, but overall it was clearly stated that the construction
of a right-wing pole would not embrace the extreme right.
After a period of uncertainty and flirtation with the UDF–RPR in the
late 1980s, the FN was pushed back towards the extreme-right fringe of
the political spectrum and condemned to political isolation. In the face
of this strong commitment from the ruling parties of the right, the FN
shifted its own position during the mid-1990s from one which favoured
a broader right-wing alternative to the existing UDF–RPR coalition to
one of fierce hostility towards the mainstream parties of the right and
President Chirac.7
Second, if we are to address the evolution of the party system which
took shape during the pre-1999 period, it is essential to outline the
impact of the institutional setting on the dynamics of French politics.
The emphasis is on the tension between proportionalist voting behaviour
in the electorate on the one hand,8 and constraints inherent in the
two-ballot system on the other. Pressures for change coming from parties
outside the mainstream have met with strong resistance from the ma-
joritarian dynamics of the system (Ysmal, 1998). In France, the number
of parliamentary parties is largely influenced by the mechanical process
of translating votes into seats (Charlot, 1993).
Analysis of vote transfers between the two rounds of legislative elections
points out the substantial effect of the bipolar constraints imposed by
the second ballot, the impossibility of minor parties gaining sufficient
support to win parliamentary representation, and the tendency for the
electoral system to manufacture parliamentary majorities for parties that
have not necessarily received majority support from the voters. The
analysis of seats–votes ratios shows how the electoral system benefits
well-entrenched parties by cancelling the effects of party fragmentation
at parliamentary level.9
The constraints of the majoritarian rule have significantly limited the
reshaping of the party system particularly when taking account of
the FN’s inability to gain parliamentary representation despite polling
substantial shares of the vote in successive elections. Under the depart-
ment-list system that was introduced in the 1986 legislative election
(highest- average formula with a 5 per cent threshold), the FN first-ballot
score in the first round of the 1997 election would have brought the
party large gains in the Assembly and an estimated total of 77 legislative
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seats. With an expected number of only 223 deputies, the mainstream
right would not have secured enough seats to form a government on
its own.10
To summarise: that the state of the French party system between 1993
and 1998 was one of transition and instability is beyond doubt. In many
ways the combination of electoral realignment, party fragmentation and
party aggregation around electoral poles is a good indicator of the waning
of the traditional bipolar party system which became apparent in the
mid-1990s and gained momentum in the period thereafter. In terms of
electoral dynamics, by 1997–98 party competition was tripolar with the
FN being the third competitive actor isolated as a distinctive pole of
French politics and capable of affecting the outcome of both the legislative
and the regional contests ( Jaffré, 1997).
And yet, however significant changes in patterns of electoral mobili-
sation were, they did not produce a truly tripolar system, particularly if
the shape of the party system is to be assessed at parliamentary level.
One first reason, as mentioned above, is the absence of a clear structural
group underlying the support for the third bloc represented by the FN
and the necessity of taking into account the protest, issue-oriented and
political disenchantment components of voting for the extreme right.
Another important reason for this is of course to be found in the distorting
effect of the majoritarian system and the constraints it placed on the
overall process of electoral dealignment in France.
The 1999 split of the FN: intra-party conflict, party ideology and
electoral competition
Despite electoral success, the FN has suffered severely from the faction-
alism endemic on the extreme right since the end of the Second World
War. Together with more than half of the top-level party elites and a
sizeable segment of grass-roots members, Bruno Mégret, general dele-
gate of the party, left the FN in January 1999 to form a rival group,
the Mouvement National, subsequently renamed Mouvement National
Républicain (MNR).
This organisational schism was largely determined by historical, tactical
and personality factors. Since its foundation in the early 1970s, the FN
has been weakened by internal fights between factions and relatively
unsuccessful in its attempt to bring together various opposing strains of
the French extreme-right family. In 1999 the quarrel between Le Pen
and Mégret was mostly about party strategy and whether the FN should
begin a process of seeking electoral alliances with the mainstream right
at both the local and national level. While Le Pen strongly favoured the
continuation of the ‘neither left nor right’ strategy initiated during
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the 1995 presidential campaign by the youth section and old guard
within the party, Mégret and his followers advocated a more flexible
approach supportive of cooperation with the RPR–UDF–DL electoral
pole (Ivaldi, 1999a).
To a large extent, the parties that emerged from the 1999 split are
identical to the two major groups of power-holders which traditionally
competed for influence within the former FN. Most of Le Pen’s com-
panions in today’s renewed FN belong to a well-identified faction, namely
the old orthodox guard composed of the historical ‘founding fathers’ of
the party, the neo-fascist activists who joined the FN in the late 1970s,
the traditionalist Catholics led by Bernard Antony, and some ‘pure at
heart’ drawn from among the ranks of the youth organisation (FNJ),
such as Carl Lang and Samuel Maréchal, who rose to prominence within
the national staff through a long process of internal promotion.
The group of elites that left the party with Mégret represents another
very specific strand of opinion. Most of the group came to the FN in
the mid-1980s following Le Pen’s attempt to integrate the party into the
moderate-right’s political space by establishing links with the national-
conservative fringe of the New Right. The MNR leadership consists
predominantly of those who, like Bruno Mégret, Yvan Blot, François
Bachelot and Jean-Yves Le Gallou, joined the party in 1985–86 in
anticipation of the general election. In 1999, the endeavour of the former
general delegate of the FN was also supported by some of the cadres
of the new generation (Philippe Colombani, Franck Timmermans,
Philippe Olivier, Damien Bariller) who were eager to challenge the
uncompromising party line and autocratic hegemony of Le Pen.
By 1997, important changes occurred in the balance of power within
the FN national leadership. In the face of its political isolation, many in
the party perceived the dangers of the hard-line imposed by Le Pen. At
grass-roots level, an increasing number of federation secretaries and local
party representatives joined Mégret in his plea for an electoral cartel
with the mainstream right in the forthcoming general and regional
elections. By winning a significant share of the votes to the Central
Committee, the mégrétistes emerged as an extremely influential grouping
at the 10th party congress in Strasbourg in April 1997. Mégret and Le
Gallou came first and second respectively ahead of Bruno Gollnisch, a
result which was soon to represent a major threat to Le Pen’s uncontested
power.11 The FN departmental conferences that took place in January
1999 largely confirmed the predominance of Mégret and his followers
within the party apparatus, with a total of 58 federal secretaries and 141
regional councillors supporting the delegate general in his attempt to
convene a party congress. The mégrétistes were also found in the majority
in 14 out of the 22 regional councils.
As suggested above, the dispute between Le Pen and Mégret was not
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a fight over the ideological stance of the movement, the FN being indeed
largely indebted to the contribution made by Mégret and the previous
members of the conservative New Right for some of the most popular
themes of the FN political agenda. As evidenced by the MNR manifesto
La Charte des Valeurs (‘The Values Charter’) publicised at the constitutive
congress of the party in Marignane in January 1999, the schism had no
clear implications for the ideological direction of the two resultant parties.
Nor did the subsequent party literature published in 2000–01 by Mégret’s
movement differ significantly from the 1997 electoral platform Le grand
changement (‘The Great Change’) of the former Front National (Ivaldi
and Swyngedouw, 2001).
Electorally, the split on the extreme right resulted in fierce competition
between the remaining FN and the newly formed MNR in the 1999
European election fought at a national level under proportional repre-
sentation. Mégret’s party performed badly: by polling a mere 3.3 per
cent of the vote, the MNR notably failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold
of representation for the European Parliament. The FN won 5.8 per
cent of the total vote and five seats.12 The whole of the extreme right
was clearly weakened by its internal division but had also to compete at
the time with the anti-European list headed by the very popular conser-
vative leader of the 1992 anti-Maastricht cartel and former Minister of
Interior, Charles Pasqua. The latter received 13.05 per cent and captured
13 seats in the election attracting a significant proportion of previous
FN and RPR voters.13
In March 2001, the FN and MNR fielded candidates in the joint
municipal and cantonal ballots which were seen as key elections for both
parties of the extreme right. In the preceding local elections, the unitary
FN had managed to establish a solid electoral base in most parts of
France through a significant number of well-entrenched party activists
and elected representatives in municipal and regional councils. In 1995,
the FN had presented lists in 48 per cent of all metropolitan communes
with more than 5,000 inhabitants; in 2001, the far right as a whole stood
in less than one-third (31 per cent) of those municipalities and the two
parties competed against each other in 77 cities. Both parties were heavily
handicapped both by the difficulty inherent in finding the requisite
number of participants to build lists in a large number of municipalities,
and also by the additional constraints imposed by the new legislation on
parity, which for the first time required political parties to put forward
an equal proportion of men and women on their lists.
In 1995, the former FN had received 14.2 per cent of the vote in the
first round of the municipal election compared with 11.3 and
12.2 per cent for the MNR and new Front National respectively in the
2001 ballot. On the latter occasion, the two parties kept control of three
out of the four cities they had won six years before in the southern part
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of France – Orange (FN), Marignane and Vitrolles. More importantly,
they also managed to secure most of the extreme-right electoral support
in the concomitant cantonal election by winning a total of 10.2 per cent
of the vote (FN 7.1 per cent; MNR 3.1 per cent) as opposed to 10.3 per
cent for the FN in the previous election of March 1994. Of particular
note is that the FN succeeded in presenting its own candidates in nearly
all of the 1,900 cantons up for renewal in 2001, while the MNR only
had a national coverage of about 78 per cent in this respect.
There is little doubt, however, that divisions within the extreme-right
camp have had a major impact on the parties’ ability to weigh significantly
on the electoral outcome, and particularly in municipal contests. In most
cases the FN and the MNR were not able to overcome the institutional
hurdle to stand in the second round of the city council elections. In 1995
the FN had fielded candidates in 108 of the largest urban areas in France
(those with more than 30,000 inhabitants); by 2001 the comparable figure
for the whole of the extreme right dropped to 41 with an average loss
of 2.2 per cent between the two rounds. In a significant number of
municipalities, the electoral decline of the FN and MNR clearly benefited
the mainstream right, as was the case in cities such as Blois, Chartres,
Evreux, Nîmes, Strasbourg and Toulon for instance.
Electoral strength of the extreme right and party system
continuation after 2002
With respect to the electoral strength of the far right and the format of
the French party system, the 2002 elections have displayed similar trends
to those observed in the preceding electoral cycle of 1995–98. Despite
the relative decrease in electoral support for the FN at the legislative
ballot, the 2002 elections have been a testament to the electoral health
of the extreme-right camp in France. In the first round of the presidential
election, the FN has reached its electoral apex by polling 16.9 per cent
of the total vote, which allowed its leader to stand in the second round
against the outgoing President Jacques Chirac. Together with Mégret’s
score of 2.3 per cent, the combined total for the far right added up to
19.2 per cent.
In 35 of the 96 metropolitan departments, Le Pen came ahead of the
candidates of the mainstream left and right, and achieved a 20 per cent
threshold in over 28 per cent of the 555 metropolitan constituencies. In
the second round of the presidential ballot, Le Pen secured 17.8 per
cent of the vote (around 5.5 million votes), far less than the 30 per cent
he predicted for himself in the aftermath of the 21 April political
earthquake but still a significant score in the context of popular mobili-
sation against the extreme right. On 5 May 2002, the FN’s candidate
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attracted more than 20 per cent of the valid vote cast in over one-third
(37 per cent) of the constituencies in metropolitan France.
The legislative elections of June indicated some limits to the influence
of the FN and a substantial drop in the electoral support for Le Pen’s
party when compared with the outcome of the 1997 election. In the first
round, the FN candidates won only 11.12 per cent of the vote (as opposed
to 14.9 per cent in 1997), the MNR polling a mere 1.1 per cent. Unlike
1997, the FN could only progress to the second round in 37 metropolitan
constituencies (against 132 in 1997) and captured no seats. Of the top-level
party elite, only five national leaders were in a position to stand in the
second round: Marine Le Pen, Marie-France Stirbois, Jean-Claude Mar-
tinez, Bruno Gollnisch and Jacques Bompard. With a total of 42.4 per
cent of the vote, the Mayor of Orange achieved the best result of all FN
candidates in the June legislative election yet failed to translate this
performance into the only potential parliamentary seat for the party.
There were of course a variety of short-term factors that could account
for the ebb and flow of the extreme right at the 2002 elections, the dis-
cussion of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. In terms of the party
system dimension, however, four main aspects are noteworthy: these relate
to party ideology, patterns of issue-voting, the socio-demographic structure
of the extreme right electorate, and patterns of party cooperation.
Party ideology
Ideologically, the electoral platform of the FN and MNR in the 2002
elections was very similar to the programme published by the FN at the
1997 ballot or the party manifesto launched at the founding congress of
Mégret’s movement in early 1999. Both parties have continued to use
anti-immigrant feeling as a campaign issue, this xenophobic line being
linked with strong authoritarian views on criminality and insecurity, and
associated with the traditional anti-system component. Consistent with
the ideological shift of 1995–97, the FN placed an even greater emphasis
on its socio-economic message to promote the synthesis of the traditional
neo-liberal and anti-tax elements of the 1980s with renewed projectionist
welfare state strategies and the populist claim to represent les petites gens
(‘the common people’).
Patterns of issue-voting
Looking at the main issues for the FN electorate reveals a triptych very
similar to that recurrently at stake in the history of the extreme right at
the polls since the breakthrough of the 1984 European election. In 2002,
Le Pen’s first-round voters expressed once again worries about insecurity
(74 per cent), immigration (60 per cent) and unemployment (31 per
cent) as motivating factors for their vote. Essential to the understanding
of the electoral dynamics of the FN in the presidential ballot is that the
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‘criminality’ issue topped the political, public and media agenda, with
nearly six out of ten voters (58 per cent) ranking ‘insecurity’ first on
their personal scale of concern, far ahead of ‘unemployment’ (38 per
cent) and ‘poverty’ (31 per cent).14
The analysis of vote transfers indicates a high degree of stability since
1995, and indicates that the party still possesses a stable core of voters:
in 2002, the FN managed to retain the support of the vast majority of
its electorate. At the first round of the 2002 presidential election, no less
than 90 per cent of Le Pen’s 1995 electorate voted either for him again
or, in a much smaller proportion, for Bruno Mégret.15
Socio-demographic structure of the extreme-right electorate
The socio-demographic structure of the 2002 extreme-right electorate
shows a lesser degree of heterogeneity and a sociological pattern similar
to that observed since the 1988 presidential election. The FN’s electorate
remains predominantly male, younger and of low education. Looking at
occupation in terms of social class, it is important to note the electoral
dynamics of the FN and its continuing ability to draw growing support
from working-class voters, reinforcing the more traditional petty-bour-
geois element of the extreme-right electorate. Again, in 2002, the FN
has managed to gather together these two socially and economically
opposed groupings: in the first round of the presidential election, Le
Pen won 19 per cent of the vote among shopkeepers, craftsmen and
small entrepreneurs, together with 30 per cent of the working-class vote.
In the second round, the FN leader secured 31 per cent of the valid
vote cast among workers and 29 per cent in the self-employed.16
Patterns of party cooperation
Lastly, looking at patterns of party system competition, it was evident
from the 2002 elections that both the FN and MNR continued to suffer
from their lack of coalition potential and political isolation within the
system. Despite efforts to establish links with the moderate right at the
local level – which in the case of Le Pen’s party unarguably represented
a U-turn from the anti-right strategy initiated in 1995 – neither the FN
nor the MNR really managed to escape from the fringe of the system
and remained, as far as inter-party cooperation is concerned, as a third
distinctive political bloc separate from both the left and the mainstream
parties of the right.
The new balance of power between the FN and MNR
The balance of power between the two main competitors of the extreme
right has undergone considerable change. A first nationwide test for
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Mégret’s party, the 2002 electoral contests demonstrated the lack of
political opportunity for a French equivalent to the process of transfor-
mation of the Italian post-Fascist MSI into a mainstream conservative
right-wing party by Gianfranco Fini. While it was fairly obvious that the
personality factor would favour predominantly Le Pen in the first round
of the presidential election, there were outstanding questions concerning
the MNR’s ability to benefit electorally from its entrenchment at the
local level.
The presidential and legislative contests both illustrated the bitter
setback of the MNR in challenging Le Pen’s monopoly over far-right
politics in France. The share of the extreme-right vote secured by the
MNR in the presidential and legislative election represented only 11.9
and 8.9 per cent of the total vote for the far right respectively, as
opposed to 36.2 per cent in the June 1999 European election. At the
2002 presidential ballot, Mégret secured his best scores almost exclusively
in his three departmental strongholds of Bouches-du-Rhône, Bas-Rhin
and Haut-Rhin, where he won over 4 per cent of the vote. Only in
Vitrolles did the MNR leader surpass the 10 per cent threshold (with
11.5 per cent of the valid vote cast in the XII constituency of Bouches-
du-Rhône) without being able, however, to move forward to the second
round.
Faced with fierce competition on both its ‘left’ and right flanks by the
newly formed UMP and the FN, the MNR experienced difficulties in
making itself heard during the legislative campaign and suffered from
the absence of a specific political space between the radical anti-system
stance of the FN and the hard-line on criminality taken by the mainstream
right and the newly appointed Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy.
A similar picture emerged from the legislative election: the party’s best
results were concentrated in a tiny number of constituencies, with only
14 cases of MNR candidates polling over 4 per cent of the vote. The
figureheads of the party failed to progress to the second round: Jean-Yves
Le Gallou received only 4.1 per cent of the vote in Gennevilliers, Damien
Bariller won less than 4 per cent in Gardanne and Bruno Mégret attracted
a mere 18.6 per cent of the vote in Vitrolles (as opposed to 35.5 per
cent in the first round of the 1997 legislative election).
The severe electoral setback of the MNR at the 2002 elections raises
doubts about the future of mégrétisme as a distinctive political current
within the party system, located somewhere between the mainstream
right and a more radical option embodied by the FN. Not only does the
MNR suffer from the dramatic drop in its electoral support and the
likelihood of a proportion of its members and sympathisers returning
to a more successful FN but also the party has to take the financial
consequences of its electoral failure and the cost of two expensive national
campaigns in the absence of future state funding.
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Conclusion: prospects for the extreme right
The 2002 elections have illustrated the continuance of electoral support
for the extreme right in France, with a range varying from a minimum
of 12 per cent (legislative) up to a maximum of nearly 20 per cent of
the vote (presidential). It is true to say that the trauma caused by Le
Pen in the second round of the presidential ballot and the spectacular
demonstration against the FN by all political parties of the left, associ-
ations, Churches and trade unions have temporarily set some limits to
the potential for electoral progress by the far right. These limits were
well in evidence in the outcome of the legislative contest. However, there
is little doubt that there will continue to be a political space for the FN
within the French party system.
One first reason for this is to be found in the capacity of Le Pen’s
ideology to resonate with the beliefs of a significant proportion of the
French voters. A trend analysis of opinion polls over the 1984–2002
period of time shows a fairly stable public support for the FN’s themes
and ideas, between 20 to 25 per cent of the whole population.17 Opinions
never translate mechanically into effective votes on the day of the election,
yet there remains a ‘reservoir’ of potential voters for the extreme right,
which goes beyond its actual electoral strength.
In terms of party organisation and intra-bloc competition, two addi-
tional factors must be taken into account. The dispute between the two
main factions led by Le Pen and Mégret, and the consequent split of
the FN in early 1999, had weakened the whole extreme right and reduced
its ability to weigh significantly on the outcome of elections. In 2002,
the FN has provided proof of its ability to take over the whole far-right
camp at the expense of the MNR, and should be in a position to benefit
from this situation of political hegemony in the near future. With Mégret
and his followers departing from the FN in early 1999, Le Pen’s party
had also significantly reduced intra-party factionalism and ensured a
greater level of homogeneity among top-level elites. One interesting
observation in 2002 was the public announcement of Gollnisch’s appoint-
ment at the head of the FN in the event of Le Pen retiring from the
presidency, together with the key role played by Marine Le Pen in the
legislative campaign and the media.
Lastly, the forthcoming electoral cycle of 2004 will be more propitious
to the extreme right, with a set of two successive ‘second-order’ elections
(regional, European) to be fought under proportional representation and
traditionally providing a great incentive to protest voting by those dis-
satisfied with the incumbent government. In the 2002 legislative ballot,
the logics of the majoritarian system and the electoral dynamics initiated
by the unified moderate right seem to have discouraged a greater
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proportion of voters from ‘wasting’ their vote on the FN candidates. The
landslide victory of the UMP has raised high expectations, particularly
with regards to tax cuts and a tough stance on crime – both proprietary
issues of the extreme right. Should the new government fail to meet
those expectations, then it is clear that Le Pen’s party would be the main
beneficiary of a new wave of popular discontent.
Notes
1 Although founded as early as 1972, the FN remained electorally irrelevant
until the mid-1980s. The impact of the party on French politics was negligible
until its first success in the 1983 municipal by-election in Dreux where the
extreme-right list headed by Jean-Pierre Stirbois won 16.7 per cent of the
vote. This performance at the local level was followed by the impressive
national breakthrough of the extreme right in the subsequent 1984 European
election, with Le Pen’s party polling over 11 per cent of the votes.
2 For a detailed analysis of the electoral evolution of the FN, see Perrineau
(1997) and more generally Le Gall (1998).
3 Social class is measured here by the commonly used class schema based on
occupation and divided in four main categories: professionals and managers,
petty-bourgeoisie, clerical and routine non-manual workers, and manual
skilled and unskilled workers.
4 SOFRES post-election survey, CEVIPOF–CIDSP–CRAPS, 26–31 May 1997,
N = 3,010. Our calculation.
5 SOFRES post-election survey, 25 March–23 April 1998, N = 2,000.
6 However, according to recent research by Andersen and Evans in response
to Grunberg and Schweisguth’s tripartition argument, there is insufficient
evidence to sustain the hypothesis of the emergence of the extreme right as
a third distinctive political bloc sui generis (Grunberg and Schweisguth, 1997,
Andersen and Evans, Chapter 11 of this volume).
7 In the second ballot of the 1997 election, the FN candidates stood in 76
three-way contests in which they were opposed to the UDF–RPR. In 1998,
the FN presented its own lists in all metropolitan departments. Although
the FN managed to use its blackmail potential in four regional council
elections, Le Pen’s party notably failed to dislodge and reshape the right-wing
pole entirely by forming right/far-right coalitions at regional level. On this,
see Ivaldi (1998b).
8 See Parodi (1997) on this dynamic.
9 Calculating an index of disproportionality for each of the legislative elections
which took place in France since 1978 illustrates the distorting effect of the
electoral system. Deviations between the percentages of seats and the per-
centages of votes received by the different parties, as registered by the Lsq
index, were much larger in 1993 and 1997 with respective levels of dispro-
portionality of 23.4 and 17.5 per cent as opposed to 7.3 per cent in the
1978 election.
10 It is worth noting that, assuming that many voters perceive distortions caused
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by the electoral system, the prevailing logic of the two-ballot majority system
did not discourage a significant group of voters from defecting to FN
candidates with poor chances of gaining parliamentary representation over
the 1993–97 period.
11 On that occasion, Mégret received 3,758 votes, Jean-Yves Le Gallou 3,439,
Bruno Gollnisch 3,398, Roger Holleindre 3,381, Franck Timmermans 3,362,
Jacques Bompard 3,328, Yvan Blot 3,316, Marie-France Stirbois 3,288, Carl
Lang 3,287 and Damien Bariller 3,166.
12 Elected MEPs were Charles de Gaulle, Bruno Gollnisch, Carl Lang, Jean-
Marie Le Pen and Jean-Claude Martinez.
13 According to various surveys conducted on the day of the election, the list
led by Pasqua attracted between 10 per cent (CSA) and 17 per cent (IFOP)
of those who had voted for FN candidates in the first round of the 1997
general election – see Ivaldi (1999b).
14 IPSOS–Vizzavi–Le Figaro–France 2 survey, 12 April 2002.
15 IPSOS–Vizzavi–Le Figaro–France 2, 12 April 2002.
16 IPSOS–Vizzavi–Le Figaro–France 2, 21 April and 5 May 2002.
17 SOFRES–Le Monde–RTL, 23–24 May 2002.
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Introduction
Since the advent of European Community/European Union politics and
the growing influence the supranational arena has over domestic affairs,
the potential for the European domain to impinge upon all aspects of
national polities has grown. On the face of it, there has been no reason
to suspect that European politics would not affect the party systems of
these polities in the same way that it has affected, say, policy-making,
judicial review and pressure groups. However, the effect to date has been
perceived as minimal, even after the introduction of direct elections in
1979. At the comparative level, direct effects on party systems have been
low: one author has commented that, ‘[T]o the simple question of whether
Europe has had a direct impact on the format of national party systems,
the equally simple answer must be an unequivocal “no” ’ (Mair, 2000: 31).
Other authors concur with this: for instance Kitschelt consecrates little
time to it in his study of evolving European party systems, and indeed
argues that in particular France provides little scope for mobilisation
along a European dimension (1997: 148). Similarly, Ross emphasises the
encroachment of the European Union on the French domestic arena,
but beyond noting the growing incapacity of governments to respond
unilaterally to areas of European policy dominance and the possible
explosion of mass antipathy to Europe, little time is spent on electoral
competition effects (Ross, 2000).
A number of contextual reasons can be given for the lack of change:
the low education of the electorate on European matters; the lack of
interest in European politics; the democratic deficit that puts the bulk
of European policy beyond the electoral arena, and so on. More speci-
fically, the format of the existing party systems is often consonant with
a European dimension in their ideological, if not social, format. Parties
which oppose Europe are often in opposition to other aspects of the
national political systems – anti-system or protest parties – and thus
simply add Europe to the litany of complaints against the system (Taggart,
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1998). Leaving aside the anti-system or protest elements, other anti- or
indeed pro-European stances are based precisely upon the same elements
which form the foundation for domestic ideology and thus as of themselves
form no basis for a shift in party system format (Evans, 2000b).
A potential source of party system change, however, derives from
intra-party disagreements over Europe (Mair, 2000: 36). Parties which
by necessity are often broad churches aggregating different ideological
streams have been split over the European question both in terms of
working within it and reaction to it. Some parties are unified in their
opposition to Europe, and the French system contains examples of these.
Given that for three of these parties – LO/LCR on the left, and the FN
and MNR on the right – the clear anti-European stance largely mirrors
their radical anti-system role in other policy domains, we will not spend
much time on this for the reasons given above: such positions do not
generally engender party system change.1 More importantly, the French
case provides ample evidence of previously cohesive party blocs divided
by the issue and, moreover, parties split – sometimes physically – by
disagreements over the European agenda. In particular, the Communist
Party betrays an ambivalent position to Europe, as does the moderate
right. Despite their recent decline, we will devote some time to examining
the MPF and RPF which were formed from splinters from the UDF and
RPR respectively and which, when united in the past, threatened to
become a relevant force on the right.2
However, these schisms which presented themselves in particular in
1999 have apparently disappeared in the wake of the 2002 elections.
The ability of French elites to collude and to put ideological differences
to one side where it is strategic to do so applies to the European issue
as it does to the rest of the political arena (Hanley, 2002). However,
whether or not such latent divisions prove disruptive to individual parties
and to the system itself depends not just upon the ideological and
pragmatic considerations of the party elites themselves, but also upon
the institutional context of the system itself. Consequently, this chapter
will first consider the areas of divergence within parties and party blocs,
the threat they posed to cohesion and the reasons for their recent
disappearance. Second, it will consider the array of institutional factors
which have contributed to keeping the European issue latent within the
party system, and the extent to which possible changes to the institutional
structure may in future promote party system change.
Partisan and intra-partisan Euroscepticism: sources and effects
A clear indication of the divisions within blocs and parties on Europe is
to be found in elite voting on the two key expansions of the European
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remit, namely the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties (Table 10.1). The
Maastricht referendum of 1992 was the first time that pro- and anti-Eu-
ropean positions cross-cut the principal axis of competition, ‘uniting’
extreme-left and right parties in opposition, ruling factions of moder-
ate-left and right parties in support, and separating out the anti-European
factions either in separate campaigns or in separate movements. Although
held to be in part a pro- and anti-Mitterrand vote, this is the first explicit
instance of the European project bringing Jean-Pierre Chevènement and
his MdC, Philippe Séguin and Charles Pasqua with a separate ‘no’
campaign, and former PR/UDF deputy Philippe de Villiers out of the
souverainiste woodwork. Within the National Assembly, the Communists
were the only group against ratification in the majority. The three main
party groupings – PS, RPR and UDF – were all pro-European, although
in the first two a minority were against. The two former UDF adhérents
Charles Millon and Philippe de Villiers within the non-affiliated group
voted for and against respectively, as expected. Finally, the RCV group were
split about 2:1 in favour.
Here, intra-party disparities appear in a number of ways. First, the
principal left party was almost completely homogeneous – less than 3 per
cent of its members voted against – together with the centre-right party
of the UDF, a party which, despite at the time being neither in government
nor the presidential party, was even more cohesively in favour. Conversely,
TABLE 10.1 Assembly votes on amendment of Article 88–2 and ratifica-
tion of Amsterdam Treaty by parliamentary group
Assembly vote no. 149 – amendment of
article 88–2
Assembly vote no. 160 – ratification of
Amsterdam Treaty
Group (N) For Against Abst. Group (N) For Against Abst.
PS (250) 228 6 1 PS (250) 213 4  3 + 1
RPR (137) 109 19 4 RPR (138) 113 18 5
UDF (69) 63 1 UDF (70) 63 2 1
DLI* (43) 42 DLI* (43) 38 1
PCF (36) 28 1 PCF (35) 33
RCV** (33) 23 10 RCV** (35) 16 16 1
No affiliation (9) 4 2 No affiliation (5) 4 1
Source: Assemblée Nationale website (www.assemblée-nationale.fr)
Notes: Votes do not sum to parliamentary group sizes (N) due to absence.
Changes in parliamentary group sizes due to shifts in affiliation/by-elections.
Italicised PS abstention refers to Laurent Fabius, non-voting due to holding
Presidency.
* Démocratie Libérale et Indépendants
** Radicaux–Citoyens–Verts
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the right wing was split, with almost 14 per cent against the wishes of its
presidential doyen.3 It is fairly clear that such opposition would have
come from the nationalist étatiste wing of the party. Yet the party was
clearly divided, and indeed such divisions were evident in the internal
party wranglings and replacement of Séguin after his resignation from
the head of the 1999 European list and as general secretary of the party.
Of greater interest, however, is the major split in the gauche plurielle.
As has been noted, the Communists were adamant in their rejection of
Amsterdam, and there is a fundamental divide in the RCV grouping.
Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s MdC expressed dismay at the relinquishing
of economic sovereignty, and was firmly opposed to the removal of
national sovereignty in foreign and military affairs, despite the joint list
with the PS and the strongly pro-European left radicals in the 1999
European elections. More appropriate, perhaps, was his resignation from
the gauche plurielle government over issues of sovereignty, and his separate
pôle républicain candidacy for the presidency, renouncing the Europhile
intentions of the main candidates.
Given the Green Party’s campaign for a ‘no’ vote on the Amsterdam
Treaty, it is fairly clear that the Green components of the alliance also
opposed ratification.
Nous rejetons ce traité qui ne fait avancer ni la démocratie ni les droits de
l’homme, ni le progrès social, ni la défense de l’environnement en Europe,
et qui interdit pratiquement l’élargissement.4
However, they voted in favour of the earlier amendment of Articles 88–2
and 88–4 on 1 December 1998. Indeed, looking at Table 10.1, the
changes in the RCV parliamentary group are the only substantial changes
between the two votes, and these are accounted for almost entirely by
the shift by the six Green deputies. We would argue that, though the
Greens are ‘pro’ Europe inasmuch as they support the supranational
arena above those defined by national boundaries, they also betray
elements of Euroscepticism because they oppose the rules of the game
as currently defined, support of constitutional amendments permitting.
For instance, opposition to the stability pact limiting budget deficits to
3 per cent ‘privent [Les Quinze] des moyens budgétaires d’impulser une
véritable politique de l’emploi à l’échelle européenne’.5 Similarly, the
lack of democratic checks on the European Central Bank raises fears of
excessive monetarism on the part of European economic policies.
This again demonstrates the need to differentiate between bases to
Euroscepticism, and certainly this is not limited just to the Greens. In
the case of the PCF, for instance, shifting positions on Europe demonstrate
a nuancing of the party’s approach to the domain. How, then, have these
differences over Europe manifested themselves in the case of the main
parties, and to what extent have they been resolved in the recent elections?
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PCF: from anti-system to system?
Historically, the PCF provides perhaps the greatest shift in party system
role and European stance. The anti-system party par excellence since its
inception and for most of its lifetime, since 1997 it found itself well
established in a governing coalition with the Socialists, and in terms of
Europe, as Lazar notes, ‘. . . dorénavant le PCF se veut euroconstructif ’
(1999: 695) (‘. . . from now on the PCF wants to see itself as constructively
European’). For the party which opposed Europe as a capitalist construct
which opened workers to the perils of free market liberalism, such a
change has occurred in a relatively short space of time. Under Georges
Marchais, such a volte-face would have been unthinkable, yet under the
reformist Hue the inevitable march of integration, and the disappearance
of the alternative supranational agenda provided by the Workers’ Inter-
national, has – at least at the elite level – moved the PCF into a position
remarkably similar to the Greens: anti-Maastricht, as Table 10.1 shows, but
seeing in Europe an arena where egalitarian social policy can potentially
be pursued.
La promotion sans discrimination des hommes et des femmes; la démocratie
et la citoyenneté; les droits de la personne et particulièrement l’antiracisme;
le respect des équilibres naturels et le développement durable; des relations
internationales pacifiques équitables et solidaires . . . sont autant de valeurs
montantes, dans nos pays, notamment parmi les jeunes.6
Notable by its absence is an overt call for economic dirigisme. Free market
liberalism is held to be in crisis – ‘Le mythe du capitalisme triomphant
se dissipe’ – but no alternative is provided, beyond vague references to
a renewed role for the EU in international economic relationships.
Consequently, the emphasis of Bouge l’Europe! – the Communist-led
list in the 1999 European elections – on social rather than economic
factors, the famous double-parity list combining a non-Communist for
every Communist, and its particular targeting of younger, socially aware
voters brings it firmly into the moderate camp, most of these items being
no more radical than the declared aims of European Social Democratic
parties. Certain existing aspects of the EU institutions are challenged –
for instance, the Schengen Agreement is seen as pernicious, particularly
for the economically less anchored Mediterranean member states, and
thus the protection of national borders is called for in rather more
traditional Communist style – but it would be difficult to promote the
PCF agenda as any more radical than the Green agenda.
In systemic terms, then, should the PCF now been seen as avowedly
pro-European? We would answer ‘not yet’. Three factors determine this
response. First, the results of the European elections showed an essentially
stagnant result, dropping –0.12 per cent from 1994, and at the national
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level the failures in the 2002 elections have emphasised this trend. The
new Euroconstructive slant has hardly proved its worth in pulling in new
electoral pools. As Bell surmises in his consideration of the strategic
options now open to the PCF, this does not mean that it will immediately
renounce such an agenda and return to dogmatic opposition (see Chapter
2 of this volume). However, two particular electoral dynamics which
contributed to this unmoving electoral score in 1999 underline that the
PCF must make some effort to regain its hard-line, anti-European voters.
First, Dolez notes that a number of Pasqua voters of 1999 came from
Hue’s 1995 presidential electorate (1999: 665); and Lazar notes that the
PCF was beaten by its extreme Trotskyist rivals LO–LCR in many big
towns, and in former bastions, such as Seine–Saint–Denis and Pas-de-Ca-
lais, the Communist lead over the Trotskyists has been eaten into (1999:
703–4). Undoubtedly, the Pasqua voters, although few in number, are
evidence of former PCF voters disenchanted with the new soft touch on
Europe; similarly, the Trotskyist defectors are disenchanted by the aban-
doning of a hard-line agenda more generally. A similar centrifugal
dynamic pertained in the 2000 presidential elections, although clearly
Hue’s losses could not be accounted for by moves to Pasqua or de Villiers,
neither of whom stood in the elections.
Such shifts are not a surprise, and the second factor to note: in 1997,
the PCF electorate remained very strongly anti-European, with almost
60 per cent declaring that they would be relieved by the collapse of the
EU (Evans 2000b: 550). Such centrifugal electoral dynamics are occurring
at the expense of electoral support which was replaced in the 1999
elections by a number of former non-PCF voters in zones of previous
weakness (Lazar, 1999: 704).7 The success of appealing to the younger
socially aware elements was clearly undercut by Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s
stronger appeal to this pool. As such, the PCF has to decide whether to
continue to try to recruit this electorate – younger, new voters appealed
to by the other, more traditionally libertarian parties of la gauche plurielle
and even by a more socially liberal UDF – or whether to stick with the
tried and tested – older, established voters with only abstention and the
minority appeal of LO-LCR as alternatives.
Third, at the elite level there is evidence that the new pro-European
line is not yet firmly established. The clearest evidence of this was
during the Kosovan crisis when many of Bouge l’Europe!’s candidates
supported European intervention in NATO, including Geneviève
Fraisse, who held the number-two slot on the list, and Philippe Herzog
the rénovateur. The Communist Party, however, opposed it. Undoubtedly,
much of the opposition derived from US involvement and perennial
concerns of imperial hegemony. However, as part of the EU’s common
foreign policy, such opposition together with other European Communist
parties does not bode well either for Communist support of and
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participation in the European project or for future collaborations in
double parity lists.
To refer to Chapter 2 again, the position of the party’s ideology
depends very much upon the role it decides to (try and) play within the
system and consequently the extent to which it distinguishes itself from
the dominant partner. The fault lines between the MdC, the Greens and
the PS within the government demonstrated the extent to which left
homogeneity is far from being a given. Moreover, as Andersen and Evans
demonstrate in the following chapter, there is no evidence of growing
homogeneity among the left electorate either. The possibility of future
PCF antagonism can still not be ruled out. As such, the Communists
may still be potential incumbents in the anti-system camp. However, the
PS’s need for a partner on the left and the Communists’ desire to retain
the possibility of future governmental participation means that the more
‘obvious’ strategic option is to try to contribute to a rebuilt gauche plurielle
and rein in its criticisms on Europe and elsewhere, rather than return
to the extreme fold where competition is now much stronger but less
rewarding.
Pasqua – de Villiers and the MPF/RPF
Prior to de Villiers’s departure from the RPF, it would have been
impossible to conceive of the formation of this movement without the
existence of a European dimension. From de Villiers’s decampment from
the pro-Maastricht UDF in 1992 to lead his own Combat pour les Valeurs
and subsequently MPF, the internal divisions between pro- and anti-Eu-
ropean members of both the RPR and the UDF became increasingly
prominent, to the extent that the Pasqua–Séguin tandem who campaigned
for a ‘no’ vote in the Maastricht referendum of 1992, had both departed
by the European elections of June 1999, Pasqua to present a joint list
with de Villiers, Séguin simply to resign both list and party leadership.
While the intra-party splits in the UDF and RPR are themselves of
interest, and considered in the following section, the formation of an
ultra-conservative droite souverainiste manifests a separate dynamic on the
right. As Ivaldi notes in his assessment of the performance of the
Rassemblement pour la France et l’Indépendance de l’Europe (RPFIE)
in the 1999 elections (1999b: 651) the party and its electorate in the
domestic arena are undoubtedly legitimist and represent the traditional
bastions of conservative right-wing support in France. Older, male, petty
bourgeois and agriculturally based, the electorate does not differ sub-
stantially from the traditional core support of the RPR (Ivaldi, 1999b:
643). Its score of 13.1 per cent represented the dual positive effect of
the proportional electoral system combined with the importance of
charismatic heads of the national-constituency lists. However, the elections
also represented the first time since the onset of the third period of
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cohabitation that the Eurosceptic right-wing electorate was able to dem-
onstrate its discontent at the national level, the need for a homogenised
right vote in 1995 and 1997 being of perhaps a higher priority, and
indeed the issue being kept off the agenda by the mainstream parties
precisely because of its divisive nature. Undoubtedly, Séguin’s resignation
due to interference from an increasingly Europhile president and his
RPR minions sealed the mass electoral defection to the Pasqua–de Villiers
movement.
The French partisan pathology of leadership rivalry has seen de
Villiers’s subsequent departure, and Pasqua’s greater desire for cooper-
ation with the moderate right-wing neighbours may seem to indicate a
return to at least allied unity, if not a united conservative right. The
latter’s withdrawal from the presidential race, ostensibly over doubts as
to whether he could collect the requisite five hundred signatures for his
candidacy, cost the RPF dear as did de Villiers’s absence for the MPF.
The parties’ reliance upon leadership prominence and their relatively
short existence meant that the absence of both of the droite souverainiste
candidates from the presidential slate deprived them of vital campaign
exposure. Moreover, an effective separate presence in the 2002 elections
was hampered by the inability to present a national slate of candidates.
Thus, in second-order European list elections, the party can mount a
serious bid to winning seats, but at the elections which count, a return
to marginality is almost inevitable. This is not helped by the presence
of two such parties, although the ageing Pasqua must soon leave the
path open to de Villiers alone. A combination of party split, an absence
of positive leadership coverage (Charles Pasqua featuring mostly in the
‘arms to Angola’ affair), the focused nature of regional support allowing
de Villiers’s election as deputy but winning only 0.8 per cent of the
nation vote, and the omnipresent strictures of the institutional framework
have seen the two parties almost vanish from the political map in the
space of two years.
On the basis that Pasqua’s political career is effectively over, only de
Villiers can hope to re-establish his party, and, given the growing salience
of the European issue, a likely strategy would be to use this to criticise
pro-European governments either of the left or of the right. Much
depends on the fortunes of the RPF’s neighbours, the FN and the UMP.
Looking first to the extremes before considering the moderate right, the
schism in 1998 certainly provided added support for the RPFIE in the
1999 European elections. Le Pen’s success in 2002 and the relatively
small decline of the FN vote in the legislative election provides a less
auspicious context for either the MPF or RPF to pick up disenchanted
support from its right. Indeed, the lack of deputies for the FN seems
likely to consolidate protest support in this party given the ‘injustice’ of
the system which fails to allocate any seats to a party with 12 per cent
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of the vote. However, the age of Le Pen and the threat of fresh internecine
rivalry, this time between his daughter Marine and the party number
two Bruno Gollnisch, could leave the FN unable to hold onto much of
its support. In a context of anti-European support, the MPF could provide
an alternative representative. Similarly, a pro-European presidential party
could lose Eurosceptic support in the same direction.
A widening gulf between UDF and UMP?
In many ways, the split over Europe which occurred in presenting separate
lists in the 1999 elections simply highlighted one of the remaining
ideological divisions between the two moderate-right parties.8 The UDF
being more socially liberal on its CDS wing, more economically liberal
on its PR side, the RPR’s cooperation with their federal neighbour was
an example of intra-bloc strategy par excellence in the French institutional
setting. Since the mid-1980s, there has been an element of ideological
convergence of the two organisations – the PR was heartened by the
RPR’s conversion to market economics, even if it was half-hearted;
similarly, the CDS wing saw greater proximity with the same party’s
conversion to Europhilia, even if this were even less well-founded for
many Gaullists (Machin, 1989: 65).
However, the half-heartedness of such changes merely reflected divi-
sions within the UDF itself, with the eventual split of Alain Madelin’s
DL – a more successful partner for the RPR in recent times – and the
unification of the UDF into a single party after the CDS’s conversion to
FD by François Bayrou. Until this point, however, the party’s prominent
role in European matters within the moderate-right bloc had given it a
purpose which the loss of its role as presidential party for Giscard
d’Estaing had denied it. In the early years of integration, it provided
the head of the moderate-right lists in 1984, 1989 and in 1994, the first
election subsequent to the 1992 Maastricht acceleration of the European
project, and the consequent departure of de Villiers from the UDF.
Similarly, the RPR’s internal ideological splits had remained muted or
channelled via internal struggles of notables until the manifestation of
divisions over Maastricht. By the time Amsterdam and subsequently the
European elections had arrived, precisely the proximate point to the
RPR within the UDF – DL – had already split off. Even with Séguin’s
resignation, Bayrou and his party felt unable to join in a combined list,
perhaps out of a certain resentment towards the UDF’s Senate betrayal
in the RPR successfully fielding Christian Poncelet for the presidency
against their incumbent Monory, certainly against the RPR’s chaotic
response to the regional presidency debacle of 1998, but primarily over
the UDF’s demands for an EU endowed with a range of sovereign,
legitimised institutions which could not have stood the test of proximity
with the RPR’s divided views (Bréchon, 1999: 654).
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The European dimension has also played two roles in electoral com-
petition terms. First, as we have seen, it has acted to sap both principal
members of the moderate-right bloc, both parties losing support to the
RPF in 1999 (Bréchon, 1999: 659). Second, the stability of intra-bloc
voting has been challenged further, with the RPR losing its centrist
electorate to the UDF – an electorate which furthermore had shown its
affinity with the UDF in their common support of Balladur in 1995, and
regionally in its clear approval of Maastricht. With the split between the
parties entrenched in part on the European dimension, some commen-
tators saw this as a means for the UDF to challenge the Gaullist hegemony
within the moderate-right bloc (Dolez, 1999: 663). Given the unification
of RPR, DL and the bulk of the UDF into the UMP, however, such a
challenge to hegemony in the short term is untenable. But the UDF still
has an incentive to emphasise the differences between it and its hegemonic
neighbour if only to underline its right to a separate existence. Clearly,
the European dimension is one area for such delineation.
In terms of Europe, the UDF is certainly closer to its moderate-left
neighbours than to the Gaullists (Dolez, 1999: 671–2). If the UMP
continues to fail to produce a stronger line with less anti-European
sniping, this may produce one factor reallocating support from the UMP
to the UDF. Furthermore, prodigal UDF deputies who decamped to the
UMP in the elections may well find their way back to Bayrou’s party
without threatening the overall stability of the moderate-right govern-
ment. In economic terms, the departure of DL had already lessened the
divide between the UDF and the PS as well – acceptance of the market
and monetarist rigour to stay within EMU bounds are both examples of
policies espoused by both parties. The likelihood of a broaching of the
centre is minimal – Bayrou’s desire for an autonomous centre-right for
strategic reasons renders the possibility of any such alliance at the national
level impossible in the short term, and the electoral consequences of
abandoning the traditional bloc would in all likelihood be disastrous.
However, the proximity does mean that the UDF is ideally placed to
compete with the PS for centrally located voters. A PS hampered in a
gauche plurielle opposition in providing a clear line on Europe, for
example, could see a critical but governing UDF pick up pro-European
support at a later date.
As we have seen, one of the principal reasons that the European
dimension has not had a greater effect on the party system is that its
proponents have been thwarted by the institutional rules of the game.
The two-bloc majoritarian straitjacket reduces the effectiveness of alter-
native agendas as a means of attracting electoral support either to bolster
flagging scores or to encourage new formations – the principal left-right
axis of competition remains the only game in town, and the European
dimension only wins support when it mirrors the traditional axis. An
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implication of this is that changes to the institutional structure could
allow a greater saliency to the European dimension at the national level.
We turn now to the possible institutional changes in the French context
and their likely effects.
Institutional context
We would posit three institutional factors as providing the framework
determining the effect of the European dimension: the different levels
of election; the electoral system at the presidential and legislative
levels; and the presidential mandate and its recent emendation. To date,
these have ensured continuity in the party system. However, changes
in these increasingly threaten such stability.
Electoral levels and the ‘electoral accordion’
As most voters would attest, France has a bewildering array of elections,
including three at the national level – presidential, legislative and Euro-
pean – as well as a series of sub-national ballots. Many commentators
have noted that, in recent years, the party system at the sub-national
level has displaced itself from the national pattern. A number of factors
have been responsible for this: the ‘personality’ politics at the local level;
the lower stakes of a sub-national ballot; the electoral system using
proportionality rather than a majoritarian system. Perhaps the most
explicit example of this was the UDF regional presidents relying upon
FN support to retain their presidency, thus forging de facto coalitions,
if not outright alliances. Such legitimation has been fought against at
the national level not for reasons of ideology or political correctness, but
due to the increased electoral threat this poses to the moderate-right
parties. At the local level, such desperate measures by Millon et al. are
illustrative of the importance of the local power base over broader
long-term considerations for the party. The internal wranglings in the
UDF over this affair was in no small part responsible for the subsequent
break-up with DL leaving the party after a less than condemnatory
attitude towards the matter, and a more critical FD remaining within
the newly unitary UDF.9
Such disparity between party system dynamics at different electoral
levels is also present at the European level. Again on the right, the
Séguin-led Eurosceptic RPR list was anathema to the UDF’s pro-European
equivalent. As we noted in the introduction, such divergence under
Parodi’s ‘electoral accordion’ (Parodi, 1997), which expands under PR
systems to allow greater fragmentation, and contracts for the two-ballot
systems, cannot go without certain osmosis between the levels. Parties
which compete at other levels must find it increasingly difficult to reconcile
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differences they have emphasised to form alliances later on. The first
ballot allows a certain level of fragmentation, but at the second, can
competing parties which have previously differentiated themselves cred-
ibly support their difficult neighbours, or from another perspective, safely
rely upon their support? The resolution of conflict between UDF and
RPR derived not from any ideological shifts but by the simple expedient
of a massive electoral imbalance in 2002.
In the past, ‘better them than the other side’ has been a powerful
logic. Yet, under the apparent convergence which all European systems
are undergoing, ‘the other side’ no longer constitutes the Communist or
reactionary threat that it once did. In a system increasingly enmeshed
with the European level, can parties which oppose each other vehemently
on the nature of this arena forge unconvincing alliances, when, to their
opposite side, a party with greater consonance on these and other matters
is present? This logic is especially important for the UDF sans DL and
the PS. Rocard’s openings to the CDS may have failed in the early 1990s,
but the mere fact of trying demonstrates its potential. When institutional
incentives change, new dynamics can appear from parties who dare –
and both the first-order electoral system and the bipolar presidential
logic seem set to change in the future.
Post two-ballot majoritarianism?
While ever the two-ballot majoritarian system pertains for both legislative
and presidential elections, the overriding logic will be for competing
parties to try to form blocs, which, although riddled with internal divisions
and personality rivalries, can at least command 50 per cent +1 at the
second round. While triangular ballots have become more common,
the two-candidate run-off for legislatives is still by far the norm, and for
presidentials the rule. To this extent, many authors have been right to
characterise the party system as being sustained in its traditional format.
However, we believe that the existing tensions highlighted above are at
least as important in demonstrating the potentially fragile state of the
party system which in the late 1990s seemed only supported by its
institutional structure. The 2002 outcome may have reduced fragmenta-
tion and re-emphasised the logic of bipolar alternation, but the plethora
of presidential and legislative candidates and the radical stances of many
of these cannot be ignored. Under different electoral rules, their influence
can become more difficult to contain.
Threats to presidential power come from the quinquennat (see below).
The main threat to the legislative elections comes from the left, where
the Greens among others are pushing for a level of proportionality to
be introduced into the electoral system. As Villalba and Vieillard have
shown in Chapter 4 of this volume, Green factions such as Autrement
les Verts and Ecologie et Démocratie have been highly critical of the
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national leadership for not pressuring the Socialists for electoral reform
by 2002. Granted, such electoral reform was unlikely in the very short
term under the Socialists and seems similarly unlikely under the UMP,
despite declarations to the contrary. In terms of promoting democracy,
the right has followed the left’s lead in putting decentralisation at the
top of the agenda.
However, in any reconstruction of the gauche plurielle, one of the key
elements which the Greens will undoubtedly push for, if they are to join
in a new common programme, will precisely be electoral reform to
include a dose of proportionality in the legislative elections. If this
occurred, the rebalancing of seats among the parties would give greater
influence within the policy-making arena to precisely those parties which
take a Eurosceptic line but which at the moment are marginalised or
absent from the legislature.
Presidential shifts
The third aspect to be considered – and, despite being an actuality, still
an unknown quantity – is the shortening of the presidential mandate to
five years. Again, we would emphasise that this amendment alone will
not inexorably lead to a change in the party system. Indeed, many of
the arguments in favour of the quinquennat imply precisely the opposite.
Following Olivier Duhamel’s arguments,10 for example, the shortening
of the mandate will reinforce presidential efficacy by making cohabitation
less likely and thus providing concurrent five-year terms for president
and presidential party alike. The relevant factor to note here is the effect
that the quinquennat will have on the reserved presidential domain. In
terms of Europe, the arena – as opposed to the issues – has remained
to date very much within the presidential domain first, and then under
governmental remit where a president feels fit. Granted, under cohabi-
tation, prime ministers have attempted to impose themselves on the
European stage, Lionel Jospin perhaps enjoying the greatest success in
international relations more generally, but the reserved domain and the
independent mandate have ensured that the president’s primacy has not
been challenged. If Duhamel is correct, and the ‘president + government’
governing team is held accountable once every five years, then it is
difficult to see how the former can prolong the pretence of his/her role
as the neutral arbiter above party politics.
If this is the case, then the president’s current unique role in foreign
affairs must be questionable. Whatever Duhamel’s constitutionalist argu-
ments for the greater accountability of the president, it cannot follow
that the president will be able to withdraw from the domestic arena in
the way that Mitterrand managed, and thus the two domains will be
inevitably brought closer. It takes little insight to see that with the ever
closer European arena mentioned above, these domains will be even
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more closely linked. With ‘foreign’ affairs increasingly impinging on
domestic affairs, the separation of domains will become increasingly
untenable and unwanted. As such, presidential candidates within parties
will have less opportunity to use these latter as their electoral support
groups at one moment, and then ostracise them the next, any more than
a prime minister is able to do this in a parliamentary system.
For the moment, Chirac’s honeymoon period is allowing him to
manipulate domestic policy, and fairly explicitly – the name of the new
right-wing party emphasises that the governmental majority is a presiden-
tial one, as if this needed emphasising. However, the longer-term
implications of such a tightening of the two branches of the executive
must demand a revisiting of the head-of-state role which itself demands
a veneer of neutrality. Whether the republican electorate which renewed
Chirac’s lease on the Elysée for another five years will support such
political domination of foreign affairs remains to be seen.
Conclusion
The elements of continuity in the French party system, to which we will
return shortly in the conclusion to this book, are deceptively powerful.
In the 1999 European elections, the fragmenting forces at work on the
right and the intra-coalition bickering on the left seemed to place the
system on the edge of a fundamental crisis. Granted, not all of these
divisions were based upon the European issue, but this issue did seem
to be increasingly dividing a governing and opposition elite both from
extremist elements and from factions within the mainstream itself. More-
over, a majority of votes in the presidential first round were won by
Eurosceptic candidates. By 2002, such divisions seem to have returned
to obscurity almost entirely. But the elements mentioned above emphasise
that the latent support for Eurosceptic feeling against the predominance
of pro-European incumbents remains and that, in the correct context, it
can reveal itself as a powerful force within the French system.
Though we can at best speculate as to the future changes in the
institutional context, the presidential quinquennat is one aspect which must
inevitably change the executive relations with Europe and thus may well
affect presidential candidate – party relations and by extension the party
system. If nothing else, an unpopular president trying to assert the
monopoly of a European role characteristic of the septennat may precisely
find vituperative Eurosceptic opposition decrying the railroading of France
into ever deeper integration. However, it seems likely that some toilettage
institutionnel will take place (Le Gall, 2002: 43) and to the extent that
many of the fundamental changes to date have responded to the European
arena, so it is likely that future changes will follow the same pattern.
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Indeed, this gives a clue to the steadfast inability of the European
‘issue’ to assert itself in party competition and within the national party
system. The nature of Europe as an arena means that its effects are seen
more through the processing of other issues in terms of policies, treaty
ratification and the like than as a separate issue by itself. Despite
increasingly encroaching upon the national arena, the saliency of Europe
can be seen more in its effect on the traditional elements rather than
in the introduction of a new element per se. In terms of the party system,
then, the parties are increasingly functioning within an arena defined by
Europe, rather than competing in a system on the issue of Europe. Only
when adjustments to this arena are made, for instance in terms of the
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, does Europe become an issue in
the common sense of the word. However, the examples we have given
in this chapter demonstrate that, when such an issue does raise its head,
the latent oppositions within and between parties on this question are
sufficiently entrenched to provide for potential change. That such change
to date has not occurred illustrates the strong currents of continuity
within the system itself rather than the irrelevance of Europe.
Notes
1 For an account of FN opposition to Europe, see Benoît (1997, Ch. 2), Evans
(2000b).
2 Saint-Josse’s Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions is another party of the right
which has limited first-order electoral support, despite winning 6.8 per cent
of the vote at the 1999 European elections (all European election figures in
this chapter are taken from the special feature on the European elections
in ECPR News, autumn 1999). As an effectively irrelevant party at the national
level, we will not spend any time on it. Similarly, the decline in the MdC
of Jean-Pierre Chevènement has effectively ended this group’s influence in
the system.
3 Interestingly, Philippe Séguin, one of the principal antagonists in the 1999
right-bloc split, voted ‘yes’ to the Amsterdam Treaty.
4 Les Verts, communiqué de presse, 2 January 1998; ‘We reject this treaty which
makes no advances in democracy, in the rights of man, in social progress
or in the defence of the environment in Europe, and which effectively rules
out expression’.
5 Les Verts, communiqué de presse, 17 June 1997; ‘deprives the fifteen member
states of the budgetary instruments required to drive an effective employment
policy at the European level’.
6 ‘Appel commun pour une nouvelle voie de la construction européenne’,
European Communist Parties, June 1999. Taken from PCF website
(www.pcf.fr/europe/une.html); ‘The promotion of men and women without
discrimination; democracy and citizenship, the rights of an individual, and
particularly anti-racism; the respect of nature’s balance and sustainable
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development; peaceful and fair international relations based on solidarity . . .
these are the kind of values which today are spreading across the country,
particularly among its young people’.
7 Indeed Lazar notes that these dynamics are also affecting the PS in some
areas (1999: 705).
8 As Knapp and Sauger note, perhaps organisational differences between the
two parties are one of the fundamental reasons for separation of the com-
ponents, militating against the desire for a single moderate-right actor among
many of its electorate (Sauger, Chapter 7, this volume, Knapp, 1999: 117
and Chapter 8, this volume).
9 See Sauger, in Chapter 7, this volume on this point.
10 Taken from the PS website (http://www.parti-socialiste.fr).
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Introduction
The emphasis of the book thus far has been on individual parties
and coalitions. Nonetheless, the demand side of the equation also pro-
vides an important context to party success because it helps define
the political space in which parties must compete for voters. In this
chapter, then, we focus on French political space over the last fifteen
years as defined by the socio-demographic and attitudinal profiles
of the voters. We build upon findings from the two major studies of
French voters in the last ten years, namely L’électeur français en ques-
tions (Boy and Mayer, 1990) 1 and L’électeur a ses raisons (Boy and Mayer,
1997).
The first of these studies was based upon SOFRES data from the 1988
presidential post-election survey and depicted the French electorate as
occupying a bidimensional space defined by economic liberalism – state
intervention versus laissez-faire – and cultural liberalism – libertarian
versus authoritarian – axes. The latter used the 1995 presidential survey
to update the analysis and presented a new model of political space at the
electoral level – a tripartition into left, moderate-right and extreme-right
political blocs – representing a radical departure from the traditional
quadrille bipolaire, and exploding the bidimensional account into a series
of cultural subdimensions. Employing these two datasets, together with
the CEVIPOF legislative post-election survey from 1997 to update the
analysis, we consider changes in the social and attitudinal determinants
of political space since 1988. Our analysis takes into account the two
principal partisan developments during this period – the growth and
implantation of the FN and the more recent establishment of the gauche
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plurielle governing coalition – to assess the extent to which change took
place during this period.
Traditional political space in France
Until recently, most research has found the left–right political spectrum
and its underlying social bases to provide an enduring and simple map
of political space in France. The French political landscape had been
firmly implanted along the dual cleavages of social class and religion
since the nineteenth century, producing strong left–right polarisation. In
keeping with the general pattern found in predominantly Catholic coun-
tries, left voting had traditionally been broader than just the working-class,
encompassing a secular and often overtly anti-clerical component com-
posed of public sector employees and educators. Thus, the French left
had always played host to a middle-class voter with a socially liberal value
system focused upon individual equality and enlightened rationalism, as
well as to the lower-class voter concerned more with economic equality
and state-controlled protectionism.
For its part, the right bloc had traditionally been dominated by the
Catholic conservative middle class composed of the traditional petty
bourgeoisie (i.e., farmers, craftsmen, traders, owners of small businesses),
professionals, and the upper salariat. Supporters of the right bloc could
be further divided into those who were economically liberal and socially
conservative, and those who were economically liberal but less socially
conservative. The former characterised the petty bourgeoisie who shunned
leftist collectivism and upheld the Catholic conservative value-system that
promoted hierarchy and order (Mayer, 1983). The petty bourgeoisie also
favoured economically liberal policies that provided tax incentives for
small businesses and prevent excessive market regulation. Professionals
and the upper salariat constituted the other group, typically being more
socially liberal and owing as much to the liberal tradition characteristic
of Northern Europe as to any Catholic doctrine.
Few challenged this basic designation of the French political landscape
along social and religious cleavages. Sometimes mediated by the institu-
tional framework or anti-system cleavages – for instance the pragmatic
alliance of the centre characteristic of the Third and Fourth Republics
or the anti-Gaullist cleavage of the early Fifth Republic – the left–right
dichotomy and its economic and cultural subdimensions truly emerged
as the effective predictor of voting choice by the 1980s (Capdevielle et
al., 1981, Bartolini 1984). Nuances of patrimoine and religious practice
and the recently more complicated class structure aside, even the basic
working class and Catholic labels remained largely synonymous with left
and right bloc belonging respectively.
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Although the extent of its predictive power has somewhat declined in
recent years, left-right ideology still remains of paramount importance.
The post-industrial shifts in the 1970s and 1980s which threatened the
status quo with radical re/dealignment has in fact settled into a more
nuanced but structurally similar competitive framework.2 Even new issues,
such as post-materialism, have easily been absorbed in France as elsewhere
into the bidimensional economic and cultural liberalism foundations to
left–right orientation (Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990, Grunberg and
Schweisguth, 1993, Knutsen, 1995). Moreover, parties mobilising around
these issues, such as the Greens, have been integrated into the principal
left–right axis of competition.
As Ivaldi has already alluded to, in recent years the extreme right of
Jean-Marie Le Pen and the FN has posed a challenge to the effective-
ness of this traditional map. Although conventionally seen as the radical
wing of the right bloc, a number of elements to the FN’s electoral and
ideological profile do not conform to the traditional left–right map
(Perrineau, 1997: 208–26, Mayer, 1999: 214–22). In particular, recent
shifts in economic policy and the presence of a large number of
working-class voters in the extreme-right electorate have suggested
that the party no longer sits comfortably on the margins of the right.3
Some have seen this as simply the manifestation of a protest movement
with a pragmatic, reactive approach to economic policy or a populist
party drawing support from all parts of the political spectrum. Gérard
Grunberg and Etienne Schweisguth’s influential analysis of public
opinion in 1995 in L’électeur a ses raisons, however, suggests that a
combination of shifts in the social bases of extreme-right support and
significant changes in the electorate’s values has resulted in the FN
separating from the moderate right and consequently becoming a pol-
itical orientation sui generis – the so-called tripartition of political
space into left, moderate-right and extreme-right blocs (Grunberg and
Schweisguth, 1997).
An implication of the tripartition thesis is that the left does not merit
a similar separation into extreme and moderate blocs. At first glance,
this bears out when we examine the second shift in the party landscape,
namely the appearance of the gauche plurielle. Paradoxically, this change
seems to have consolidated the left side of the spectrum to an extent
not seen before under the Fifth Republic. Such convergence suggests
that an emphasis on pluralism of views being brought into the governing
fold may be matched by a convergence of mass attitudes to an extent to
allow this, in contrast with the fortunes of past left alliances. Put another
way, a cohesive plural left cannot afford to be too plural at either mass
or elite levels. We turn to look at this aspect now, before considering
the tripartition hypothesis in more detail.
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The consolidation of the gauche plurielle
As Hanley’s chapter has shown (Chapter 5, this volume), left-wing parties
have always engaged in various kinds of within-bloc alliance, although
until the 1990s, these have proved for the most part fragile and short-lived.
The Rocard minority government’s equally doomed overtures to the
centre CDS in 1988 fell prey to the inescapable logic of the bipolar blocs
of left and right which the Fifth Republic’s institutional and electoral
framework had established. Conversely, the gauche plurielle has been much
more stable than many commentators had foreseen, bringing together
a PCF which had previously helped bring down the first PS-dominated
government, a vocal Green Party previously unrepresented in govern-
ment and a fiercely Jacobin MdC with an Interior Minister, Jean-Pierre
Chevènement, who had resigned from the previous left government over
the Gulf War.4
As Hanley suggests, this stability has been based firstly on the weakness
of the PS and the need for its elites to compromise; and second, upon
its minor partners’ need of the coalition in order to enter government.
The emphasis here is clearly on elite pragmatism. What has not yet been
analysed is the extent to which it is matched by, if not predicated upon,
a growing convergence within the left-wing electorate. The Greens of
the Waechterian period placed great emphasis on the salience of Green
issues, and eschewed the mainstream policy alternatives which threatened
to render them a party comme les autres. Such isolated electoral success
has not been matched, but the integrated ‘realistic’ Green strategy
epitomised by Dominique Voynet has come close, and better still has
brought the Greens into the incumbent fold. If for the Green vote
the environment retains primacy in issues terms, mainstream left-wing
economic and social considerations have also risen in importance.
Similarly, the reactionary idealism that returned the PCF to the wil-
derness in the mid-1980s has been replaced by a more pragmatic ‘liberal’
programme capable of attracting and accepting a half non-communist
and grudgingly pro-European list in the European elections of 1999, the
edicts of democratic centralism a thing of the past. Furthermore, its
electoral results may be a long way below those of its anti-system heyday,
but the terminal collapse predicted since the Eastern bloc cataclysm of
1989/90 and reiterated on a regular basis since had failed to materialise
by 1997 (although came a step closer after the 2002 results). Given the
presence of the gauche de gauche LO and just as importantly the plethora
of non-electoral social movements highlighted by Wolfreys in Chapter 6,
less entrenched sections of the PCF electorate displeased with the ideo-
logical bent of Hue’s party could certainly find alternative vote receptacles
or modes of political action.
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Many commentators have emphasised that the party grouping of the
left is solely pragmatic. They argue that it merely represents a declining
PS shoring up its electoral success in 1997 with Green, PCF and MdC
supporters. In return, these parties used the opportunity as a ticket out
of the electoral wilderness without relinquishing their old identities.5
Similarly, Villalba and Vieillard-Coffre have underlined in Chapter 4 of
this volume that the factions vying for power and the presidential
candidacy within the Greens have disagreed over the extent to which
the PS had betrayed the former’s demands made as a condition of their
governmental support. We know of no analysis concentrating on the
ideological consistency of the core electorates supporting this alliance,
however. Data from 1988–97 are important because they can indicate
whether the electorates were in the process of converging before the
1997 governing coalition. These data can also give hints to what extent
the compromises of five years in government were challenged in the
2002 elections because of a priori dissatisfaction with ideological incom-
patibility. Future data on the 2002 elections will be crucial in determining
whether the period of the gauche plurielle’s first incumbency resulted in
convergence of the respective parties’ voters. However, given the results
of the 2002 legislative elections, it must be said that, if any convergence
did occur after 1997, it had absolutely no cohesive effect on the left.
Thus, in looking at the success of the left bloc, we will explore whether
there was a homogenisation of its electorate in attitudinal terms. This
homogenisation, then, should reflect growing cultural liberalisation of
the French electorate (Schweisguth, 2000) and the declining impact of the
previously explosive topic of economic management. As a mirror image
to this process, however, the second major partisan development of
relevance to this analysis has been seen as fragmenting rather than
uniting the right bloc.
Tripartition and the fragmentation of the right
The tripartition argument implies that the extreme right now possesses
a basis for long-term stable identification. In other words, the social and
ideological characteristics of its electorate should be quite distinct from
the two traditional political blocs. This would, of course, give less credence
to the protest and populist arguments since it implies that the basis of
FN support is not solely due to socially segmented interests or the
popularity of its leader.
The rise of the anti-system FN during the 1980s did not initially
challenge the stability of left–right politics because it was perceived to
be in proximity to its moderate-right neighbours, at least during its early
years. Its early espousal of neo-liberal economic doctrine, together with
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an authoritarian moral and overtly anti-immigrant line placed it firmly
in the right bloc. Yet by 1995, the FN’s traditional petty bourgeois
Catholic support had been increasingly matched by working-class and
secular voters with economically more interventionist views more char-
acteristic of the left-wing parties from which many had come. Thus,
Charlot’s ‘double electorate’ of 1988 had become implanted (Charlot,
1988: 30), apparently unified only in their socially conservative and
ethnocentric views, but also, in keeping with the extreme-right trends
across Europe, manifesting decreasing levels of education and being
drawn increasingly from younger cohorts (Betz, 2001). In social terms
too, then, the extreme-right voter decreasingly resembled his older, more
educated moderate-right counterpart.
For Grunberg and Schweisguth, the change in profile of extreme-right
voters reflected a reorientation of ideological concerns on the extreme
right, and in particular a decline in importance of economic liberalism
and the fragmenting of attitudes pertaining to the previously unidimen-
sional cultural liberalism scale. In the case of economic liberalism, the
decline in state intervention as a policy option and indeed its failure
under the Socialists during the 1980s has led the left to move away from
its previous position of protectionism and engage in its own privatisations
(Grunberg and Schweisguth, 1997: 148). Paradoxically, the FN has moved
towards the left, abandoning radical neo-liberalism and adopting a more
mixed protectionist policy offering national preference in response to
the demands of its disenchanted working-class voters who precisely wish
to benefit from some element of economic and social protectionism.
Moreover, the moderate right cannot be said to promote unfettered
neo-liberal economic policies during this period either.6
In contrast to the convergence of bloc supporters in terms of economic
attitudes, Grunberg and Schweisguth posit a more striking evolution in
cultural liberalism. Although historically conceived of as a single ideo-
logical dimension, they argue that 1988 saw it explode into a number
of independent subdimensions. In particular, they argue that by 1995
issues related to homosexuality, the death penalty and immigration could
no longer be used to map French parties along a single cultural liberalism
scale. They argue that cultural liberalism should now seen as two separate
fundamental value sets: progressive–traditional and socially egalitarian–
hierarchical elements. The latter of these they also refer to as the
universalist–anti-universalist dimension (1997: 164). The former is closely
linked to religiosity, being the ideological manifestation of the secular–
Catholic conflict over attitudes on moral matters, such as homosexuality
and abortion. While the extreme right had manifested a strong element
of moral authority in 1988, by 1995 these issues had become the domain
of the moderate-right identifiers, whereas attitudes to social authority
and law and order, as well as differentiation and rejection of out-groups
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had intensified on the part of the extreme right. In the same way that
the moral elements were characterised by high levels of religiosity, so
the authoritarian and ethnocentric elements forming the anti-universalist
belief system were characterised by low levels of education (1997: 168).
Thus, if Grunberg and Schweisguth are correct, a younger, more
secular, less educated group of anti-universalist extreme-right voters
should now be separated from the older, religious, educated traditionalists
of the moderate right. This profile matches the modernisation loser or
populist models of extreme-right support (Betz, 1994, Minkenberg, 1998).
Grunberg and Schweisguth lay particular emphasis on the separation of
political blocs, the extreme-right bloc in their formulation being in many
ways as close to their left-wing counterparts as to the moderate right, at
least in social structural terms. The key difference lies in the ideology,
however, which as we have noted has moved in the opposite direction
from the general trend in the French population towards greater cultural
liberalism.
Expanding Grunberg and Schweisguth’s analysis
Grunberg and Schweisguth base their findings on the SOFRES presiden-
tial surveys, using presidential vote to define political space. Such a
measure of political space can be problematic because it does not take
into account the various important pragmatic or non-ideological con-
siderations which may motivate a voter’s presidential choice – credibility,
personality effects, economic considerations, protest, inter alia. Instead,
party proximity or party identification are more suitable measures of
political space because they imply a longer term psychological attachment
more appropriate for defining political bloc identification. In addition
the inclusion of the 1997 data, which were not available when Grunberg
and Schweisguth carried out their analysis, means that the only constant
variable in voting terms is that of identification – all legislative voting in
the presidential surveys is recalled at two years’ distance. We thus use
the identification measure as our dependent variable, rather than
presidential vote.7
To look at the shifts in political space, rather than the individual
ideologies of party electorates, we group the parties into the three relevant
blocs for the analysis. Mean scores and distributions of the socio-demo-
graphic indicators and attitudinal data will indicate the relative distance
between the three blocs – of importance to the definition of the dimensions
in political space. As concerns the homogeneity of the left bloc, standard
deviations of the attitudinal items will indicate the trends in this across
time. Bloc allocation of the parties is given below (Table 11.1).
As independent variables, we look first at the social indicators of bloc
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belonging – age, gender, education, class and religion – and then look
at the bloc positions on economic liberalism dimension, as manifested
by a question on respondents’ attitudes to privatisation; cultural liberalism,
using support for or rejection of re-establishing the death penalty; and
ethnocentrism, using a question on respondents’ views on the number
of immigrants in France being excessive. Lastly, because of its importance
in the tripartition argument, we include the 1988 and 1995 data for
homosexuality, the item unfortunately being missing in 1997.
Including 1997 in the analysis is important both because it provides
a longer time period over which to assess trends and also for a number
of contextual reasons. First, party actors remained stable from 1995, and
the principal shift in voting alignment occurred between moderate left
and moderate right, together with the reintegration of abstainers and
generational turnover favouring the left. Indeed, the extreme right
consolidated its position, with the FN winning just below what Le Pen
received in the 1995 elections – 15 per cent as compared with 15.5 per
cent. This was the first time that the legislative score had so closely
approached the presidential equivalent. Furthermore, in 1997 the number
of extreme-right identifiers jumped to 7 per cent, from less than 5 per
cent as the previous ceiling (Mayer, 1999: 191). Given this appearance
of the FN and the extreme right as a growing focus for identification,
it seems crucial to assess the political bloc hypothesis in 1997 as well as
in 1995. In particular, does the extreme-right group of identifiers manifest
greater social and ideological specificity than before?
Our principal aims are two-fold: to establish whether the FN should
now be separated from its moderate-right counterparts in a separate
TABLE 11.1 Allocation of party proximity response to blocs
Left Moderate right Extreme right
1988 Extreme left
PCF
PS
Left-Radicals
Ecology parties
UDF
RPR
FN
1995 Extreme left
PCF
PS
Left-Radicals
‘Ecology Generation’
Greens
UDF
RPR
MPF
FN
1997 Extreme left
PCF
PS
UDF
RPR
MPF
FN
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electoral bloc; and, second, to establish the extent to which the left-wing
electorate has become more homogenous, in particular in ideological
terms. More generally, we wish to assess the stability of support for the
three alleged major political blocs – the moderate right, the left and the
extreme right (essentially the FN) – in order to discern whether there
have been any trends in social realignment during the 1988 to 1997
period.
Analysis
We start with Table 11.2, which displays the demographic profile of the
three major political blocs as determined by a survey question measuring
party proximity. Here we can see clear differences in the socio-demo-
graphic profiles of the three major groups. A couple of general
observations can be made from this table. First, the profile of extreme-
right identifiers is quite different from the profiles of moderate-right
identifiers, but quite similar to the profile of left identifiers. Second,
there has been very little change in the relationship between demo-
graphics and party proximity over time. We discuss these observations
in more detail below.
TABLE 11.2 Demographic profiles (per cent) of party proximity groups in
France (1988–97)
Left bloc Moderate-right bloc Extreme-right (FN)
1988 1995 1997 1988 1995 1997 1988 1995 1997
Men 47.6 49.5 48.6 49.3 45.2 47.0 60.5 56.3 55.3
Less than 30 years old 28.2 23.8 21.0 17.6 21.0 20.0 32.2 39.3 26.7
Practising Catholics 21.2 16.2 20.6 49.1 43.4 45.5 26.5 18.0 22.0
University degree 15.1 24.8 21.0 18.2 23.8 23.7 11.8 15.8 7.3
Social class
 Managers and
  professionals
20.5 22.3 27.7 22.6 21.1 32.9 17.1 13.7 18.9
 Self-employed 10.1 8.2 9.0 24.5 21.8 21.5 16.4 10.4 13.6
 Routine non-manual 30.3 21.7 29.1 26.3 19.8 22.9 24.3 26.8 25.0
 Working class 39.1 47.8 34.2 26.7 37.2 22.7 42.1 49.2 42.4
Unemployed 9.8 15.8 6.5 9.7 14.8 3.8 7.9 16.4 6.7
We shall begin by discussing how the moderate-right profile differs
from the profile from the other groups. Most importantly, we notice that
moderate-right voters are generally older, more likely to be practising
Catholics, have university degrees and be self-employed. The age dif-
ferences are not surprising given that parties under the left bloc and the
extreme-right bloc have clearly more radical policies. This concurs with
Contemporary developments in political space  179
previous research on voting and attitudes in western societies that shows
young people are generally more likely to favour radical ideologies
because they have less invested in the status quo.8
A similar explanation can be given for the overrepresentation of
Catholics in the moderate-right bloc – i.e., since religious people are
more likely to be socially conservative, they are also more likely to support
the status quo and moderate parties. Differences in education and occu-
pation can be explained by considering voters as rational actors who
choose parties that best reflect their economic interests. This is especially
true with respect to the fact that self-employed and educated people
generally have much to gain from a well-functioning capitalist economy,
something the moderate-right parties uphold more than others – looking
at Table 11.2, it equally applies to managers and professionals, two other
groups served well by capitalist structures.
We now turn to an examination of the uniqueness of extreme-right
support. Perhaps the most striking observation, albeit well documented
in the literature, is the manner in which its gender profile stands out.
Here we notice that the extreme right has clearly been far more attractive
to men than women while both of the other blocs have slightly higher
representation from women than men. Equally striking is the convergence
of the party electorates across time: although men are still more strongly
represented than women on the extreme right in 1997, the ratio has
gradually moved towards parity since 1988. The opposite trend produces
a similar effect in the moderate blocs. More at odds with ‘accepted
wisdom’, however, is the finding that being unemployed is seemingly
unrelated to party proximity and that this relationship changed little
over time. Of course the marginal proportions of unemployed shifted
across time, but the relative inter-group proportions remained fairly
constant. Simply put, unemployed individuals are as likely to identify
with the left or moderate right as the extreme right, ceteris paribus.
It is clear from Table 11.2 that the extreme-right and left groups find
similarities in their attracting younger, less religious, working-class ident-
ifiers than the moderate right. This finding suggests that social divisions
in the contemporary French electorate no longer can be divided neatly
into the traditional bidimensional secular–working class and Catholic–
middle-class blocs. To what extent is there evidence of similar
restructuring along ideological lines? Our analysis will now try to answer
this question.
To assess changes in the cultural liberalism foundations of the bloc
affiliations we can explore the relationships between party proximity and
three types of issues: (a) authoritarian issues; (b) ethnocentric issues; and
(c) sexual issues. Authoritarian issues are tapped by asking respondents
whether they thought the death penalty should be reintroduced. This
item was measured using a four-point scale with high scores representing
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attitudes against reintroduction of the death penalty. Ethnocentric issues
are tapped by a question asking how respondents felt about immigration.
Low scores indicate that the respondent felt that there are too many
immigrants in France while high values on this question represent
disagreement with this statement. As we mentioned earlier, we only have
data available for the homosexuality question pertaining to 1988 and
FIGURE 11.1 Mean scores (standard deviations in parentheses) for attitudes
in favour of immigration by party bloc
FIGURE 11.2 Mean scores (standard deviations in parentheses) for attitudes
not in favour of the death penalty by party bloc
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1995. The question in this case is coded so that high values represent
attitudes against homosexuality.
The average scores (and standard deviations in parentheses) for the
immigration and death penalty questions are shown in Figures 11.1 and
11.2. The most important point from these figures is that the profile of
FN supporters is clearly on the extreme right of the political spectrum
in all three years. On average, FN identifiers are far more likely to feel
FIGURE 11.3 Mean scores (standard deviations in parentheses) for attitudes
against homosexuality by party bloc
FIGURE 11.4 Mean scores (standard deviations in parentheses) for attitudes
against privatisation by party bloc
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that there are too many immigrants in France and to desire a reintro-
duction of the death penalty than those who identify with the other two
blocs. Concomitantly, left identifiers are far less likely to favour a rein-
troduction of the death penalty and far more likely to favour immigration
than identifiers of the other blocs. With both of these issues the moderate
right sits neatly between the FN and the left-bloc parties. Crucially, taking
the score of 2.5 as the political centre, the moderate-right party consist-
ently falls to the right of centre in all six cases. In other words, the
moderate right resembles the extreme right in terms of direction but
not in intensity. In this sense, the two blocs are not distinct.
We now turn to Figure 11.3, which charts attitudes toward homo-
sexuality of the electorate for each of the major political blocs. Recall
that high mean scores represent negative attitudes towards homosexuality.
Looking at the trend between these, and expecting to see a drop in
tolerance on the moderate right not matched by the extreme right, the
prediction does not bear out. Very simply, the two parties move almost
in parallel towards a slightly more tolerant stance.9 Regarding this issue,
the moderate and extreme right both seem to be following the national
trend towards liberalisation on such matters in 1995.
We now explore attitudes towards the economy. As stated earlier,
Grunberg and Schweisguth argue that the FN could no longer be
accommodated within the traditional left-right spectrum with regards to
economic issues from 1995. Each of the surveys we use contained a
question regarding attitudes toward privatisation which allow us to easily
assess this argument. Figure 11.4 plots average responses to this question,
with high scores indicating negative attitudes toward privatisation and
low scores indicating positive scores toward privatisation, for each of the
major political blocs. As Grunberg and Schweisguth suggest, we find that
with respect to this issue, the FN’s supporters are clearly in the centre
between identifiers of the left and moderate-right bloc.
When examining the standard deviations of economic positions, how-
ever, we see that there was considerably more variation in mean scores
for the extreme-right electorate than for the left and moderate-right
electorates. Breaking down the figures by occupation, as in Table 11.3,
it is evident that the lower social strata, represented by the blue-collar
and routine non-manual occupations, are much less favourable towards
privatisation than the managerial and the self-employed categories. The
former strata are closer to the left bloc in their views, the latter to the
right. Again, the benefits derived from free market capitalism determine
the views of the individuals towards privatisation, and it would be unwise
to see the electorate as having a single line on the subject.10
These findings for the right are again suggestive that political space
in France is more than one dimensional – i.e., the left–right bloc does
not neatly divide parties along a single dimension. Contrary to Grunberg
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and Schweisguth’s argument, this pattern is stable through the course of
the years we examine. This, of course, indicates that if there was a critical
change in ideological space, it occurred before 1988 rather than in 1995.
Moreover, the social profile of the FN is not distinctive, suggesting that
there is not a clear basis for defining it as a distinct political bloc.11 There
seems no ideological reason not to regard the FN as still on the radical
wing of the right bloc in toto. Ultimately, the ideological disparities
between moderate-right and extreme-right blocs are all a matter of
intensity rather than direction.
Lastly, we return to the hypothesis of mass ideological convergence in
the left bloc prior to the gauche plurielle incumbency. Simply, we find no
support for this hypothesis. In all cases, the standard deviations remain
constant, even in the cases where the position shifts across time.12 On
cultural issues such as the death penalty and immigration, there is a shift
between 1988 and 1997 towards a more liberal stance. Still, there is no
evidence whatsoever of a mass convergence within the left bloc. Only
with regards to homosexuality are opinions converging towards a more
liberal position, but this shift is smaller than that of the right-wing
electorate. Furthermore, in comparison with the two right blocs, there
is greater disparity on the death penalty and immigration issues – to this
extent, the evidence is that the left merits subdivision into more than
one bloc as much as the right. Such figures demonstrate that the
coalition-building was indeed based upon elite pragmatism, rather than
any convergence of left-wing views.
Of course, it remains to be seen from the 2002 data whether or not
the experience of cooperation has an effect at the mass level. As we have
already noted, however, the electoral campaign and electoral results
suggest that this was not the case. Granted, many of the problems with
the left were associated with the campaign and its ‘intended’ candidate
at the presidential ballottage, Lionel Jospin. However, the intense frag-
mentation on the left in the presidential first round and the almost entire
inability of the gauche plurielle to field candidates under the hastily
contrived gauche unie banner are clear indications that policy, as well as
personality, were at stake.
TABLE 11.3 Average attitudes toward privatisation for extreme-right
identifiers, by year and social class (standard deviations in parentheses)
1988 1995 1997
Managers/professionals 2.00 (0.76) 2.04 (1.08) 2.04 (0.88)
Self-employed 2.17 (1.04) 2.13 (1.01) 2.06 (0.99)
Routine non-manual 2.42 (0.84) 2.43 (1.07) 2.69 (1.10)
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Conclusion
Overall, the key feature of French political space between 1988 and 1997
is its stability. While there are some trends in social and ideological
profiles, these are subtle and do not indicate any major reconfiguration
of the French electorate’s views. In many ways, the left and the right
blocs present interesting contrasts in this respect. The right, for so long
fragmented by personality clashes, shows surprising evidence of homo-
geneity, even including the extreme right. The left, a coherent governing
bloc between 1997 and 2002 because of elite compromise, shows no sign
of ideological homogeneity, either empirically from its electorate’s views
in 1997 or speculatively from the 2002 election results. Moreover,
those parties and candidates on the left trying to move the debate
away from the traditional axis of competition, notably the MdC and
Jean-Pierre Chevènement discussing the PRep, and the Greens pushing
the environmental issues, both suffered in the legislative tally. To this
extent, then, the left–right spectrum remains as valid as ever in French
political life.
Most tellingly, perhaps, the ‘nuisance effect’ predicted to be devastating
for the right in these elections 13 turned out to be entirely redundant,
despite Le Pen’s earlier success in the presidential elections. Where the
37 triangulaires occurred, the FN experienced considerable losses as
compared with the first round, undoubtedly because of a solid cohesive
moderate right. The FN only made significant gains in straight two-can-
didate run-offs against the left, profiting from a proportion of
moderate-right support. In other words, under both scenarios, the success
of the extreme right is principally conditioned by the strength of the
moderate right. The separate bloc winning support from both moderate
blocs simply does not match reality in 2002.
Indeed, the separation of moderate and extreme right as political blocs
per se was already somewhat at odds with the experiences of the right
over the past five years. First, the moderate right had itself experienced
a level of fragmentation unprecedented under the Fifth Republic. While
the basis to this has to a large extent been personality rather ideological
politics at work, ideological differences are nonetheless present. As Evans
has shown in his chapter on the European dimension (Chapter 10, this
volume), some members of the UDF and of the former RPR are poles
apart in their vision of France in the EU, even if there economic and
cultural attitudes are close. The way the UDF can exploit this specificity
in the new legislature will undoubtedly determine its survival over the
next few years.
Similarly, one of the key issues in intra-UDF and UDF–RPR relations
in the late 1990s – the regional council presidency support from the FN
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for the UDF – demonstrated diverse attitudes to relations with the
extreme-right party. These feelings and conflicts were mutual – as Ivaldi
has noted, one of the major sticking points between Mégret and Le Pen
was precisely whether or not the FN should open to their moderate
neighbours. These are all political divisions, undoubtedly, but again along
the principal left–right axis, the ideologies remain similar in their direc-
tion, the socio-economic specificity of the two groups is blurred, and thus
the ‘third bloc’ status of the FN/MNR and their presidential candidates
is weak.
In conclusion, it is perhaps unsurprising to note that between 1988
and 1997, mass attitudes have changed little. After all, nine years does
not represent a period sufficiently long to expect generational turnover
in attitudes. However, it is clear that there has been no major sea-change
in the French electorate’s desires, either. Where political changes have
occurred, it has been due to changes in political supply, either in shape
or in quality. Indeed, it is quite revealing that the French electorate want
pretty much what they wanted over a decade ago. However, from the
continued alternation every election, a rise in protest voting and in
abstention, they are simply still not getting what they want. That the
left–right logic remains the principal axis of competition illustrates two
things. First, the modern conceit that globalisation, Europe, post-industrial
society and the rest are fundamentally altering the shape of politics does
not find sustenance in political competition: as Cole states, these issues
are undoubtedly muddying the ideological waters, but behind this the
main ideological affiliations remain (see Chapter 1, this volume).
Second, and connected to this, the conceit that modern societies have
solved the old conflicts that used to structure politics is also wrong. In
an election campaign where the main differences between left and right
parties appeared on issues of taxation and according to traditional
left–right lines, the ‘modern’ issues have become a given for all parties
rather than a new political cleavage and thus largely irrelevant in France’s
first-order elections. The search for something truly New in political
competition continues.
Notes
The authors are indebted to the Banque de Données Socio-Politiques, Grenoble,
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survey datasets and to CREST (Centre for Research into Elections and Social
Trends) for providing funding for part of the research.
1 For ease of accessibility for readers, we refer throughout the text to the
excellent translated version published by the University of Michigan Press
(Boy and Mayer, 1993).
186  System context
2 On theories and interpretations of the post-industrial transformation, see in
particular Dalton et al. (1984), Franklin et al. (1992).
3 On economic shifts on the extreme right, see Bastow (1997). On working-class
voters moving to the extreme right, see Evans (2000a).
4 And indeed resigned once again, this time over the Corsican question.
5 Szarka is particularly vehement on this point, emphasising that ‘the gauche
plurielle represented an attempt to stabilise a crumbling electoral base, rather
than a realignment of the French left’ (1999: 35).
6 As Sauger recounts in this book, by 1999 DL had separated itself from the
centre-right UDF, concerning itself with promoting the free market ethos
(see Chapter 7).
7 Many observers have argued that party proximity/identification is traditionally
weak in France (Converse and Dupeux, 1962, Percheron, 1977) but we concur
with more recent literature suggesting that it has become sufficiently nor-
malised in recent years (Converse and Pierce, 1986, Haegel, 1993).
8 On this, see for instance Inglehart (1990).
9 In fact, in a more robust testing of the tripartition hypothesis, the independent
effect of the homosexuality issue on presidential voting and party proximity
turned out to be stronger in distinguishing moderate right from extreme
right in 1988 than in 1995. This element to the tripartition hypothesis would
have been more suited to the earlier election, then – see Andersen and
Evans (2003).
10 It is worthwhile acknowledging that the central position of the lower strata
would be interpreted according to directional voting theory as ambivalence
or indifference to the issue – see, e.g., Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989),
Merrill and Grofman (1999). Given blue-collar and lower white-collar defec-
tion to the FN and Le Pen through disillusionment with the moderate parties’
competing but equally failing economic policies, such a lack of salience for
this item would be unsurprising. In short, blue-collar and lower white-collar
groups are not voting for the extreme right on the basis of economics.
11 We examine the theoretical role of socio-structural elements in political bloc
definition in greater detail elsewhere (Andersen and Evans, 2003).
12 In the bloc codings, we realise that we have included two actors – the extreme
left and GE – in the left bloc which are not included in the gauche plurielle
government. The standard deviations remained almost identical when they
were excluded from the left bloc, and so we have not excluded them for a
separate analysis.
13 Le Monde, 2 February 2002.
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Looking at the French party system in 2002 in the wake of the presidential
and legislative elections, it is perhaps initially tempting to see abrupt
change everywhere. An apparently successful left-wing government is
overturned, all its partners losing almost half their National Assembly
seats or more. A fractured moderate right, led – if one can use that word
– by a president weighed down by corruption scandals and coming out
of a largely inactive incumbency, wins almost 70 per cent of the seats in
the Assembly, and the vast majority of those under a single-party label.
For the fringes of the system, the changes seem almost more abrupt
than even for the mainstream. The extreme left, so visible in the
presidential elections and so vital in the left’s second-round absence,
disappears from view once more with no seats, as does its extreme-right
opposite numbers whose combined score in the presidential elections
accounted for one in five French voters. In a system renowned for its
larger-than-life political figures, the names of Jean-Pierre Chevènement,
Dominique Voynet, Martine Aubry, Charles Pasqua, Philippe Séguin and
others have all been eclipsed during the last legislative term or by the
elections themselves.
Yet, because of the primacy of the presidential race and the peculiarity
of its first round – an unprecedented disarray of candidates and a ballottage
unsurpassed by even the 1969 election – focus has been too tightly drawn
onto the éléments de rupture so beloved of French political commentators,
and has largely ignored the éléments de continuité which are in fact far
more characteristic of a system which coasts blithely on from election to
election, ignoring the howls for constitutional reform and fundamental
rebuilding which have greeted some aspect of every result since 1959.
In drawing this book to a close, we wish to try to discern more exactly
what represents continuity and what represents change. To do this, we
turn first to some basic summary statistics which are commonly used to
look at party system dynamics – the effective number of parties; individual
and total volatility – in order to locate the 2002 party system at the end
of a trend starting in 1978, the quadrille bipolaire benchmark year. Such
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statistics by their very nature simplify depictions of reality, but this makes
them an ideal means of identifying trends across time in a system if they
are used cautiously. We will then turn to consider the implications of
these figures for the parties, and what they reveal about the likely
prospects for the French party system in coming years.
As expected, an empirical perspective to the trends in the party system
clarifies the level of continuity which the system is experiencing. Figure
C. 1 shows the index for the effective number of parties and presidential
candidates for elections since 1978 (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 79).2
The presidential elections show a definite trend towards greater frag-
mentation, with the major increase between 1995 and 2002, explained
by the parties’ need to field presidential candidates to ensure campaign
prominence prior to the legislatives, as well as a product of the lack of
decidability between the two main candidates. However, the legislative
elections show what we might refer to as trendless fluctuation. The
implantation of the quadrille bipolaire between 1978 and 1981 is followed
by a rise in fragmentation in 1986 due to the appearance of the FN,
and another surge in 1993 with the increase in FN and Green support.
The two following elections remain stable, with a decline in the effective
number of parties in 2002 due to the birth of the dominant UMP. The
Source: Banque de Données Socio-Politiques, Grenoble, electoral archive 1
FIGURE C.1 Effective number of parties and presidential candidates in
France (1978–2002)
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major comparison to be made between presidential and legislative trends
is clear: until 2002, the effective number of parties and candidates never
differed by more than one unit, but the fragmentation of the 2002
elections was totally at odds with the party system format.
If we look at Figure C. 2, which disaggregates the presidential and
legislative scores into left and right blocs, the ‘fault’ for the excessive
fragmentation in the presidential elections clearly lies with the left.
Granted, the right sees a steady increase in the effective number of
candidates between 1981 and 2002. However, given its reputation for
personality-riven politics, the increase from 3.3 in 1988 to 4.3 in 2002
is an effective increase of only one candidate. The losses in the 1980s
and 1990s were clearly unrelated to an excess of supply in the right bloc.
The left on the other hand blossoms from 2.5 candidates to 4.8 in 2002,
almost doubling the effective number of candidates. In other words, the
number of candidates standing increased, and the distribution of the
vote was more equitable.
This is quite at odds with the legislative pattern. The left bloc remains
relatively stable in terms of party numbers, with the exception of 1993,
again due to the surge in Green support. The fragmentation of the right
is far more prominent, with the FN’s presence from 1986 pushing the
FIGURE C.2 Effective number of parties and presidential candidates on
the left and right in France (1978–2002)
Source: Banque de Données Socio-Politiques, Grenoble, electoral archive
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quadrille bipolaire more towards a five-party format. But the pattern is
clear – when the right finds itself relatively close to the left in terms of
fragmentation, it wins. The obvious exception here is 1986, when the
proportional representation system meant that level of fragmentation
was largely irrelevant. In 2002, in particular, the offer from the UMP
that could not be refused by the other right-wing parties gave the right
bloc a cohesion which, together with the added value of a presidential
success, an ultimately failed extreme right and a divided left, secured its
landslide success. The right has thus returned to a two-party bloc, the
UMP and the two ‘half-parties’ of the UDF and the FN, plus assorted
stragglers.
However, it is very noticeable that the left cannot be described as
irrevocably split. Indeed it is at its lowest level of fragmentation for three
elections, back to its 1978 levels. The problem for the left is the domi-
nation of a Socialist Party that cannot find that all-important partner to
ensure control of its own electoral space while encroaching on the centre
to win the floating voters from the right. The volatility figures between
1997 and 2002 next to the actual results tell the story all too clearly
(Table C.1).
TABLE C.1 2002 legislative election results (first round) and change
(1997–2002)
2002 vote Change (1997–2002)
Extreme left 2.80 0.23
Communists 4.90 –5.05
Socialists/radicals 25.71 0.05
Republican Pole/other left 2.27 0.09
Ecologist (Greens + others) 5.33 –1.19
UDF–RPR/UMP 38.16 8.16
Other right 5.34 0.66
FN/MNR/other ex. right 12.55 –2.68
Others 2.94 –0.17
Total 100.00
Total volatility 9.14
Source: Banque de Données Socio-Politiques, Grenoble, electoral archive
In net terms, it appears that the new UMP won most of its support
from extreme-right and Communist defections – an unlikely scenario in
the latter case. What is more likely is that the Communist losses moved
largely to the Socialists, who themselves lost centrally located voters more
attracted by the cohesive presidential UMP than by the presidentially
failed, fractionalised left and perhaps anxious to avoid another period
of cohabitation.3 But in net terms, the Socialists lost almost no support
whatsoever. What caused the left to lose by such a margin was the
centripetal competitive dynamic away from the extreme left partner
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PCF on the left, from the extreme-right FN and MNR to the UMP, and
crucially across the centre in the key area of inter-bloc competition. In
these terms, a system which six months earlier had looked fragmented
and which during the presidential elections had seen extremist candidates
pick up a significant share of the vote, is once more displaying dynamics
almost synonymous with moderate pluralism as defined by Sartori (1976)
– medium fragmentation, centripetal competitive dynamics and an un-
occupied central ideological space whose voters win and lose elections.
Lastly, in empirical terms, the total level of volatility is the lowest since
the 1973–78 electoral period, and indeed one of the lowest in the history
of the Fifth Republic (Figure C.3).4
The 1988 election stands out as the outlier in an otherwise relatively
smooth trend in volatility. The 1986–88 right-wing government clearly
made little difference to the electorate in terms of their choice – no
wholesale defection to the right, no grateful return to the left, and hence
the minority government of the left until 1993 when wholesale defection
did occur. However, in the following two elections, volatility has declined
despite the change in government in each case. In aggregate terms, at
least, the French electorate is stabilising.
Given the findings of Andersen and Evans in Chapter 11 of this
volume regarding the electorate’s stability in attitudinal terms, this is of
little surprise. If post-war research into the role of policy preferences
and vote has agreed on anything, it is that when underlying preferences
remain stable, one would not expect high levels of voting change ceteris
FIGURE C.3 Total volatility in French legislative elections (1978–2002)
Source: Siaroff (2000: 42–3), Banque de Données Socio-Politiques, Grenoble, electoral archive
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paribus.5 This is not to say that changes do not occur, but that if they
are significantly common, one evidently needs to look to other sources
of change. In the case of the Communist Party in 2002, for instance,
the five-point drop in support was partially a result of the perceived
failure of the party as an influential governmental partner, as an effective
representative and certainly, given Robert Hue’s individual result, as the
presidential party of the extreme left. Where this support goes is key.
In the case of the 2002 elections, it is clear that some support moved
to the Socialists, smaller proportions to the extreme left and some was
lost to generational turnover among an ageing electorate – and crucially
some to abstention.
For it is clear that political parties, despite predictions of their wide-
spread demise because of policy inadequacies, corruption, failing
mass-elite linkage and so on, still have potential electorates in society –
all voting patterns and survey data support this. What parties are finding
increasingly difficult to do in France, as in other countries, is to mobilise
these potential electorates so that they become actual. Party behaviour
and the electorate’s reaction to this over the last twenty years demonstrate
this very effectively. First, abstention is rising. Arguments over whether
this is due to increasing apathy among comfortable voters or increasing
disenchantment among a political and social underclass both have validity,
but the proximity in social and attitudinal profiles between abstainers and
the FN electorate, with the key exception of xenophobic and authoritarian
attitudes, suggests that the former has greater resonance.6
Second, party behaviour has repeatedly played into the hands of
abstention as well as losing the all important centre floating voters which
allow the other bloc to win. In 1988, as we have mentioned, the left’s
‘victory’ was a race with no winner, and suffered from a lack of mobilisation
accordingly. In 1993, the Socialist Party’s virtual admittance of defeat
before the election, epitomised by Michel Rocard’s ill-timed call for a
complete overhaul of the party a couple of weeks prior to the first ballot
– the infamous ‘big bang’ – added dispirited abstention among some
supporters to defection to the right by others. In 1997, it was the right’s
turn to demobilise its voters both with a cynical early call for elections
and an unresponsive Gaullist Party fielding an arrogant and unpopular
government. Lastly, in 2002 Socialist protestations that the presidential
disaster should convince left-wing supporters of the need to turn out
had no visible effect whatsoever, even if the PS vote did remain stable:
despite a respectable first term in office, many gauche plurielle voters
simply failed to play their part in pressing for a second.
Third, on the rare occasion that French parties do get their act together,
the results are usually beneficial. The combined RPR–UDF lists of 1986
would have won an even greater victory had a majoritarian electoral
system been in place. In 1997, the cohesion of the gauche plurielle at least
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in terms of candidates provided a newly humble alternative to the disasters
of four years previously that could capitalise on the right’s unpopularity.
Similarly in 2002, the UMP behind the newly incumbent president
presented the possibility of an effective and unified moderate right which
for so long had been riven by personality disputes and subsequent party
fragmentation. As both Sauger and Knapp have emphasised in their
respective chapters in this volume, organisational differences have played
a role in obstructing right unity (see Chapters 7 and 8). But as many
parties have learned to their cost, such esoteric disputes are of no interest
to an electorate. The only party that clearly understands this is the FN:
given that its split was predicted to destroy the extreme right, Le Pen
and his cohorts’ exorcising of the mégretistes and their return to ‘politics
as normal’ as far as possible proved to work in terms of electoral support,
even if the possible Mégret bridge to the moderate right had been lost.7
Perhaps the Green elites’ replacement of Lipietz with Mamère might be
seen in a similar light.
The attempt by the Socialists to salvage some cohesion on the left by
promoting the notion – although unfulfilled – of gauche unie candidates
in 2002 suggests that both the left and the right are relearning the
underlying dynamics of the Fifth Republic institutional framework. There
is a common misconception in much of the literature that party system
typologies and classifications somehow inexorably set the dynamics and
strategies that parties will undertake in a certain system type or class. In
reality, where schemas identify such dynamics, they simply indicate which
dynamics are prevalent in a certain type or class and consequently which
strategies may be regarded as appropriate to exploiting these. There is
nothing to say that parties can or will engage in these strategies, either
due to imperfect information or due to external factors which prevent
them from doing so.
The early years of any regime are largely regarded as forming a
learning curve for the parties within, and the Fifth Republic was no
exception (Bartolini, 1984). As a number of the contributors to this
volume have mentioned, the convergence on the quadrille bipolaire, the
ideal type of moderate pluralist competition in the Republic’s institutional
framework, occurred principally through the balancing of the right-wing
parties, the nationalisation of the Socialist Party and the centripetal shift
of the Communists. Similarly, as the effective number of parties and
volatility figures show, both elite and mass levels stabilised. Yet any
notion of inexorable system dynamics pulling the parties towards this
bipolar bloc arrangement are quickly dispelled by the late 1980s and
early 1990s which, as we have seen, manifested higher volatility levels
and, more importantly from a systemic perspective, growing fragmen-
tation. This can partly be ascribed to the entry of new relevant actors,
particularly the Greens and the FN. However, new parties do not
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necessarily mean new poles – there is no reason a priori that Green
parties or extreme-right parties cannot be integrated into existing blocs.
What has prevented this in the French case has been splits within
parties over such a possibility – the Greens hovering on the border of
integration and autonomy, the FN excluded by some of the moderate
right but not others, and itself split over rapprochement with the Gaullists
and UDF.
Ideological divergences are most often cited as the reason for such
separation, but as the chapters in this book have made clear, the extent
of such divergence is largely an exaggeration by elites wanting to retain
their specificity in a competitive arena. For smaller parties, merger means
oblivion; for larger parties, promoting one’s uniqueness remains an elite’s
prerogative in the fight for leadership. Yet, the experiences of both left
and right from the mid-1980s onwards have shown that such stances are
not only vacuous, they are often damaging in electoral terms, and no
more so than in 2002. The left’s conceit that somehow its eight presidential
candidates all had something different to offer provided no small em-
barrassment when this ‘diversity’ led to its absence from the second
round. Moreover, to criticise Jacques Chirac for only winning 19 per
cent of the vote and yet still win rather misses the point: Jacques Chirac
has remained remarkably stable in his vote between 1981 and 2002,
always winning between 18.0 per cent and 20.7 per cent of the vote
(albeit this time as the incumbent). It is the other candidates who have
collapsed.
So the parties have learned that it does make sense to follow the
system’s dynamics and cohere even when personalities, organisations and
ideologies are not necessarily conducive to this. The UMP provides the
hegemonic party of the right that the UNR and its successors provided
in the 1960s. The Socialists have realised that the gauche plurielle may
have saved them from the arrogance of the 1980s but in its format to
date it concomitantly promotes fragmentation which does their electoral
chances no favours in the face of a cohesive right. In future, it needs to
secure similar predominance on the left and try to ensure that the
multifaceted candidatures or lack of electoral agreements do not sink it.
But as Hanley predicts, the single party of the left – a left-wing UMP –
is far from likely, given the continued rivalries and political persuasions
that constitute this bloc. Whether an alliance or a single entity would be
more attractive to the left electorate is unclear.
But to what extent can we expect the parties to act upon such learning
where the consequences are more evident? As Knapp points out, at the
time of writing DL had still not dissolved itself as promised and the UDF
has no intention ever to do so. Whether the UMP proves a stable
replacement for its Gaullist, DL and dissident UDF predecessors will
only be shown by its founding Congress and the success of the Raffarin
196  The French party system
government in its first incumbency. With the notable addition of the
prime ministerial seat, the distribution of ministerial positions has been
as equitable as in previous right-wing governments, and to this extent
the smaller partners have little to complain about. Whether this is the
case after the end of the honeymoon period, cabinet reshuffles and
the usual round of petulant resignations remains to be seen. However,
it is perhaps naïvely optimistic to think that the personality politics which
have riven French parties since the Third Republic are likely to disappear
as of 2002.
The key test for the right in this respect will be the future selection of
Jacques Chirac’s successor. Assuming that Chirac does not run for a third
term, commentators have already lined up Alain Juppé as the dauphin,
no doubt because Chirac himself sees his former prime minister and
Bordeaux Mayor in this light. Whether the rest of the Gaullists, UMP
and the electorate regard him as such is very much another matter. For
a candidate whose lack of charisma and perceived arrogance was in no
small part responsible for his government’s 1997 defeat, the position of
right-wing présidentiable looks less than assured. The likes of Nicolas
Sarkozy and Philippe Douste-Blazy are unlikely to sit back and allow
Juppé to inherit the presidential mantle by default. Memories of the 1974
election and the worthy but dull Jacques Chaban-Delmas’ trouncing by
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing after a young Jacques Chirac’s betrayal inevitably
spring to mind.
The left’s predicament is more immediate. Despite the certain knowl-
edge that a greater show of unity might have given them a chance of
the victory in both 2002 elections, the shape that such unity should now
take is unclear. The Socialists’ vote remained stable in aggregate and
thus its dominance is assured. The question is, who will it dominate?
The PS does not have an obvious partner for a governing coalition
alternative. In terms of votes, the previous gauche plurielle partners may
only be 6.5 per cent behind the new right incumbents, but to win back
this support requires offering something more persuasive than simply
‘more of the same – but with weakened Greens and Communists’. The
old partnership needs to be revitalised to win back centre voters and to
remobilise many of those who abstained in 2002.
An obvious solution for revitalisation would be a strong présidentiable
able to gather the remnants of the gauche plurielle as well as inspire
electoral support. Looking at the left, however, who that candidate might
be is not obvious. Some of the more charismatic left-wing leaders have
been on the margins – Jean-Pierre Chevènement and Dominique Voynet,
for example – and their political careers are currently in decline. Laurent
Fabius and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, younger members of the old guard,
are lacking in cross-party and electoral appeal and have both been
damaged by scandal investigations, despite neither being convicted. Lastly
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the likes of François Hollande, the Socialist General Secretary, and
Martine Aubry, the mayor of Lille lack the charisma necessary for a
successful presidential candidate.
But the left also faces an external threat from its extreme flank. Arlette
Laguiller, Olivier Besancenot et al. may not have repeated their presiden-
tial success at the legislative elections, but they have less of a need to
do so. Unlike the mainstream parties, the extreme left’s success has come
as much from the direct-action approach to politics highlighted by
Wolfreys as through the ballot box (see Chapter 6, this volume). Increas-
ingly, social movements in France are taking up the issues and complaints
of the left-wing electorates in a way that political parties used to, but
apparently no longer can. The risk for the left is that, as the electorate
increasingly turns to such movements for issue-representation and focuses
its limited political interest on these groups, the motivation to turn out
for the parties of the left decreases. Granted, in the face of a hard-line
right-wing government, such voters might turn out rationally in order
to prevent the incumbency of a party or coalition which they perceive
as pernicious. But the evidence to date is that such voters decreasingly
perceive governing parties in such a light, rather the opposite – they do
not see sufficient distinction between them. In which case, why bother
voting?
That demobilisation is more a curse of the left than the right is
understandable. The increasingly dominant new middle class and its
traditional counterpart are less likely to belong to strata dislocated from
politics and society, and conversely are more likely to feel that they have
something to lose specifically from a left-wing government. The left will
probably benefit more in the long term if the right engages in a confident
hardline programme of business-friendly, growth-oriented policies, rather
than a middle-of-the-road, socially oriented approach. Which path the
right will take is currently unclear. On the one hand, the reaction to the
questions of law and order and security has seen Minister of the Interior
Sarkozy touring French gendarmeries promising increased funding. Simi-
larly, this traditionally authoritarian right-wing approach has been
matched by the initiation of income tax cuts, particularly for higher-in-
come brackets, as promised by Chirac in his presidential manifesto.
However, Raffarin himself is seen as a moderate whose appointment
coincided with Chirac’s wish to present an inclusive face to his ‘republican’
second-round electorate. Epitomising these two tendencies have been the
economically liberal economic minister Francis Mer’s clashes with the
socially inclined social security minister, François Fillon.8 Which approach
wins the upper hand as the incumbency progresses will have major
implications for how the left chooses to oppose the government – ‘we
can do social liberalism better than they can’ or ‘hard right policies are
wrong’.
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In many ways, the system and political context resemble the late 1960s
in France, the right strongly implanted in the presidency and government,
the left about to embark upon a long period of reconstruction to allow
it into power over a decade later. Commentators have predicted that the
Socialists will need a long period in opposition to be able to consolidate
their strength and move back into a position to challenge the right.9
Undoubtedly any future coalitions will be fraught by the same ideological
and logistical differences which hampered the programme commun for so
long and cost the left an earlier victory than it eventually won. Whether
the cycle back to left power takes as long as predicted is a moot point
– after all, the 1993 raz-marée proved remarkably curtailed in its after
effects. That the process is cyclical is less in doubt. As the past twenty
years have proved, the institutional framework of the Fifth Republic
promotes alternation, and there is only one alternative to the right. Short
of major constitutional reform, which was promised during the elections
but which has now slipped down the agenda, such political cycles are
destined to continue – and those parties and alternative dimensions such
as Europe which currently find themselves marginalised are unlikely to
find any greater saliency in future.
Overall, the French party system has displayed a number of changes
since the 1990s, but these should be seen as principally conjunctural
changes taking place within a relatively stable structural framework.
Parties have fragmented against the competitive logic of the system and
have caused the defeat of governments in elections. However, such shifts
against the prevailing dynamics of the system have almost inevitably been
revealed as negative in terms of electoral strategy, and the parties have
reacted accordingly, albeit sometimes slowly. Where they have done so
with less success, extreme parties and abstention have been the sole
beneficiaries. Such continuity does not disguise the fact that the system
has become host to parties which find it increasingly difficult to mobilise,
let alone inspire, their electorates. An increasing tendency to ignore party
politics has itself caused changes within the system. However, the elec-
torate is still there to be mobilised. Parties which show the capacity to
adapt win an electoral premium which is normally sufficiently large to
ensure victory. The challenge to French parties in the twenty-first century
is thus to ensure that the system does not become an elite desert where
the players scrabble for ever diminishing pools of voters. Parties are
secure as the means of staffing government, simply because there is no
viable alternative. In this respect, the notion of a crisis of parties is
exaggerated. But whether such recruitment is for a mass-oriented rep-
resentative government based on a social majority or a distant oligarchic
institution based on a political minority depends largely on parties’ focus
and performance in years to come.
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Notes
1 All figures and tables in this chapter include only the 555 metropolitan
constituencies due to data availability.
2 The effective number of parties or candidates is calculated as the inverse of
the sum of individual party votes squared. For example, in a party system
with four parties, two large (40 per cent of the vote each) and two small (10
per cent each), the index would be 1/(.40 2 + .40 2 + .10 2 + .10 2) = 1/.34
= 2.94. In a system with four equally sized parties (25 per cent of the vote
each) the index would be 4.00. Thus this index takes into account both the
number of parties and the distribution of the vote between them to illustrate
the fractionalisation of the party system.
3 This is supported by a more detailed analysis of volatility at the constituency
level (Abrial et al., 2002).
4 It should be noted that volatility can also be calculated without grouping
parties which have split or amalgamated. For instance, we could have
calculated volatility including the UMP as a separate party, rather than an
amalgamation. In this case, volatility would have been much higher. However,
this would have made no real intuitive sense.
5 This was one of the key underlying assumptions of Philip Converse’s ‘normal
vote’, the distribution of latent party preferences among the electorate
(Converse, 1966).
6 For an analysis of this, see Andersen and Evans (2003).
7 Jean Marie Le Pen is keen to play down the possible succession battle between
Marine Le Pen and Bruno Gollnisch, his second-in-command.
8 Le Monde, 23 July 2002.
9 In conversation with a member of Le Figaro’s political department, the author
was told that the Socialists were now condemned to opposition for at least
twenty years. Allowing for rhetorical hyperbole, the implication is clear.
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